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ABSTRACT
MARXISTS IN THE NIGERIAN LABOUR MOVEMENT:
A CASE STUDY IN THE FAILURE OF IDEOLOGY
by Robert Melson
Submitted to the Department of Political Science on
16 January 1967 in partial fulfillment of the re-
quirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
This thesis is concerned with ideological prediction
and verification. Prediction is taken to mean, the deriva-
tion of a set of propositions about the future from an im-
plicit or explicit set of assumptions. Verification is
taken to mean the matching of the prediction to events. It
is suggested that political development varies with social
learning which in turn depends upon prediction and verifica-
tion. A fruitful approach to the study of political devel-
opment, therefore, may lie in studying how political actors
predict the future and verify their predictions.
A case study of these processes became possible when
Marxists in the Nigerian labour movement, colloquially known
as the "Youths," launched a labour party after the general
strike of June 1964, and tried to contest in the Federal
election of December 1964. The strike was an event from
which Marxists made inferences about the nature of Nigerian
politics, and from which they imputed motives to the
strikers. The launching of the labour party was an attempt
to act on the predictions derived from the strike. The per-
formance of the labour party in the Federal elections, and
the Youths' explanation for it constituted the verification
of the predictions.
The case study showed that although the Youths cor-
rectly assessed the workers' motive for striking, they
falsely.predicted the workers' commitment to a labour party.
The Youths made wrong predictions because their conceptual
system was overly simple and because they were receiving
invalid information from the workers. The conceptual sys-
tem falsely assumed a one-to-one relationship between
motives and actions, while information failed to reflect
the fact that workers were cross-pressured and willing to
support rival parties. *
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Political Learning and Political Development
Implicit in a theory of political development, as
opposed to a theory of social change in general., is the
understanding that development means change with respect
to a goal. One can say development takes place, if changes
facilitate approach to the goal. One can speak of the
failure to develop, if changes are taking place, yet the
goal is not approached.. A goal can be approached in
either of two ways; by a random process, or by a process
of learning, that is, of trial-error-adjustment-trial,1
Let us not concern ourselves here with random processes
and the attainment of goals by unintended consequences.
Rather, let us consider the processes of learning and in
particular, political learning.
Political learning can be divided into three sub-
processes: prediction, action, and verification. By pre-
diction, I mean the derivation of a set of propositions
1This perspective on political development is similar
to that of Karl Deutch. See his The Nerves of Government
(New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 254-255. It should
be noted that we are using the terms "goal" and "develop-
ment" in terms of the actor and not of the observer. What
may be "development" for the actor may be retrogression for
the observer, and conversly.
2about the future from an implicit or explicit set of assump-
tions, If the assumptions are explicit, I shall call the
prediction "ideological," keeping in mind that by ideology
is meant something akin to political theory. By action in
this context, I mean goal oriented behavior, and by verifi-
cation, I mean the matching of the prediction to events
taking place in the real world. If the matching is close,
one can speak of having verified the prediction and attained
the goal. When the matching is not close, that is, when
predictions fail, then verification is most important and
determines whether social learning has taken place.
When predictions fail, politicians are challenged to
account for the failure and perhaps review certain postulates
or axioms of their ideology. Following this review, social
learning and therefore, in part, political development have
taken place if, in the subsequent attempt at prediction and
action, these processes have more closely approximated the
stated goals of development. But these considerations still
beg the following question: If development is dependent
on social learning which, in turn, is dependent on predic-
tion and verification, what are prediction and verification
dependent upon? In order to deal with this question, we
need to study some concrete cases of political prediction
and verification. This thesis concerns itself with one such
case.
1Assuming, of course, that other non-ideological
factors have remained unchanged.
3The Case Study
On August 15, 1964, two months after a general strike
and four and one-half months before a federal election, a
group of Marxists in the Nigerian labour movement, collo-
quially called the "Youths," launched the "Nigerian Labour
Party." Having waited for a demonstration of labour unrest
for over fourteen years, the Youths found great significance
in the strike and in the fact that it closely preceded the
election. In the strike they saw the end of their long and
painful powerlessness; and in the election, the opportunity
to begin recouping the political losses of fourteen years.
Their plan was to support a number of candidates
across the nation, and especially Michael Imoudu, president
of the Nigerian Labour Party, in his bid for election from
the Lagos North constituency. Because they were a new party
and poor, the Youths did not expect tQ win national power.
However, being Marxists, the Youths had faith in the future
of their cause. If they could win in Lagos, they said,
they would ultimately win in the country, because, writ
small, Lagos was the Nigeria of the future. It so happened
that, in the Federal elections, the Nigerian Labour Party
failed, leaving the Youths to account for a false predic-
tion.
lAt one time, the Youths had been of some importance
in the early nationalist movement, but with the eclipse of
the Zikists, the Youths became irrelevant to Nigerian poli-
tics from the early nineteen fifties until the general
strike of 1964. (See Chapter II below.)
4The elements of the case study relate to the larger
problem in the following manner: the Youths, as political
theorists, apply Marxism, their ideology, to the events of
the strike, in order to make predictions about the outcome
of the coming elections. The launching of a labour party,
together with the explanation the Youths give after the
election, is their way of acting and verifying their ideol-
ogy. The timing of the strike, so close before the Federal
electiQn, provides an excellent opportunity to study the
process of ideological prediction and verification in a
developing country.
In this study of the Youths, I am concerned with why
the Youths failed to predict the fate of their party more
accurately and how they rationalized their failure after
the election. If their predictions were wrong simply be-
cause they had a bad theory, one could dismiss them as
another crank group, like those predicting the end of the
world. At best, one could study them as a special case in
the history of Marxism. But predictions are true or false,
not only as a function of whether theories are good or
bad, but also according to how the theories are applied to
the real world. This, in turn, depends on the information
the theorists have and their skill in matching their
theories to what they perceive.
For example, let us consider the possibility that
the Youths predicted inaccurately because they were getting
5false information about the nature of their support. If
only the Youths receive such false information about Niger-
ian politics, then, once more, they could be dismissed as
of only marginal interest. If, however, the misinformation
the Youths received from their supporters is symptomatic
of defects in information linking other actors to the polity,
this would be a fact of considerable importance about
Nigeria. Although we mention this point in passing only,
it is possible that, given the present stage of Nigerian
development, no politician gets accurate information about
the Nigerian polity.
This possibility raises some questions for scholars
interested in the theory of political development. If
politicians lack reliable information, they can neither bar-
gain nor plan. Ignorant of their support, they cannot know
with what resources they confront their adversaries. With-
out valid information, politicians can build neither the
"good" nor the "bad" society and politics is left to the
forces of unintended consequences.
In so generalizing about the difficulties of the
Youths in predicting the fate of the Labour Party, I raise
what may be a fundamental theoretical problem about the
application of beliefs or ideology to politics: the problem
of ideological prediction and verification. Having briefly
1 For a brief but lucid review of such theories, see
Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston and
Toronto: Little, Brown, 1966), pp. 31-49.
6introduced the problems and the case study with which this
thesis will be concerned, I turn to a discussion of ideology
and in particular, to aspects of ideological prediction and
verification.
Ideology
For students of this or that "ism," an ideology is a
static entity, but in real life, this is not so. In reality,
what happens is not ideology, but "ideologizing," a process,
a way of applying theories to politics. More precisely,
as will be shown below, it is a way of applying theories
to information about politics. In these pages, I shall say
something about this process and the men involved in it,
using examples, not only from politics, but from science
and the scientific method as well.
As a starting point, an ideology, like all belief
systems, combines a cognitive model of reality with state-
ments of value and feeling, Let us begin our discussion
of the application of ideology to politics with the cogni-
tive model. A useful way of discussing the application of
this model to politics is in terms of the familiar
transmitter-channel-receiverI paradigm. Thus, after the
lSee C. Osgood, P. Tannenbaum, and G. Suci, The
Measurement of Meaning (Urbana: The University of Illinois
Press, 1957), chapter 7. We adopt this terminology to em-
phasize the interactive nature of the cognitive process.
Briefly, we see it as a transmitter sending information
through a channel to a receiver, If the receiver is hooked
to the channel and the information is perceived, it is then
available for conceptual and especially ideological "de-
coding" or pigeon-holing.
7general strike of June, 1964, the Youths made a series of
predictions about the future behavior of the workers. In
particular, they predicted that the workers would support
Imoudu and the Nigerian Labour Party in the December Federal
elections. In terms of my scheme, the workers (transmitters)
sent information through various channels (mass meetings,
riots) to the Youths (receivers). The Youths perceived
this information, conceptualized it in ideological terms,
and derived predictions. Since I am interested in why the
Youths failed in their predictions, let us consider some-
what more closely: (1) the process of information trans-
mission, and (2) perception and conceptualization.
Transmission of Information to the
Receiver
If it is true that a prediction about the course of
events depends on one's perception of such events, and that
perception depends on the information one has, it follows
then, that a source of invalid predictions may be the
1
invalidity of the information one is receiving. Assuming
lAlthough a rather obvious point, it should be noted
that perception is viewed here as varying with information,
not with "real" events. A general makes his plans on the
basis, not of what is happening in battle, but of what he
thinks is happening. The latter depends upon the informa-
tion he gets about the battle. If it is false or otherwise
inadequate, there is a good chance that he will make wrong
inferences about the course of the battle. Similarly, the
Youths made inferences, not on the basis of what was hap-
pening in the workers' minds, but on the basis of what they
thought was happening, and this was a function of the infor-
mation they were getting about the workers.
that the channel through which information flows is clear,
a transmitter can send false information to a receiver in
at least two ways. First, he can lie or deceive him.
Secondly, he can transmit unreliable, inconsistent, and
unstable information without intending deception. For
example, in informing the receiver about his own prefer-
ences, he himself may not "know his own mind." Similarly,
if he is not cominitted to his preferences, or likely to
change them, everything else being equal, the receiver is
likely to get false information.
These considerations apply to Nigerian workers at
the end of the general strike and on the eve of the Federal
elections of 1964. It seemed to everyone, especially the
Youths, that the workers were strongly in favor of a labour
party led by Michael Imoudu. However, few people realized
that the workers were being crosspressured and in fact,
masking inconsistent and unstable loyalties. I discuss
these points in Chapters X, XI, and XII. There, I indicate
how ideological failure can begin with the transmission of
information to politicians and need not be due to the con-
ceptual framework into which the information is cast for
prediction. However, the conceptual framework also may
lead to false predictions.
9Perception and Conceptualization
Having briefly discussed the relationship between
the transmitter and the receiver, it is now possible to
discuss the cognitive processes of the receiver. Here,
let us make a rough distinction bQtween two stages of per-
ception, to account for the difference between the first
selective perception of a piece of information and the
translation of this perception into some ideological or
conceptual framework. The first stage we shall call "the
ordinary language stage of conceptualization" and the
second, "the ideological stage." What interests us here is
the application of the terminology of the second stage to
the first.
An example from science may clarify these notions.
Imagine, for example, that you see a stone falling. If
you are pre-Newtonian, you say to yourself "a stone is
falling." If, however, you are post-Newtonian, you are
also in a position to say "a mass is falling." Recognizing
that a "stone" is a "mass" has important consequences for
your understanding of the behavior of the stone, because
from the Newtonian hypothesis, F = MA, you will be able to
1Our data do not lend themselves to any finer dis-
tinctions, although we are aware of the psychologist's
warning that "all perceptual experience is necessarily the
end of a categorization process." See Jerome S. Bruner,
"On Perceptual Readiness, " Psych. Rev., 64 (1957), pp. 123-
152.
10
derive the force with which the stone will hit the earth,
knowing only its weight and acceleration.
If you have a theory or ideology, familiar objects
expressed in ordinary language can be renamed in terms of
a conceptual system. In general, such systems are com-
posed of at least the following elements: primitive terms
("mass"), operations (mathematical multiplication), a set
of axioms (mass remains constant during the fall), a set
of hypotheses (F = MA), and criteria for verification.
The power of the system lies in fitting ordinary observa-
tions into much more general primitive terms and these
into the deductive scheme of axioms and hypotheses. Thus,
when speaking of it in terms of "mass," it is not necessary
continually to observe the stone, because the behavior of
"masses" can be predicted quite well from the hypotheses
of the system.
In its general form, this interrelationship between
ordinary language and conceptual systems in involved in
ideology as well. Most Nigerian Marxists would agree with
the view that Nigerian worklers represent a new political
force and a new morality. They would argue that the worker
qua worker, finding himself separated from peasant tech-
nology and independent of peasant authority, necessarily
is a carrier of a new set of attitudes ("consciousness")
appropriate to his new technological relations and author-
ity figures. Here, too, there are primitive terms, such
as "workers," "technology," "class," etc., and hypotheses,
like "the workers' attitudes are different from those of
the peasant as a function of his changed relation to tech-
nology,"
Nevertheless, the example from physics and that from
politics differ importantly in the translation of ordinary
language terms into the primitive terms of the conceptual
scheme. What is "class" in Nigeria and how does one deter-
mine who belongs to what class? I shall examine how the
Youths apply these terms to Nigerian politics in Chapters
VII and VIII. Here, let us note that another source of
error in ideological prediction lies in the selection of
information to be ideologically "named" and the inferences
drawn from such naming.
Thus, for example, after the strike of June, 1964,
it was clear to everyone that workers had gone on strike
because they were angry with the difference in wages be-
tween what they were receiving and what their rulers were
getting. Workers also were disappointed with the way
Nigerian politics had developed since independence. Pre-
disposed by their long history of failure in Nigerian
politics, the Youths saw in these motives more than was
said. When workers spoke of "gap," Youths translated
'class struggle"; when workers spoke of "corruption in
high places," or "loss of trust in government," Youths
translated "post-independence crisis." Class struggle
and post-independence crisis were clear indications to
the Youths that workers would support a labour party which
would defend their "class" interests. It turned out that
the workers did not support the Youths. The Youths did
not realize (and perhaps did not want to realize) that
there is no one-to-one correspondence between action and
motives. Spotting some motives correctly, they generalized
and renamed them and wrongly inferred certain actions.
While the Youths failed in their ideological predic-
tions, could they have learned and did they learn any-
thing from their failure? Observations I have made about
the two types of failure in ideological prediction intro-
duce another problem concerning ideology, namely, ideo-
logical verification. Turning to this question, let us
again rely on science to serve as illustration and criterion
for comparison.
Verification
In an ongoing science, axioms are revised, added,
or dropped. The Newtonian axiom that light travels at
an infinite speed was revised by relativity theory. If
axioms change, so does the structure of hypotheses derived
from such axioms. Sometimes, primitive terms are revised;
for example, the discovery of the neutrino changed the
number of objects that physics concerns itself with. Some-
times, a discovery in the operations of the science, such
as the invention of the calculus or tensor algebra changes
the science.
In practice, scientists build their science and go
along without verifying it, until they have a backlog of
hypotheses, data, and instruments for measuring so that they
can conduct a critical test. Their reasoning seems to be
something like this:
We are all agreed that hypotheses one through ten seem
to be true; hypothesis eleven, derivable from the first
ten hypotheses, leads to an unobvious conclusion. That's
interesting. Now, if we can show that hypothesis
eleven is true (not false within an area of certainty)
we shall be satisfied (for the moment) that we are on
the right track and that hypotheses one through ten are
also true.
This procedure goes on until a critical test shows that a
hypothesis derived from some well-established body of work
is false, at which point revisions take place at a number
of points in the science.
For a sociologist of knowledge interested in comparing
an ideology with a science, the point at which a hypothesis
is shown to be false in a science highlights the difference
between an ideology and a science. If a hypothesis is
disproved in a science, two possibilities are open: (1) the
test is rejected or (2) the test is accepted and the hypothe-
ses on which it was constructed are changed to conform with
the new results. At times, as in relativity theory, all
hypotheses including axioms are seriously revised. Whether
the first or second possibility occurs depends on the social
structure of the science. It will depend, for example, on
the authority of the scientists involved, the importance
14
of the theory, the number and weight of the hypotheses over-
thrown, the elegance of the theory, and so on,
Changes occur in a science whenever hypotheses fail
to satisfy certain agreed upon cognitive criteria. However,
an ideology, as we have indicated, includes not only a cog-
nitive model of the world, but also statements of value and
feeling. The difference between science and ideology lies
in the former restricting its criteria of verification to
the cognitive type. This is clearly not the case in ideol-
ogy, where statements are accepted into the belief system,
not only on cognitive grounds, but from considerations of
value and feeling. Ideologies change, or remain stable,
not only because they are false or true, but also because
they satisfy certain evaluative and emotional criteria. I
shall call these criteria, "goodness of fit," "success,"
and "affective coherence."
The term "goodness of fit" refers to the correspond-
ence of ideological statements with the real world, and is
akin to the term "confidence level" in science. The term
"success" refers to the evaluation placed on ideologically
guided actions in attaining certain values in politics.
1That the growth of science as a human activity is
dependent on a certain value orientation is not disputed
here, but it seems clear that the statement "F = MA" is
relatively value free and affect free. It should be noted,
however, that the difference between a science and an
ideology is a matter of degree, not of quality. Both types
of statements are beliefs subject to evaluative and affec-
tive criteria. One need only refer to the case of Galileo
to note that the reduction in importance of non-cognitive
criteria in science is a fairly recent development.
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An ideology is then said to lead to "success" in politics.
In our use of the term, "success" need not only denote the
attainment of power, but can be applied to the attainment
of any valued object. Finally, the term "affective coherence"
is meant to connote the observation that beliefs are often
held to maintain emotional balance in the believer. 1
Truth and Falsehood, Success and Failure,
and Changes in Ideology
An analogue to hypothesis testing in the evaluative
dimension of ideology lies in determining whether an ideo-
logical statement led to success or failure in maximizing
values. If an ideological prediction is felt to lead to
success in maximizing values, then that prediction is more
likely than not to remain unchanged. By this I. mean that
the primitive terms ("class"), operations ("class struggle"),
and predictions ("ultimate triumph of the proletariat") will
remain unchanged.
Although in theory, it should be quite simple to
determine under what conditions an ideology changes, in
practice, the situation is much more ambiguous because it
is not always simple to determine success or failure in
attaining valued ends. This is so because at least three
lFor example, the view that beliefs are held as re-
action formation, ego defense, or cognitive consonance are
essentially views of beliefs as maintaining or restoring
states of emotional equilibrium. See I. Sarnoff, "Psycho-
nalytic Theory and Social Attitudes," Public Opinion
Quarterly, 1960, pp. 251-279; and L. Festinger, A Theory
of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston: Row, Peterson, & Co.,
1957).
criteria of verification exist. Since goodness of fit is
only one such criterion, used to evaluate an empirical
situation, it can be abandoned or changed in order to satisfy
the other two criteria. For believers, a failure of pre-
diction, at the least, must be explained in a way that does
not offend basic values and commitments. The simplest way
of doing this is to reinterpret the failure. This can be
illustrated in what happened to the Youths after the failure
of the Nigerian Labour Party in December 1964-January 1965.
Although the Youths, after the strike of 1964, had predicted
that the Nigerian Labour Party would demonstrate that it
had a popular following in Lagos, it became clear to this
observer that it did not. If the election had proceeded
as planned, the party presumably would have succeeded or
failed in getting Imoudu elected from the Lagos North con-
stituency. But the Federal elections did not go as planned.
One of the nationalist parties (UPGA) boycotted the election
and voters stayed home, Imoudu and the NLP had started
out in opposition to UPGA, but by the time of the boycott,
they were acting ambiguously enough that their allegiance
or opposition could not be determined. Was this because
they realized that as the election neared, they were losing
support because their ideology was misapplied? Or did they
1 . Festinger, H. W. Riecken, Jr., and S. Schachter,
When Prophecy Fails (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1956).
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assume that in a political crisis, it was tactically wiser
"from the long range point of view" to support the nation-
alist party? How did the fact that they avoided the
political test affect their ideology? I discuss these
points in Chapter XIV.
Having discussed the problems of ideological prediction
and verification and indicated the groups of major concern, let
us proceed to the last two sections of this introduction;
the plan of the thesis and a discussion of the methods used
in collecting data.
The Plan of the Thesis
The thesis is divided into two main parts. In the
first part, it is primarily concerned with locating the
Youths in the context of Nigerian politics and labour. The
first part can be seen as consisting of three sections. In
the first section (Chapters II and III), the thesis introduces
the reader to the major parameters of the Nigerian political
system and the labour movement. The Youths, as Marxists
in the labour movement, straddle both politics and labour
and their role is delineated at the intersection of these
two spheres of Nigerian life. The second section (chapters
IV-VT) comprises the history of the emergence of the
Youths in the two spheres of labour and politics. This
section not only traces the Youths over time, but serves
as a partial explanation for their anti-governmental motives.
In the third section (Chapters VII and VIII) the thesis
-=Ed
describes the ideology of the Youths. It does this by ex-
amining the writings and biographies of five Youths, each
of whom represents a major faction among Marxists in the
labour movement.
In the second part, the thesis turns to the case study
of ideological prediction and verification. Here, four
sections can be distinguished. In the first section (Chap-
ter IX) is described the general strike of June, 1964. In
the second (Chapters X and XI), relying partly on what the
Youths said and partly on the description of ideology in
Chapter VIII, the thesis describes how the youths misunder-
stood the motives of the workers for going on strike and
falsely predicted the support the workers would give to the
Labour Party. In the third section (Chapters XII and XIII),
the thesis turns to the second source of ideological failure,
that is, the kind of information the Youths were getting
about expected support. Here it accounts for ideological
failure by referring to the quality of information and not,
as in section two, by referring to the kinds of inferences
the Youths made. In the fourth section, the thesis recapit-
ulates briefly the experience of the Nigerian Labour Party
and turns to how one of the leaders accounted for its fate
in the Federal elections of December 1964. In describing
the Youths' account, it is concerned with the question of
ideological verification.
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Methods
Since in this thesis I am interested in making in-
ferences to the process of prediction and verification in
ideology, I deal with two groups, those who transmit infor-
mation to the ideologists, and the ideologists themselves.
In particular, I deal with workers who communicated with
Youths and with the Youths.
Studying the Youths
Although criteria for selecting a respondent varied
with the phase of the problem, the Youths were selected on
the basis of organizational membership, position within
the organization, reputation and self-identification. No
random sample of Youths was attempted; I tried to inter-
view all Youths who were seriously involved first in the
general strike and later in the Federal elections of 1964.
In the period May, 1964 - July, 1965, the period of
the study, there existed the following Marxist organiza-
tions either inside the labour movement or closely allied
to the labour movement. These were the Socialist Workers
and Farmers Party (SWAFP), the Nigerian Trade Union Congress
(NTUC), the Nigerian Youth Congress (NYC), and the Nigerian
Labour Party (NLP). There were other organizations, the
central labour bodies, such as the Labour Unity Front (LUF),
the United Labour Congress (ULC) and the Nigerian Workers
Council (NWC) which were not explicitly Marxist but in
which some Marxists held leadership positions.
--- "=Md
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In the period of the study, I tried to interview all
the leaders of the unambiguously Marxist organizations.
These usually included the President or Chairman of the
organization, the General Secretary and the members of the
"Central Committee." In the non-Marxist organizations, I
would try to interview those members of the leadership who
had a reputation (especially among leaders of the explicitly
Marxist organizations) for being Marxists. A well known
and good example of this second type of Youth is Gogo Chu
Nzeribe, General Secretary of the Post and Telegraph Workers
Union and General Secretary of the non-Marxist Labour Unity
Front. In this manner I interviewed fifty-two Youths.
The interviews lasted anywhere from two hours to a
week. Most were repeated three or four times during the
period at issue. Questionnaires C - F1 were used to get
background material but on the whole I relied on open-ended
questions. Since I am interested in what the Youths thought
about politics, most questions of the open-ended category
were directed to the then current political scene. I have
tried to codify the results of some of these interviews in
Chapters VII and VIII below.
Studying the Workers
I was interested in specific groups of workers, namely
those who communicated with the Marxist leaders whose beliefs
we were studying. I drew seven non-probabilistic quota
lSee Appendix.
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samples of workers. The characteristics of the quota were
such as to increase the chances that the respondent would
be in touch with Youths. Since the Youths were labour leaders
it was assumed that workers who were wage earners, and high
in the hierarchy of their trade unions would be more likely
to interact with Youths than, for example, non-wage earners
or trade unionists low in the hierarchy of their union.
Following only this logic, however, would have limited
the sample to trade union executives (members of their
executive committees) in the central labour bodies such
as the NTUC and LUF which were more likely to be run by
Youths. But the Youths mixed not only with persons of
their own ideology but with workers, trade unionists, and
labour leaders who were not Marxists. For this reason, I
included in my sample of "workers" trade unionists in all
the central labour bodies including those not run by Youths.
From Table 1.1 it can be seen that I drew six samples of
trade union executives and one survey of non-executive
trade unionists. My remarks are limited to the first cate-
gory only.
The Characteristics of the Samples
Because they are similar to D, I shall not review
the characteristics of all the seven samples drawn. Below
I present the characteristics of the two sub-samples which
1 See Chapter III, pp. 60-72.
TABLE 1.1--Surveys July, 1964
Questionnaire* Method of Dates Location N Position ofDistribution Respondent
A Handed out at July 1964 University of 61 Executives
meeting Ibadan meeting
B Handed out in October ULC 38 Executives
class 1964
C Mailed** December Nigeria-wide 56 Executives
1964
C Handed out June 1965 University of 18 Executives
at meeting Ibadan meeting
D Handed out April 1965 LUF 52 Executives
at meeting
D Handed out April 1965 NWC 37 Executives
at meeting
Total 262
E Direct inter- May 1965 Railway 585 Non-Executives
view by team Quarters
of interviewers Ebute-Metta
*See Appendix
**Based on a list of 556 trade unions kept by the registrar of trade unions.
He estimates that of these only about 300 are extant. This gives a return of about
17% on the mailed questionnaire.
May, 1965.
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make up sample D, The characteristics are listed in terms
of social background and include: (1) Central Labour Body
(whether union belongs to a centrallabour body controlled
by the Youths or by non-Youths), (2) position of respondent
in branch union, (3) regional background of respondent,
(4) occupation, (5) religion, (6) age, and (7) education.
It is clear from the simple background data presented
that the workers who get the ear of the Youths (this par-
ticular group was interviewed at an annual meeting in Lagos)
are hardly representative of the Nigerian population which
is mostly Northern, Muslim, and illiterate. And in terms
of education (primary certificate only is required for most
wage paying jobs) they are hardly representative of the
wage earning population. For a more extensive discussion
of the wage earning population as a whole we direct the
reader to Chapter III.
TABLE 1.2--Percentage of Respondents Who
are Members of Unions in Central Labour
Bodies.
Central Labour Pody Percentage
Controlled by Youths 58
Not controlled by Youths 42
Total 100(89)
Percentage
Eastern Majority 31
Eastern Minority 15
Western Majority 33
Western Minority 0
Mid-Western Majority 1
Mid-Western Minority 12
Northern Majority 0
Northern Minority 1
N.A. 6
Total 99 (89)
* I list the regional background of
the respondent instead of his tribe because
in terms of political orientation, the
designation of a tribal name bears much less
information in the regionalist context than
does the designation of the respondent by
region and by whether or not he belongs to
the majority or minority ethnic group. It
is clear that by Eastern Majority here is
meant, Ibo; by Western Majority is meant,
Yoruba, and by Northern Majority is meant
Hausa and/or Fulani. At the time of writing
Mid-Western Ibos seemed to be most influential
in the Mid-West, consequently Mid-West major-
ity is Ibos. Table 1.4 accurately reflects
the greater frequency of Southern as against
Northern workers and trade unions.
Regional Background
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TABLE 1.2 -Position of Respondents in
Br.nch Unions in Per Cent.
Position Percentage
General Secretary 43
President or Chairman 30
Treasurer 2
Vice-President 2
Other Executive 16
Non-Executive 4
N.A. 3
Total 100 (89)
TABLE 1.4--Pegional Background of Respond-
ents in Per Cent.*
-TABLE 1.5--Occupation of Respondents in
Per Cent.'
Occupation Percentage
Full Time Trade Unionist 7
White Collar Worker 22
Skilled Worker 30
Unskilled Worker 9
Farmer, Trader, Craftsman,
or Artisan 12
N.A. 20
Total 100 (89)
TABLE 1,6--Religion of Respondents in Per
Cent.
Religion Percentage
Muslim 10
Protestant 60
Catholic 21
Other 7
N.A. 2
Total 100 (89)
TABLE 1.7--Age of Respondents in Per Cent.
Age Percentage
Below 20 0
20-29 36
30-39 42
40-49 16
50-59 2
60 or over 0
N.A. 3
Total 100 (89)
Other Sources of Data
I used three other sources of data: published or
filed materials in public and private archives, newspapers,
and participant observation. Besides having the use of the
national archives of Ibadan, I had access to the files of
the Nigerian Railway Corporation and of the United Labour
Congress. Chapters IV, V, and VI dealing with the early
history of the labour movement and of the emergence of the
militants could not have been written without such data.
In addition to these, I was given access to some of the
published and unpublished pamphlets and memoranda in private
possession of individual respondents. Chapter VIII, which
tries to construct a Marxist interpretation of Nigerian
politics, is based on such materials.
I relied on participant observation whenever this proved
to be possible. Arriving two weeks before the general strike
of June 1964, I formulated some of my first questions and
wrote some of the first notes during automobile trips in
which I chauffeured trade union leaders from Ibadan to Lagos.
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TABLE 1,8--Education of Respondents in
Per Cent.
Education Percentage
Primary Only 30
Some Secondary 12
Secondary 54
N.A. 4
Total 100(89)
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During the rest of the field trip, having moved to Lagos
in October, I observed the predictions and the outcomes of
the predictions that friends among the Youths had made in
June.
CHAPTER II
THE REGIONALIST SYSTEM
Initial Conditions
By the end of the Second World War and the emergence of
the nationalist movement in Nigeria, for the British admin-
istration the problem arose of reconciling the desire for
representation with the power of the imperial government; the
efficiency of the civil service, with the integrity of tradi-
tional rulers. The solution, a rather simple one which came
to be known as "Regionalism," was to divide the representa-
tive electoral system into as many units as the administrative
system and to make it congruent with these units.1
Since the civil service itself had been linked under in-
direct rule wherever possible to the traditional rule of na-
tive authorities, a corollary of Regionalism was the division
of Nigeria into three regions which more or less corresponded
to the major Nigerian nationalities. Thus, the Northern Region
came to stand for a system of representation based'on the Hausa
and Fulani peoples, and linked to a Northern civil service;
1 This discussion of regionalism is based on the ground-
breaking work of James S. Colman and Richard L. Sklar. See
J. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960) and
R. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent
African Nation (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1963).
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-wom-
similarly for the Western Region and the Yoruba people, the
Eastern Region and the Ibo people.
From the Richards constitution to the London confer-
ence of 1953, when measures were begun to implement region-
alism, the system was thought to have a number of sanguine
effects. It preserved the Emirate system of the North. It
prevented the Legislative Council from being too large and
unwieldy. It blocked the formation of an unofficial major-
2ity without responsibility. Moreover, giving representation
to the regions powerfully strengthened the hands of the
traditional rulers, since nationalists would have to appeal
to them to construct winning electoral coalitions. Thus,
regionalism was thought to have the desired effect of,
according to Governor Richards, checking the "absurdly pre-
dominant influence of Lagos." 3
One should not infer that only the Imperial adminis-
tration supported regionalism, because, in fact, the system
had backing from a number of indigenous sources.
Regionalism and the Nationalist Parties
Although the beginnings of nationalist support for
regionalism can be traced further back, the initial point
1The Richards Constitution of 1946 was named for Sir
Arthur Richards then Governor of Nigeria. This constitution,
"brought about not only further administrative devolution
but a political and budgetary regionalization as well .
See Coleman, pp. 322-323.
2Coleman, p. 274. 3Coleman, p. 275.
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which concerns us here is the founding of the Nigerian
Youth Movement (NYM) in 1936.1
The Nigerian Youth Movement
From its inception in 1936, the NYM was an organiza-
tion of elite Lagosians, mostly non-Ijebu Yorubas, many of
whom were King's College alumnae. We are interested in the
NYM because the beginnings of Southern regionalism and divi-
sion in the nationalist movement can be traced to the split
of the NYM into two.factions: one which followed Dr. Nmamdi
Azikiwe (Zik) out of the organization and another which stayed
and was led by subsequent leaders of the Action Gryup'(AG),
such as Chief Obafemi Awolowo, H. O., Davies, and S. L.
Akintola.
Although at first Zik was a successful member of the
NYM, he soon found it too elitist and provincial, not in
tune with the more radical, national plans he had for
Nigeria.2 It was only a matter of time before he or some-
one like him would discover that besides the patricians of
Lagos, another source of electoral power lay with the crowds
of students, petty traders, market women, and wage earning
workers.
1See Coleman, p. 218.
2
"Azikiwe had spoken of the natural right of self-
determination and had demanded self-government within fif-
teen years from 1943; but the leaders of the NYM were less
emphatic. . ." Coleman, p. 263.
The National Council of Nigeria and
the Cameroons (NCNC)
On August 26, 1944, with Herbert Macauley of the pop-
ulist Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) and Zik
behind the scenes, the Nigerian Union of Students calls for
an inaugural meeting of the "National Council of Nigeria.
Over forty organizations, among them the Trade Union Congress
of Nigeria (TUCN), are ". . . to work in unity for the reali-
zation of our ultimate goal of self-government within the
British Empire." 2 It is not surprising that the NYM and
its leaders boycotted the National Council, seeing it "as a
stratagem of Azikiwe and Macauley to seize control of the
nationalist movement."3 By 1946, getting an overwhelming
mandate, the NCNC contested election to the legislative
council in Lagos and defeated the NYM.
Leaders of the defeated NYM such as Obafemi Awolowo
learned well the lessons of the popular NCNC. By March
1951 they inaugurated a new political party called the
Action Group (AG). Its base of support lay in the Western
region among the Yoruba. Its techniques were those of the
1Coleman, p. 264. Ibid. 3Sklar, p. 57.
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"The new organization received its strongest support
from the old Yoruba families and the Yoruba professional
class of Lagos, from the growing Yoruba middle class based
upon the cocoa trade, from Yoruba chiefs . . . from Yoruba
intellectuals opposed to the NCNC . . . and from selected
leaders of minority groups in the Western region . .
Coleman, pp. 349-350,
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mass party but its audience was, in the beginning, mainly
limited to the Western Region.
At the same time as a division of the nationalist move-
ment was beginning to take place in the South, at nationalist
party, the Northern Peoples Congress, was inaugurated in
December 1949 in Kano partly as a reaction to Southern incur-
sions and partly out of the opportunities provided by region-
alism. Similar to the AG which wanted to further the cul-
tural integrity and the ruling groups of the Yorubas, the
NPC organized to protect Islam and the Emirate system of
the North.1
Once the AG and the NPC demonstrated majority support
in the West and North respectively, the hand of the region-
alists in the NCNC was greatly strengthened. They argued
that, since the leaders of the other parties had become
premiers of their regions, Azikiwe, the one" truly national
leader in Nigeria, should become Premier of the East, where
the NCNC had control. "These considerations prevailed, and
the political center of gravity in the NCNC shifted to the
East while central direction of the party organization as
a whole lapsed seriously . . .,2
The flow of political attention and activity from the
national to the regional level in the early fifties left
1Coleman, p. 358.
2Richard L. Sklar and C. S. Whitaker, Jr., "Nigeria,"
Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa,
ed. James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), p. 602.
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behind the Zikists, the first organized opposition to the
regionalist system. It is an irony of history that the
movement founded in the name of the greatest African nation-
alist was to be repudiated by him as the locus of power
shifted from the center to the regions.
The Zikists
From its inception in Lagos in February 1946, the
Zikist movement formed the militant youth wing of the NCNC.
"The Zikists were the angry young men of postwar Nigeria.
They were anti-regionalist, anti-tribalist, and ttrongly,
favored a unified centralized Nigeria. If need be, they
said, they were willing to lead a revolution against the
imperial power.
Already by 1948 it became increasingly clear to the
Zikists that regionalism challenged their unitarian beliefs.
The Zikists also realized that groups such as the Ibo State
Union and other tribal unions which had increased in
1
Sklar, p. 73. The term "Zikism" was first used by
A. A. Nwafor Orizu in his book, Without Bitterness. Al-
though the Zikists were at first followers of Dr. Azikiwe,
and later they were to repudiate him, the term always meant
more than simply a congerie of Ziks followers. Richard
Sklar quoting Orizu notes:
His choice of the term "Zikism" was not intended
to create a personality cult around the figure of
Azikiwe; the latter was merely an "exceptional
character" whose life was an inspiration to others.
"Zik," he explained, is derived from the "African
name Azikiwe . . . which can be translated: 'the
Youth is overwhelmingly indignant,' or 'The New
Age is full of revenge.' . . ."
influence in proportion to the regionalization of Nigeria
challenged their influence within the NCNC and with
Dr. Azikiwe.
To stem the tide of tribalism and regionalism the
Zikists decided on a strategy of direct action which they
called "positive action." It was decided by the "Central
Committee" of the Zikist movement to precipitate a crisis
which would result in revolution. Their tactic was to
invite Azikiwe to a meeting during which Zikists would make
seditious speeches. Azikiwe would be arrested. Free
Zikists would seize on the arrest to make a martyr of Zik,
and the revolution would start.
Things did not turn out as the Zikists had hoped. They
set the stage by calling for a mass meeting of the NCNC
for 7 November 1948. The mass meeting was to be attended
by the cabinet of the NCNC including Zik. As had been
planned, H. R. Abdallah, President of the Zikist movement
made a seditious speech:
We have passed the age of petition. We have passed
the age of resolution. This is the age of action,
plain, blunt, positive action. . . . This iniquitous
British Government is determined to keep us slaves
forever . . . the only way out as I see it and as
I know it is for every one of us to declare himself
free and independent and be resolved to stand by that
declaration and damn the consequences.1
But Zik did not show up. The Zikist leaders were jailed,
and when Dr. Azikiwe disassociated himself from the movement,
many Zikists turned against him and against the NCNC.2
1Sklar, pp. 75, 99. 2Sklar, p. 76.
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The Youths
One should not be under the impression that all rad-
ical young men in southern Nigeria gravitated to the NCNC or
to the Zikist movement. Some refused to join the NCNC "be-
cause it was mainly for Ibos." 1 But they would not join the
pan Yoruba NYM "because it was run by the big guns among the
Yorubas and a talkative young man like me had no chance to
express my views." 2 Once the AG came along many of the more
radical young radicals joined up.
Nevertheless, more than any other Nigerian party, the
early NYC was a pan-tribal, congress type organization dedi-
cated to unitary nationalism. With regionalism, the radical
factions of the NCNC declined in power. Some radicals had
their teeth drawn, some left the NCNC to found the AG, or the
NPC, still others left the NCNC for the labour movement.
It should be noted that even before their disenchant-
ment with the NCNC, leaders like Nduka Eze in the Zikist
movement were also militant trade unionists. Eze's "object
since 1946 had been to link the labor movement to the
Zikist movement for revolutionary action." 3 After their
disenchantment with the NCNC many radicals turned to the
labour movement in the hope that out of the workers they
could create a truly antiregionalist, radical, and Marxist
party. This group of radicals in the labour movement
1Phrase used by a Lagosian Youth in a personal inter-
view.
3Sklar, P. 76.2Ibid.
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The regionalist system may have, begun as an adminis-
trative and constitutional expression, but in time it, took
on economi'c and political life. We turn now to a descrip-
tion of how the system worked. At its base was the connec-
ti-Qn.between money and power.
Money and Power
Under indirect rule, the regions had been administra-
tive expressions; with the constitutional changes of the
Richards and MacPherson constitutions, they became consti-
tutional and political units, and after the London conference,
they became economic units as well. This was done by dis-
solving the commodity marketing boards and creating new
multi-commodity regional marketing boards. The purpose of
these boards was to accumulate surpluses by selling com-
modities at a profit on the world market in order to provide
funds for development in their respective region.
In principle, the marketing boards were to provide
capital to regional development corporations which were, in
turn, to initiate agricultural and industrial projects.
Without going into the details of the operation, in practice
the regional marketing boards, the development corporations
and their subsidiaries proved to be a rich field for pa-
tronage and corruption. The party, through its control of
the legal and representative apparatus of each region, would
1 Coleman, p. 311.
appoint its supporters to responsible positions on the
boards or corporations. In return, the appointees would
facilitate the granting of loans to party supporters and
to the party itself. Conversely, by controlling the flow
of capital and licenses, the party could bring considerable
economic pressure on its opponents.1
In the absence of a developed private sector, the
party through the regional marketing boards had considerable
influence on the distribution of economic opportunities
within each region. In the modern sector, this distribu-
tion had profound effects on the social stratification system.
He who had something to give to the party and who was loyal
to it could expect to improve his life and to climb; he who
was not loyal either was irrelevant or fell from whatever
position he had been able to reach.
The parties' influence over the social stratification
system of a region had a serious effect on the organization
The ideal model of the tie-up between party and,
regional marketing board is best documented for the Western
Region, but good evidence exists to assume that essentially
the same pattern repeated itself in the East and North. For
the West see Report of the Coker Commission of Inquiry into
the Affairs of Certain Statutory Corporations in Western
Nigeria (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1962).
2See Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire Into
the Fears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying Them
(London: Report Cmnd 505, 1958). According to the Willink
Commission, the relative distribution of amenities and funds
was argued, surprisingly, to be just. But, according to the
report, this view was not shared by the minority witnesses
to the commission. One should perhaps reformulate the point
to say that minorities perceived that they were being dis-
criminated against.
of groups and inter-group conflict within each region.
First and most obviously, the party rewarded those groups
which kept it in power. It would therefore be more likely
to reward the majority group, exacerbating in this way
communal tensions between majorities and minorities. 1
Second, since its Electoral power lay in the regions and
since traditional authorities were more likely to bring out
the vote, the party limited its appeal to cultural volun-
tary organizations, such as tribal unions and town unions;
trade unions and other economic interest groups were ex-
cluded as irrelevant. Third, the party alienated a
cross section of the population, especially within the civil
service, which had been recruited on achievement criteria.
Junior civil servants would often point to a politician,
and say with some bitterness, "Why I knew that man when he
was hawking newspapers. Look at him now."
Thuseven by treating each region in isolation from
the others, it could be seen that the link-up between party,
majority nationality, and regional marketing board en-
gendered opposition from minority groups, economic interest
groups, and a cross-section of the population fed up with
corruption and low positions in the social stratification
system. However, regions did not exist in isolation from
each other, or from the Federal government, and, on the
1The Northernization policy of the NPC and the Lagos
University crisis of 1965 are only two examples of party
policy'exacerbating communal tensions.
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contrary, whatever conflicts there might have been between
the political stratum and the rest of society in the region
were greatly exasperated by inter-regional conflict.
The Growing Power of the Federal Government and
the Breaching of Regional Security
Had each region been an independent nation, the three
regions would simply have increased by three the number of
one party states. However, since the regions were part of
a federal structure, they were forced to interact. In par-
ticular, regionally based parties, such as the AG and the
NPC began to look for allies within the other regions and
the NCNC reactivated its nationalist wing as inter-party
competition for control of the federal government became
more intense.
Inter-party competition intensified as a function of
the growing power of the Federal government. By 1956, the
powers of the Federal Parliament, enumerated in the "Ex-
clusive Legislative List" were (1) External affairs, (2) De-
fense, (3) Citizenship, (4) Immigration, (5) External trade,
(6) Monetary exchange control, (7) Customs and excise duties,
(8) Currency, (9) Mining, (10) Maritime shipping, (11) Prin-
cipal modes of communication and transportation. Consti-
tutional power which were to be shared jointly by the Federal
Parliament and the regions on the "Concurrent Legislative
List" were: (1) Public order, (2) Prisons, (3) Labour
relations, (4) Welfare, (5) Higher education, (6) Industrial
development. The Federal constitution had supremacy over
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regional constitutions in all cases of concurrent jurisdic-
tion. The Federal Supreme Court had the right to interpret
the regional constitutions. Residual areas were reserved to
the regions. 1
From the above list, it should be noted that the Fed-
eral Government had a great deal of constitutional authority
in the economic field (and therefore, over relative develop-
ment of each region), in the military, and over the legal
system.
No one claims that constitutional power adds up to
real power, but in a number of test cases, each of which
precipitated a crisis, a portion of the population turned
against the regionalist system, and it became increasingly
clear to the party leaders that there could be no regional
security without control of the center.
1For a more extensive discussion of these points, see
Richard L. Sklar, "The Federal Republic of Nigeria," National
Unity and Regionalism: Eight African States, ed. Gwendolyn
M. Carter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966).
2Federal control of development funds was modified by
the system of regionally reallocating such revenues. An in-
dication of the 'economic power of the Federal Government,
however, can be gauged by noting that in 1963 it provided
70% of the Regional governments' revenue. Also, one wonders
if it is an accident that in 1963, the year of the Western
Region Emergency in which the Federal Government intervened
in the Western Region, 57% of the Western Regional govern-
ment's revenue had a Federal source whereas in 1962, the
year before the emergency, and in 1964, the year after the
emergency, 69% of the Western Regional Government's revenue
had a Federal source. Annual Abstract of Statistics 1964
(Lagos: Federal Office of Statistics), Table 11.1 and
11.2, p. 115.
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Crises of the Regionalist System: The Action
Group Crisis and the Western Region EmergencyL
When Chief Awolowo and the Action Group (AG) became
the Federal parliamentary opposition in 1959, they revised
their theory of regional security and began an aggressive
and partially successful attempt to break the monopoly of the
other two parties over their respective, regions, by appealing
precisely to those elements which had been excluded by the
regionalist division of the spoints. And so, in 1959, the
Action Group was able to ally itself with minority dissident
parties in the Northern region and thus, capture sizable
portions of the minority vote, particularly in the Middle
Belt areas. At the same time, the party moved ideologically
to the left, a move which evoked response from sections of
the Marxist labour movement and especially the Yoruba Zikists.
Awolowo's attempt to break out of regional confines and
capture the center by breaking the monopoly of power in the
other regions threatened the NPC and NCNC. Taking advan-
tage of rivalry for leadership of the Action Group between
the Awolowo and the Akintola factions, the Federal Govern-
ment (read "NPC-NCNC coalition") stepped in to discredit
Awolowo. The upshot of this struggle was the imprisonment
of Awolowo and some of his lieutenants on charges of plotting
lSee Richard L. Sklar, "The Ordeal of Chief Awolowo:
Nigeria's Political System in Transition," Politics in Africa,
ed. Gwendolyn M. Carter and Alan F. Westin (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1966). The crisis can be dated
from February 1962, the Jos Conference, to January 1966,
the first coup.
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a coup, and the emergence of the Akintola faction as the
dominant power in the Western Region. The lesson of this
episode was clear to all: the Federal government could use
the army and the police ultimately to work its will upon the
regions. In effect, this meant that the North, which was
able to gain control of the Federal Government by its pre-
ponderant voting strength, had very real power to wield
through the neutral civil service and the neutral army.
(Ultimately, the army refused to stay neutral.)
Crises of the Regionalist System:
The Census Issue'
In another way, the lesson that the AG learned from
the Western Region Emergency was to be relearned by the NCNC
in connection with the "Census Issue." Briefly, the conflict
between the NCNC and the NPC was based on the fact that the
allotment of seats in the Federal Parliament is a function
of population. The census, a statistical device, became a
subject of political controversy, when it was shown, truly
or not, that the North had enough people to maintain the
electoral hegemony of the NPC over the Federal Government.
What had started out as a Federal coalition of a
Southern party with a Northern party against a Southern
party, after the census controversy, became a line-up of
1See John P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and
Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966),
p. 547. gensus day was May 13, 1962, but the issue was
politically relevant only by 1963 and especially by Decem-
ber 1964, the Federal election.
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North (with its Southern agents) against South (with its
Northern agents).
The General Strike of 19641
Sequentially, the next crisis for the regionalist sys-
tem is the general strike. Although the strike will be dis-
cussed at greater length below, it should be noted that this
was the first mass manifestation of something going wrong
with the system. This was no matter of a party leader
breaking with another in a moment of pique; close to 800,000
people participated in the strike.
The Federal Election Crisis of 1964-652
Like theater, event followed event with some inexorable
logic, leading to the destruction of the constitutional sys-
tem. With the census issue still hot in the minds of the
NCNC, with the Yorubas growing daily more alienated from a
Western Regional Government, which represented a small elite
section of the population, and above all, was an agent of
the Northern NPC, with the cities of the South still recov-
ering from the general strike, the nation prepared itself
for the first Federal election since independence.
By the fall of 1964, the Nothern party, the NPC, with
its Southern ally, the NNDP, formed an electoral coalition
1For an excellent summary of the strike, see William
H. Friedland, "Paradoxes of African Trade Unionism: Organ-
izational Chaos and Political Potential," Africa Report,
Vol. 10, No. 6 (June, 1965).
2Mackintosh, p. 545.
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calling itself the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA); at
about the same time, the remaining Southern parties formed
a coalition called the United Progressive Grand Alliance
(UPGA). The issue, of course, was control of the Center.
When the NNA announced that 68 candidates from the North
were running uncontested elections, within weeks of voting
day, it became clear that UPGA would lose, and so UPGA
decided to boycott the election. It was rumored that UPGA
expected, with or without the help of the President,
Dr. Azikiwe, to stage a coup, but after sounding out the
army, it decided against this move, and the boycott turned
into a political fiasco for UPGA. The NNA emerged on top.
The Western Region Uprising and the Coup
The victory of the NNA proved to be a pyrrhic one.
With constitutional means blocked, Southern politicians
began seriously to consider extra-constitutional measures
to redress the balance between North and South, and es-
pecially, to prevent Southern wealth (oil in the East
particularly) from being used to develop the poorer North.
The final test case for constitutionalism was to be
the Western Region Election scheduled for the summer of 1965
actually taking place later in October 1965. Observers recall
that UPGA was convinced that it would win this election and
that if it did not, "blood would flow in the West." The
1See West Africa, January 9, 1965.
NNDP claimed that "the AG is a dead party." Ultimately,
both proved to be correct.
As it turned out, the NNDP government in power in the
West rigged the election, and the UPGA, as it had promised,
took terrible revenge. When it was rumored that Ahmadu
Bello, leader of the NPC, and S. L. Akintola of the NNDP
were going to use the Army to crush the UPGA, the Army, that
mortician of constitutional rule, shot them, ended the
strife and the old order.
The story of the regionalist system and its demise
is still to be told. What concerns us here are not the
political party elites of that system but the young men
like the Zikists who had been opposed to the regionalist
system from its inception. With the banning of the Zikist
movement and with the apparent success of the nationalist
leaders in winning independence, many Zikists and other
radicals made their peace with regionalism and tribalism.
A group of young men did not. Since 1950 they have worked
in various organizations but especially within the labour
movement keeping intact the belief in a unified Nigeria.
Among these were the Marxist Youths.
The Youth have at least three characteristics. They
are anti-regionalist, they are Marxists, and they work in
the labour movement. While neither their anti-regionalism,
Marxism, or labour affiliation posed any serious political
threat to the regionalist system and the major parties in-
volved with it, the Youths, in their attempt to launch a
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political base explicitly on these elements, become an inter-
esting case study in the political implementation of ideology.
Our primary goal in this study is to describe and explain
the political mind of the Youths, but before we can talk
about what the Youths thought of politics, it is necessary
to turn to the site of their work, the labour movement. In
discussing the labour movement we are interested in three
questions: (1) what is the Nigerian labour movement and who
is in it? (2) how did people in the labour movement become
aware of political issues and in particular who are the
radicals in the labour movement? (3) how did the Youths
get involved with the labour movement? Once we touch on
these three questions we shall be in a position to discuss
what the Youths think of politics and how they view the
labour movement as fitting into their political calculations.
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CHAPTER III
THE LABOUR MOVEMENT
We shall discuss the labour movement under four
headings: (1) The Workers, (2) The Trade Unions, (3) The
Central Labour Bodies, and (4) The Labour Parties.
The Workers
Here by "workers" we mean "wage earners." The signifi-
cant political fact about wage earners is that they make up
a tiny fraction of the Nigerian population. However, if one
assumes that most wage earners live in urban centers, then
as we show below, workers make up a sizable fraction of the
urban population. These two observations have some relevance
for a discussion of the workers in the regionalist system.
The discussion of the workers we shall subdivide into four
subsections: (1) Wage Earners in the Regionalist System,
(2) Employers, (3) Occupational Groups, (4) Earnings and
Cost of Living.
Wage Earners in the Regionalist System
As of 1963, about 8000,000 to a million Nigerians are
wage earners; about 4,000,000 or 10% of Nigerians live in
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Taking only urban areas defined as towns with a popu-
lation of 20,000 or more, wage earners constituted 30% of
the Lagos population, 5% of the Western Region urban
1The 800,000 to a million figure is quoted by National
Manpower Board, Manpower Situation in Nigeria, 1963. Lagos.
The 4,000,000 figure is used by the Annual Abstract of Statis-
tics, 1963, Lagos. The population figure assumes a rate of
growth of between 2 and 4per cent from the 1953 census
figures. In 1953 the population of Nigeria was to the nearest
ten million, 30,000,000 and the population living in urban
areas of 20,000 or more was to the nearest million, 3,000,000.
48
towns with a population of 20,000 of more. If one assumes
that most wage earners live in towns, about one-quarter of
the urban population consists of wage earners. These
figures can be broken down by region as follows:
TABLE 3.1--Employment Trends by Regions, 1958-1960*
Region Sept. 1958 Sept. 1959 Sept. 1960
Lagos 95,600 94,900 94,500
West 96,300 97,300 133,000
North 150,800 141,000 144,200
East 98,100 100,000 128,200
Total 440,800 433,400 499,900
*Table 3.1 is adapted from Table IIC of Manpower Sit-
uation in Nigeria 1963, p. 7. The discrepancy between the
one million figure and the statistics of Table 3.1 and
Table IIC is accounted for by the statistics of Table IIC
being those of"establishments employing ten or more workers.'
See p. 7 of Manpower Situation in Nigeria, 1963.
-- Rd
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population, 20% of the Northern urban population, and 20%
of the Eastern urban population.
Thus although the wage earning population constitutes
at most 3% of the Nigerian population as a whole, in urban
centers such as Lagos, Port Harcourt, and Zaria wage earners
constitute a more sizeable proportion of the population
Simple numbers tell us a great deal about the politi-
cal significance of the workers. From the perspective of
political parties who need numbers to win elections it is
clear that the workers were not an important segment of the
population. It comes as no surprise therefore that in
the full bloom of regionalismworkers and their leaders
carried very little weight in the deliberations of the major
regionalist parties. From the perspective of the Youths,
had they complete support from all the workers, they would
still have had the support of only 3% of Nigeria. However,
as we shall see below, what was significant for the Youths
was that 30% of Lagos consisted of wage earners, and ac-
cording to the Youths, Lagos was the shape of the future.
If they could capture the wage earning vote in Lagos the
Youth could be confirmed in their belief that they were the
vanguard of things to come.
1These figures are correct to the nearest ten per cent.
Assuming a rate of growth of 2 to 4 per cent they are derived
from the 1953 census. The low figure for the Western region
can be explained by two factors. First, Lagos draws many
Yoruba wage earners. Second, the Yoruba Western region un-
like other regions of Nigeria is largely populated by tradi-
tional towns whose growth preceded the modern wage-earning
economy. The generalization, that about one-fourth of urban
centers consists of wage earners is therefore not true for
the Western region without Lagos.
TABLE 3.2--Employment in 1962 by Type of Employer*
Type of Employer No. of Persons Returned Percentage
Federal Government 48,073 9
Regional Government 74,605 15
Local Government 72,554 14
Public Corporations 75,800 16
Commercial Firms 200,309 38
Voluntary Agencies 47,464 9
Total 518,805 101
*This table is adapted from Table
Abstract of Statistics 1964. Lagos.
3.6 of the Annual
We note that 54% of Nigerian wage earners come under
the ken of one of the governments or one of the public cor-
porations (ultimately run by ministries of the Federal
Government), and that 38% work for commercial firms. The
first number alerts us to the fact that industrial relations
in Nigeria will necessarily include government as employer.
Workers ask, "It is Nigerian government, why do the politi-
cians not raise our wages?" Imagine what happens if
50
Employers
Judging from Table 3.2, the principal employer of the
workers are the governments: Federal, Regional, Local, and
the Public Corporations. The next major employer of workers
are the commercial firms.
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government cannot raise wages but at the same time insists
on paying European-type salaries to higher civil servants and
to elected representatives. The second figure alerts us
to the fact that the second largest employer after the
governments are the commercial firms. But the commercial
firms are largely European owned or controlled. If the
government does not support the workers in their demands
for higher wages in the private sector, it lays itself open
to siding with Europeans against Nigerians. Accusations of
corruption and neo-colonialism are right around the corner.
The vulnerability of government stemming from its heavy
involvement in the economy is not lost on the Youths.
Occupational Groups
From Table 3.3 we note that the great majority of
Nigerian workers belong to the category of unskilled, "Gen-
eral Labour."
It is clear that when the Youths speak of the "workers"
they mean above all the third and perhaps the second cate-
gories. These categories are most important not only because
between them they account for 94% of the wage earning force
but because, since independence, they have been most agitated
by the difference in wages between themselves and elites
of the upper civil service and political parties. We shall
1 It is no accident that many of the most anti-regionalist
Youths such as A. Ikord and Wahab Goodluck head trade unions
in the private sector.
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return to this point again when we discuss the General
Strike of 1964. Let us turn to the question of wages.
TABLE 3.3--Occupational Groups*
Group Number Per cent
Professional and administrative 32,793 6
Minor professional, skilled, clerical,
sales 134,667 26
General labour 351,345 68
Total 518,805 100
*Adapted from Table 3.4, Annual Abstract of Statistics
1964. Lagos.
Earnings and Cost of Living
If 68% of the Nigerian wage earning force consists of
general labour, let us consider how much these people earn,
how well they have done over time, and how wage gains com-
pare to the rise in cost of living. The difference between
the two last variables should give us another indication
of conflict from which the Youth can profit.
The figures in Table 3.4 are, after all, average
figures; many are lucV to earn up toX100.0. To get the
political significance of these figures consider that some
senior civil servants and ministers earn more than 43000.0
per year and that the cost of living has been rising. Let
the situation of hewers working for the Nigerian Coal
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Corporation serve as an example. In the period 1956 to
1962, wages went up about 20% from f14.8.2 to $17.10.2.
In this same period the average cost of living index in
Enugu, the site of the mines, rose by 33% from 112 to 149
and in some cases the index doubled during the same period.1
TABLE 3.4--Average Yearly Cash Earnings by Type of Employer
(in a s)*
Employer Average Cash
Earnings 1962
Federal Government
Government Corporations
Regional Governments
242.9
243.0
192.2
120.8
174.1
186.2
Local Governments
Commercial
All Employees
*Table adapted from Table 3.8, p. 30 of Annual Abstract
of Statistics 1964. To convert to dollars, multiply pounds
by 2.6.
Of course it is difficult to argue from wage statistics
to political consequences. One needs the intervening effect
of perceptions. Did the workers and their leaders perceive
discrepancies between what they earned and what others
earned and between what they earned and the cost of living?
To both questions the answer is, certainly. The Joint Action
1Annual Abstract of Statistics 1964, Tables 5.3 and
Tables 10.11.
Committee quoted similar statistics. We present this fact
not as further evidence of economic trends, but as evidence
of felt or perceived injustices. One of the reasons trade
unionism has grown so quickly in Nigeria lies precisely in
this perceived injustice in wage differences. Let us then
turn to a discussion oftrade unions.
Trade Unions
We shall discuss trade unions under four headings:
(1) The Origins of Trade Unions, (2) Trade Union Organiza-
tion, (3) The Number of Youths in the Trade Unions, and
(4) Strikes.
The Origins of Trade Unions
Although here we are concerned with the history of
the trade union movement only insofar as it touches on
identifying the Youths and in clarifying what they do, we
must note that trade unionism in Nigeria represents one of
the earliest forms of modern social organization.
The first firm evidence of the rise of modern trade
unionism is provided by the formation of the Nigerian
Civil Service Union Monday, 19 August 1912. This
inaugural meeting . . . was called "in order to con-
sider the ways and means of inaugurating a league of
Civil Service officials." 2
The Joint Action Committee was a committee of trade
unionists formed in September 1963. This committee led the
General Strike of 1964. See page below.
T. M. Yesufu, Industrial Relations in Nigeria, (London and
N.I.S.E.R.., Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 34.
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But the- early unions were composed mostly of white
collar workers who had banded together to improve con-
ditions of service,not to bargain radically over wages
and certainly not to go on strike.
During the meeting of 15 November 1912 a proposed
amendment to the draft rules and regulations that the
objects of the union should include the discussion
of all matters affecting the Native staff "with a view
to common action being taken" was lost. The founders
of the union seemed satisfied that their objects could
be met by provisions for "periodical contributions--
lectures and addresses--to be delivered from time to
time. 1
Until the second World War and the passing of the Trade
Union Ordinances on April 1, 1939, the history of the
Nigerian trade union movement was largely the history of
three unions: the Nigerian Union of Teachers, the Nigerian
Civil Service Union, and the Nigerian Railway Workers Union.2
After 1939 the pace of unionization quickened.
By 1940 there were fourteen registered unions, repre-
senting 4337 workers. By 1941 the number of unions increased
threefold, the number of members increased fourfold and the
number of strikes increased six fold. Under the impetus of
the Labour Secretary and following wage agitations for in-
creased Cost of Living Allowance (COLA), amalgamation grew
apace. In October and November of 1941, four civil service
unions joined to form the Aftican Civil Service and Tech-
nical Workers Union (ACSTWU), with L. A. Nkedive, President,
and M. Imoudu, Vice-President. In November 1942, the first
2 See pp, 8 5-90 below.l Ibid ., P.- 35.
Trade-Union Congress (TUC) is formed With ,T. A. Bankole, of
the Land and Survey Workers ias Chairman, S. 0, Coker, of the
Railwag Wotkers'Union (RWU) as' Vice-Chairman and N. A. 'Tokun-
boh, of the;Railway Station Staff Union as General Secretary.
The statistical story of trade union growth is sum-
marized in Table 3.5 below. We shall return to the histori-
cal aspects of trade union development when we deal with
the rise of militancy in the trade union movement in Chap-
ter IV. Let us now briefly turn to trade union organization
keeping in mind especially what consequences it has for the
Youths.
Trade Union Organization
As of 1964 an estimated 30 per cent of wage earners
or about 300,000 workers are members of trade unions, and
about 60 per cent of wage earners in establishments of ten
or more people are members of trade unions.2
Trade unionization has occurred in all industries as can
be seen from Table 3.6 below. It is estimated that 37 per
cent of trade unionists belong to craft unions, 45 per cent
to industrial unions and about 16 per cent to general
unions. The remaining 2 per cent belong to guilds. The
1Herbert A. Tulatz, Die Gewerkshaftsentwicklung
Nigerias (Hanover: Verlag Fur Literatur Und Zeitgeschehen,
1963).
2These estimates are based on rounding-off the number
of trade unionists to 300,000 and on assuming the existence
of 1,000,000 wage earners and 500,000 wage earners in es-
tablishments of 10 or more workers. The 300,000 figure is
based on Yesufu's report of 235,742 corrected for population
growth.
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TABLE 3.5--Trade Union and Strike Statistics in Nigeria.
No. of No. of No. of Work Days
Year Registered Members Strikes Strikers LostUnions
1940 14
1941 41
1942 80
1943 85
1944 91
1945 97
1946 100
1947 109
1948 127
1949 140
1950 144
1951 124
1952 131
1953 152
1954 177
1955 382
1956 270
1957 298
1958 318
1959 347
1960 347
1961 331
1962 N.D.*
1963 N.D.*
1964(June)556***
1964(June 14-
Sept.)
4,337
17,044
26,156
28,000
30,000
27,621
52,747
76,362
90,864
109,998
144,389
152,230
143,282
153,089
165,130
175,987
198, 265
234,742
25)4,097
259,072
260,00
276,677
282,800
N.D.*
300,000
300,000
1
6
11
6
9
13
10
28
20
46
19
38
26
33
30
43
30
49
53
54
65
58
N.D.*
N.D.*
Gen. Strik
89
500
3,338
5,292
3,927
1,522
55,871
6,468
17,416
7,375
50,000
31.987
6,930
11,855
10,024
6,602
89,522
23,623
N' D. *
19,046
23,072
33,731
18,673
N.D.*
N.D.*
e 300,000-
1,000,000
18,194
N.D.*
N.D.*
N.D.*
N.D.*
5,541
1,800,000
132,000
132,000
N.D.*
577,000
286,351
20,243
59,847
26,874
12,166
901,600
61, 297
63,4oo
73, 095
70,862
157,373
57,303
N.D.*
N.D.*
5,200,000-
14,600,000**
68,375
*N.D.= No Data
**This estimate assumes that the number of strikers
varied between 300,000 and 1,000,000 which is the estimated
number of wage earners. The strike lasted for fourteen days
(see Chapter IX below).
***This figure is based on a listing kept by the registrar
of trade unions.v The actual number', estimated by the regis-
trar, is 300.
SOURCES: Tulatz,, p. 127; Yesufu, 57; Annual Report of the
Federal Ministry of Labour, 1960-61 (Apapa: Nigerian National
Press, 1964); ARML 1961-62; Quarterly Review, Federal Ministry
of Labour, September 1964, Lagos.
figure of 45% membership in industrial unions masks the fact
that 80% of these are house unions. Like an industrial union,
the house union is composed of workers in the industrybut
unlike the industrial union the house union limits its mem-
bership only to those workers working "in the house," usually
for one employer.
TABLE 3.6--Trade Union Organization by Industry, 1958.*
Total No. No. of unions Membership
Industry of Unions Rendering ReturnedReturns
Agriculture, Forestry
and Fishing 20 20 52,103
Mining and Quarrying 14 14 26,575
Manufacturing 20 37 10,926
Building and Construction 22 20 8,037
Electricity, Water,
Sanitation 8 8 4,220
Commerce 45 39 7,758
Transport and
Communications 66 62 44,458
Services 77 66 80,110
Others 6 6 1,555
All Industries 298 272 235,742
*Adapted from Yesufu, p. 41
The Number of Youths in the Trade Unions
The fact that a great number of workers belong to house
unions has multiplied the number of unions in Nigeria far be-
yond the needs of organization. As of 1965, there were about
600 unions registered with the Registrar of Trade Unions.
Assuming that of the approximately 600 about 300 were opera-
tive and considering that every union had about 10 men on its
executive, this would mean that there existed about 3,000
m
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executive trade union positions. This may be an underesti-
mate since some of the larger unions such as the Post and
Telegraph Workers Union include branch unions with their own
executive committees. On the other hand, this may be an over-
estimate since any five men could join to register a union.
Limiting ourselves to the executives of trade unions,
it can be estimated that about one-third or about 1,000 exec-
utive positions could be occupied by Marxists, but a smaller
number would actually be in control of the Youths who com-
manded the central labour bodies.
Strikes
One notes from Table 3.5 that since the 1940's the strike
has been a frequently used weapon in Nigeria. All major
strikes such as those in 1945, 1955, and 1964 were strikes
over wages. It is noteworthy that none were settled by
existing industrial relations machinery, but by committees
and "Commissions or Arbitrations." 2 Thus, for example, after
the general strike of 1945, the Tudor Davis commission is
appointed to deal with the problem of the Cost of Living Al-
lowance (COLA). In 1955 the Gorsuch Commission is appointed
to inquire into conditions of employment of the established
staff of all the Governments. In 1963 the Morgan commission
is appointed to inquire into conditions of service and wages
in both governments and private employment.
lOut of 300 possible responses to a mailed question-
naire, we received 56 replies; of these, one-third were from
trade union executives in the two central labour bodies which
were then currently influenced if not controlled by Youths.
It is on this basis that we estimate the number of positions
possibly open to Youths to be at least one-third of the total
number of positions. One-third is an underestimate because
Marxists would be less likely than non-Marxists to respond to
an "American social scientist."
2Yesufu, p. 59.
Appointing commissions to deal with labour issues has
been a consequence of conflict between government and labour, but
it has also caused conflict between government and labour.
It should be noted that government as employer can change the
wages and conditions of service of its workers but it cannot
do so by fiat in the private sector. However, workers in the
private sector have never accepted this division of respon-
sibilities. Consequently whenever there is an adjustment in
wages in the public sector, agitation for a wage adjustment
takes place in the private sector. This accounts for the
great number of work days lost. For example, in 1955, after
workers in government service got a raise, workers in private
establishments also demanded their "Gorsuch." Note, also,
that in 1964, there were 68,375 days lost after June 14, when
the General Strike was already over. This is accounted for
by disputes between workers in private establishments who in-
sisted on their "Morganf and employers who refused to follow
government in raising wages.
We shall discuss general strikes in greater detail in
Chapters V and IX. Here let us note that one cannot under-
stand about the timing and the organization of general strikes
without reference to central labour bodies. It is to these
that we next turn.
The Central Labour Bodies
* We shall discuss the central labour bodies under seven
headings: (1) Organization, (2) Youths and Neutralists,
(3) International Affiliation, (4) ANTUF, (5) Break in ANTUF
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Due to International Affiliation, (6) After ANTUF,
(7) Youths in the Central Labour Bodies.
Organization
Constitutionally the Nigerian central labour bodies
beginning with the first Trade Union Congress are modeled
after the British TUC. They have a full time staff most of
whose members are elected at the annual or biannual confer-
ences. The staff tries to coordinate efforts of the member
unions with the central labour body by means of appointed field
secretaries. The purpose of the central labour bodies is
to coordinate member unions in joint efforts beneficial to
the labour movement. 1 In practice this has largely meant
that the elected and appointed staff is left without very
much to do until a movement for a major strike develops.
1Some issues with which one central labour body, the
United Labour Congress (ULC) sees itself concerned are as
follows:
Resolutions passed at ULC Lagos District Council meeting,
Nov. 23, 1962, in observance of Labour Week, 1962:
1. ULC directs letters to all the political parties
. . . expressing disappointment at the reception
which the problems of workers . . . and the claim
for improved wages has received from the various
governments . . .
2. ULC undertakes . . . organization of all grades
of workers, including agricultural and other self-
employed . . . sponsors . . . amalgamation of all
unions with the same identity . . .
19. ULC reiterates its support . . . in matter of
Britain's entry into common market
20. . . . ULC shall remain affiliated with the
ICFTU, but the Congress shall take all reasonable
steps to relieve that organization . . . of finan-
cial obligations connected with routine expenses of
Congress.
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Although, constitutionally, the full time staff of the
central labour bodies is to be supported by the member-
ship dues of the member unions, it had been reported that,
in practice, up to 90% of the salaries, rent, mail and other
expenses are paid by foreign support.
Youths and Neutralists
Although there appear to have been many central labour
bodies called by many different names in Nigeria, closer
examination reveals two major factions divided by two issues.
The two are the Youths and for want of a better term, the
Neutralist faction. Unlike the Youths who are anti-
regionalist and Marxist, the Neutralists have accommodated
themselves as best they could to the regionalist system,
and they have supported alignment of Nigerian trade unions
to the pro-Western International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU) and opposed the Youths in their bid
to affiliate Nigerian trade unions to the pro-Eastern
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).
It should be made clear in what sense the Neutralists
are neutral. They are neutral in the sense that they allow
individual trade unionists to join political parties of
their choice, but they are not neutral with respect to the
political party alignment and the international alignment
of the central labour bodies and the trade unions.
I
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Domestically they insist that the labour movement be in-
dependent of all' parties. Thus, for example, the United Labour
Congress, the direct descendant of the very earliest neutral-
ist faction, lists in its constitution the following proviso:
The United Labour Congress seeks to fight against the
projection of capitalism, communism, fascism, and
national political partisanship in the Nigerian Labour
Movement, but without prejudice to the rights of in-
dividual trade unionists to believe in any brand of
political ideology or belong to a political party of
his own choice. 1
This article, if seriously meant, places the ULC at odds
with a group such as the Nigerian Trade Union Congress, all
of whose officers are officers of the Socialist Workers and
Farmers Party, a Marxist party. The aims of the NTUC are
not only those of trade unionism but are those of estab-
lishing "scientific socialism" in Nigeria. Moreover if
seriously meant, this article precludes political activity
and precludes the challenging of the regionalist parties
by the ULC.
Internationally, the Neutralists are not neutral.
Article 2, Section 15 of the constitution states:
The ULC seeks to maintain fraternal relationships
or affiliate with international trade union or-
ganizations as shall be determined by the Congress
in accordance with this constitution.
Since 1956 the Neutralists have affiliated with the "Anti-
12
Communist" International Confederation of Free Trade Unions."
1Draft Constitution of the United Labour Congress of
Nigeria, Article 2, Section 12.
2It should be noted that since 1956, publicly, the
Youths have denied that they are trying to affiliate trade
I
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The two issues of anti-regionalism and international
affiliation did not divide the two factions at the same
time. The first issue to separate the two factions was the
issue of political alignment and anti-regionalism. Thus
the first Trade Union Congress which had been founded
31 July, 1943 was split after the strike of 1945 into a
faction of militants who wanted to align unions to the
NCNC and a faction which opposed the alignment of the TUC
to any political party. The militant group called itself
the Nigerian National Federation of Labour. The NNFL
was the forerunner of all the central labour bodies that
the Youths were to control subsequently. When we conclude
the discussion of the strike of 1945 we shall touch on the
formation of the NNFL.1 Here let us deal briefly with the
issue of international affiliation and its consequences
for the division of the Nigerian labour movement. The
issue of international affiliation becomes salient with
the end of the second World War and the emergence of the
Cold war.
International Affiliation
There have always been international forces at work
on Nigeria but never with such frequency and intensity as
unions to any world body. It has been said, however, that
the Youths have received support and funds from Ghana and
from countries of the Eastern bloc. It was rumoured that
on the eve of the Federal Elections, the Socialist Workers
and Farmer Party received 450,000 from East Germany.
lSee pages 119-122.
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during and after the second World War. Students, returning
soldiers and especially labour leaders became involved in
international politics after the war. For example, by 1945,
E. E. Esua of the Nigerian Union of Teachers was sent as
an advisor on colonial matters with the British delegation
to the international labour conference. In February of
the same year, President Bankole and General Secretary
Tokunboh of the Nigerian TUC attended the congress of the
World Federation of Trade Unions. Since then hundreds of
Nigerian trade union leaders affiliated to one or the other
faction have traveled to the East and West.
On 28 November, 1949, the World Federation of Trade
Unions split into an anti-communist wing calling itself the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and a pro-
communist wing retaining the old name. This split was to
have important consequences for the unity of the Nigerian
central labour bodies for it precipitated the splintering
of the ANTUF, the central labour body under which the NNFL
and the TUC factions had come together in the early fifties.
ANTUF
The All Nigerian Trade Union Federation (ANTUF) was
founded by 29 unions on July 31-August 2, 1953. The new
1Preceding the creation of the ANTUF, in July 1952,
Youths and Neutralists formed a committee to prepare the
foundations of the new federation. The Chairman of the com-
mittee was M.A.O.Imoudu and the secretary was L.U.Agonsi
boty of the Nigerian Railway Workers Union. Others on the
committee were H.P.Adebola of the Railway Station Staff
Union, M.I.Ajorgbor of the Nigerian Civil Service Union,
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central labour body was formed when the Youths, especially
the former Zikists among them, were discredited by Azikiwe
and broke with the NCNC. At this time the labour leaders
of the TUC and the NNFL ceased quarrelling over affiliation
to the NCNC. Moreover, the Youths were still not fully
committed to the formation of a labour party. Hence, the
two factions could unite and did in the ANTUF. But the co-
alition of factions was a restless one ready to break over
another issue. This other issue was international affiliation.
Break in ANTUF Due to International Affiliation
On April 1956 the Council of ICFTU Affiliated Trade
Unions with L. U. Agonsi, secretary, was set up by the ICFTU
in Nigeria. Five unions and a federation of unions in mer-
cantile houses joined the Council. A few months later the
Enugu Council of Labour and the Nigerian Civil Service Union,
formerly independents, applied for admission to the Council
and to the ICFTU.
In November 1956, at the fourth annual conference of
the ANTUF, which took place in Ebute-Metta, the Youths put
together an amendment giving Imoudu greater powers and doing
away with the position of the Chairman and vice-Chairman.
The opposition took the opportunity to reject "communist"
tactics, and tried to pass through a motion calling for
N. A. Cole of Nurses Union, Chief Fagbenro-Beyioku of the
Marine Workers Union, Gogo Chu Nzeribe of the Union of Post
and Telegraph Workers and Ayo Ogunsheye of the Nigerian
Union of Teachers.
67
affiliation with the ICFTU. This motion was defeated 62-
58. A new split was in the offing.
In January 1957, H. P. Adebola, L. L. Borha, N. A.
Cole, N. A. P. Nwana and 0. Egunwoke resigned their execu-
tive posts in the ANTUF and "these decidedlyanti-communist
leaders" as they were to be called by an ICFTU represent-
ative formed the National Council of Trade Unions-Nigeria
(NCTUN). 1
Since 1957 when the ANTUF split the rhetoric of
division between the Youths and the Neutralists was put into
the terms of communist and anti-communist, but.oneshould not
confuse rhetoric with underlying conviction..,-, There is
a group of Youths who are Marxist in the sense of also
supporting the Soviet Union and increasingly China in
1Sec/Gen to Minister of Labour, April 20, 1957,
ref. no. NCTUN. 2/1/57:
The inaugural Congress of the Council held on 17th
of April . . . was attended by delegates from the
following trade unions: Asso. of Loco Drivers, Nigerian
Coal Miners Union, Nigerian Union of Seamen, RTSA,
Amal Union of Customs and Excise Workers, NUNS, Nigerian
African Mineworkers Union, Holts African Workers Union,
R&PTSU, Union of Asiatic Workers, ATMN African Workers
Union, Likomba Plantation Workers Union, NESCO Workers
Union, SCOA Workers Union, Dutch African Workers Union,
Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives, BEWAC African Workers
Union, PZ African Workers Union, Marine Flating Staff
Union, NPA Clerical Staff Union, and Union of Printers
and Allied Workers of Nigeria . . .
The officers of the Council for the year 1957/58 are:
N. A. Cole, Pres. Adebola, Miriki, Okei-Achamba,
F. Olugbake, Vps. 0. Egwunwoke, Tres. L. L. Borha,
Sec/Gen. H. A. P. Nwana, Asst Sec/Gen. Agonsi, Gbadamosi,
Anunobi, Asst Secs.
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international conflicts, and there are Neutralists who look
to the United States and Britain. But the majority of Youths
are Marxists with respect to interpreting internal Nigerian
politics and like their Neutralist friends they have come
to concern themselves with international relations because
they have become dependent on foreign money to keep the
battle going or to build their own influence within the
labour movement.
After ANTUF
After ANTUF and before independence, there are a few
attempts at unity but they all fail. Thus in 1959, the
ANTUF and the NCTUN combine in the Trade Union Congress of
Nigeria, with Michael Imoudu as President and Lawrence
Borha as General Secretary. The TUCN lasts for a few months
but again over the issue of international affiliation the
Youths break with it, and form the Nigerian Trade Union
Congress, In 1960, after months of effort by the Mbadiwe
Unity Committee,2 the two wings fail to unite, but in the
process they change their names into the United Labour
Congress (Neutralists) and the Independent United Labour
Congress (Youths).
1With the introduction of the check-off system (Labour
Code [Amendment] Act 1960) it was believed that some of this
dependence might decrease.
Named after Dr.kkO. Mbadiwe, at the time, Federal
Minister of Commerce and Industry.
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From ~independence in October 1960, to the Federal
Elections of December 1964, the situation changes remarkably.
The British are out and the party Nationalists are in power.
Increasingly the Neutralists in the trade union movement
find it difficult not to turn against the regionalist system
and the party nationalists. As an anti-regionalist faction
begins to grow in the Neutralist camp, a basis for unity begins
to develop between the Neutralists and the Youths. By
September 1963, rapprochement between the two wings has gone
so far as to lead to the formation of the Joint Action Com-
mittee and the joint prosecution of the General Strike in
June 1964.1
Ironically, after independence as rapprochement pro-
ceeds between the two factions, internally the two factions
begin to splinter into sub-factions. On the Neutralist side
dissension between the General Secretary, Lawrence Borha
and some of his Assistant Secretaries leads to the formation
of a breakaway faction led by N. Chukwurah. By 1963, the
Chukwurah faction gets outside financing from the Inter-
national Federation of Christian Trade Unions (an old non-
communist rival of the ICFTU) and founds the Nigerian
Workers Council (NWC). The NWC holds its first conference
in the spring of 1965.
On the Youths'side there develops a crisis between
two factions. The first faction is led by Michael
1See Chapter IX for more extended discussions of
this process of rapprochement.
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Imoudu, Chairman of the IULC and Amnefule Ikoro, the General
Secretary of the IULC. The second faction is led by Wahab
Goodluck, President of the IULC and S. U. Bassey, Assistant
Secretary of the IULC. The dispute begins as a struggle
over the General Secretaryship but soon develops into a
crisis which splits not only the IULC but the Nigerian Youth
Congress and the Socialist Workers and Farmers party. On
the labour side Goodluck and Bassey take over the IULC,
while Imoudu and Ikoro join Gogo Chu Nzeribe in a loose
confederation calling itself the Labour Unity Front.
Youths in the Central Labour Bodies
The Youths have more than a set of beliefs and values
in common. We shall note below that they had no strongly
institutionalized parties, but they were in touch with one
another and they did command some scarce organizational
resources in their labour movement. Thus the Youths were
not randomly scattered throughout the labour movement but
on the contrary one would be more likely to find them in
association with, and against another of, the central
labour bodies.
For example, on the eve of the General Strike of 1964,
one would be more likely to find them in the NTUC than in
the ULC and in the LUF than in the NWC. It should be noted
however that although the leadership of the NTUC
1For a discussion of these organizations and of the
split, see Chapter VI below.
was controlled by Youth and the Secretary of the LUF was
a Youth this does not mean that all Youths were in these
bodies or that all persons in these bodies were Youths.
On the contrary, for example, in the LUF the largest unions
such as the Nigerian Union of Teachers, the Civil Service
Union, and UAC Workers Union were not controlled by
Marxists.
To be precise one must go beyond merely identifying
certain labour organizations with the Youth; one should
keep in mind that the real unit of organization among the
Youths was never an organization such as a trade union or
a central labour body, but a faction or a series of factions.
Each faction was connected to the other by shared elements
of belief and each was divided from the other by allegiance
to this or that leader.
To identify the factions of Youths in the labour move-
ment one has to step outside the trade union movement .
and the central labour bodies, and look at the labour parties
that Youths were trying to launch. More often than not if
there were two or more labour parties outside of the trade
union movement, the Youth wing of the trade union movement
would be divided into factions following this or that
labour party. Let us now consider the Youths and the forma-
tion of labour parties.
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The Youths and the Formation of
a Labour Party'
Before Independence
Since the general strike of 1945 there have been fre-
quent attempts to form a labour party (both Marxist and non-
Marxist) in Nigeria. Thus, in 1947, F. 0. Coker, one of the
militant leaders of the strike of 1945, tried to launch a
labour party but was rebuffed both by Azikiwe and by Imoudu.
In 1949, Nduka Eze and other Zikists, such as Ikenna Nzimiro,
launched the Convention Peoples Party of Nigeria. After
some internal fights, Imoudu, Eze, and Coker broke off to
2found the Nigerian Labour Party. The NLP was the political
wing of the Nigerian National Federation of Labour and its
successor, the Nigerian Labour Congress.
With the banning of the Zikist movement and after the
debacle of the UNAMAG strike in 1950,3 the attempt to found
a labour party is separated from the labour mo*ement and con-
centrated in Marxist "study groups." Although they give
themselves names such as Talakawa Party and the United
Working Peoples Party, these are not parties but groups of
free floating intellectuals, labour leaders, and politicians
1Much of the information in this section is repeated
in later chapters. We include this section to provide the
reader with an overview of some of the attempts to found
a labour party.
2Not to be confused with the NLP founded by Imoudu
in August, 1964.
3See Chapter VI.
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who come together to exchange ideas and to publish manifestos.
In the forefront of such groups are labour leaders such as
Gogo Chu Nzeribe, A. Ikoro, and Michael Imoudu. It is not
until after independence that prospects for launching a
labour party again seem good.
After Independence
On the eve of independence in October 1960, old Zikists
like Mokwugo Okoye, and new Zikists call on "progressive"
youths to join an organization called the Nigerian Youth Con-
gress. By the spring of 1961, the NYC holds its first con-
ference. Although at first the NYC is mostly an educational
arrangement for an organization of like-minded Marxists,
their followers, and students, it takes on life after the
Lumumba riots in Lagos, February 16, 1961. The Nigerian
Youth Congress was the forefront of the riots that took
place in front of the Belgian and American embassies.2 Gogo
Chu Nzeribe read the funeral oration:
Patrice Lumumba, Mopolo and Okito are dead! What
is dead? Is our respect for Lumumba and his
associates dead, or our love for them as comrades,
patriots, or our understanding for the ideas they
lived and died for dead? Has the feeling and
warnings of the neo-colonialist danger they aroused
in our hearts vanished, or our knowledge of them
as honest, courageous men? Surely, these can never
die. True, Lumumba's lips may be dead, his words
lSee p. and p. below.
2The riots were led by the Nigerian Joint Action Com-
mittee for the Congo. The NJACC was sponsored by the Niger-
ian Youth Congress, the NTUC, the Nigerian Union of Students,
and the Pan Africanist Movement. Besides the American em-
bassy there were a number of expatriate firms which were
damaged. See Nigerian Daily Times, 18 February, 1961.
and deeds shall live on in the hearts of us
all!l
Youths like Gogo Chu Nzeribe recall how exhilerated they
felt that at last, after years of study-group workthey were
involved in direct action and no longer isolated.
But the unity and seeming relevance of the NYC was
to be short-lived. A factional dispute which had been
brewing in the labour movement and which was to affect the
NYC as well as other groups erupted in 1963. This factional
dispute to which we turn below was based on ideology as
well as personality and was to divide the labour movement
throughout the period of the General Strike of 1964 and the
Federal Elections of 1964.
Factional Disputes Among the Youths Before the
Strike of 1964
The post-independence factional dispute among the
Youths begins with a contest for power between the A. Ikoro,
Michael Imoudu faction and the Wahab Goodluck, S. U. Bassey
faction for control of the Independent United Labour Congress
(IULC) which by 1962 is the most current name for the central
labour body and the group of unions over which the Youths
have some influence.
Concomittantly as the two factions are jockeying for
power within the IULC, each is also laying the ground-work for
the foundation of a labour party. Secretly the Ikoro-Imoudu
1Gogo Chu Nzeribe, Funeral Oration Delivered on the
Ocassion of Mourning of the Brutal Murder of the Late Patrice
Lumumba, Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo.
Jfaction is sounding out Youths and other trade unionists
for support of what they were planning to call the Revolu-
tionary Socialist Labour Party. The Goodluck-Bassey faction
is sounding out support for what they were going to call
the Labour Party.
In the spring of 1962 at the Jos Conference of the
IULC, having been accused of misappropriating funds, Ikoro
is removed as General Secretary, S. U. Bassey takes his
place and the Imoudu-Ikoro faction quit the IULC. A few
months later most of the faction joins with Gogo Chu
Nzeribe's union and with some other big unions to found a
loose confederation of unions, calling itself the Labour
Unity Front.
When news of the rift reaches the NYC, Eskor-Toyo,
one of its influential secretaries, steps into the breach
to offer his services in reconciliation. Prompted by Eskor-
Toyo and other neutral Youths, the Central Council of the
NYC passes a motion in favour of seeking to unite the warring
factions, but it goes even beyond this step. The Secre-
tariat is asked to call a meeting of all factions in the
labour movement and of Marxist factions outside of the
labour movement in order to study the possibility of
launching a Marxist party under whose wing all factions
could work.
Despite some tensions the conference which is held
on April, 1963, is a success. The delegates support the
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foundation of a Marxist-Leninist party which is to be called
the Socialist Workers and Farmers Party (SWAFP). The Con-
ference concludes its business with the setting up of a
secretariat for the party, naming a committee of twenty-
five to prepare the manifesto and the constitution, and
calling for a resumption of the conference in August.'
No sooner had the April conference completed its
business that conflict develops between the two factions.
It turns out that out of the Imoudu-Ikoro group only Ikoro
is elected to the constitutional committee. If this is not
bad enough, when the committee meets it is discovered that
Ikoro's name has been left out, and he is refused a seat.
These developments Eskor-Toyo explains by suggesting
that Dr. Tunji Otegbeye, the President of the NYC, had all
along been in league with the Goodluck-Bassey faction of
the IULC, and that he and his friends used the opportunity
afforded by Eskor-Toyo's peace keeping efforts to read the
Imoudu-Ikoro faction out of the Marxist movement.
If this interpretation is correct, the tactic of
the Goodluck-Bassey-Otegbeye faction boomeranged. A split
which had divided only the IULC now carries over into the
NYC itself and threatens the unity of the SWAFP. By
August of 1964, two months after the general strike the
1Eskor-Toyo, "Crisis in the Nigerian Youths Congress"
(Lagos: Nigerian Labour Party Publications, 1964), p. 7.
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SWAFP is itself split, and Imoudu, Ikoro, and Eskor-Toyo
found the Nigerian Labour Party.
The "London Group" and the "Professional
Revolutionaries"
Underlying the Imoudu-Ikoro and Goodluck-Otegebeye
split within the left during the sixties are two important
issues: one is the question of roots, and the second is
the question of strategy with respect to the regionalist
parties. Turning to roots one notes that almost everyone
in the Imoudu faction is either a former Zikist or an early
Marxist. Almost no one except for Ikoro, who stayed in
Ghana for six years, has been away from Nigeria. On the
contrary, the Otegbeye group is filled with young men who
instead of pursuing "revolutionary" work in Nigeria, left
Nigeria during the doldrums of the fifties for training
abroad. Thus the epithet "London Group" thrown at them
by Eskor-Toyo, who accuses them of "opportunism" and
'reformism."
It must be stated here that the Otegbeye-Goodluck
group and their petty bourgeois "London Group"
professionals [Otegebeye is a Doctor] do not like
to see Imoudu, Ikoro, Khayam, Jonas and other of
their type, pricisely because these elements are more
revolutionary, more ready to make sacrifices, less
opportunistic . . . . This group is a hardened
group of devoted and professional revolutionaries. . .
It is only to be expected that "old Youths" such as Imoudu
and Eskor-Toyo who have been in the movement since the
Eskor-Toyo, p. 8.
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General Strike of 1945 and before,would be reluctant to
share positions in the movement with new Youths such as
Dr. Otegbeye and Wahab Goodluck.
Turning to the issue of strategy with respect to the
regionalist parties, one notes that there are at least two
positions a Marxist can take. He can choose the more
"progressive" party or a wing of a party and join in a
united front, or he can oppose all regionalist parties.
On the eve of the General Strike and the Federal Elections
of 1964, the Otegbeye-Goodluck faction chose the "united
front" line, and the Imoudu-Eskor-Toyo-Ikoro group chose
the line of opposition and non-cooperation.1
Thus, in 1964, in an obvious allusion to the UPGA,
Dr. Otegbeye wrote:
The party must learn the fine art of winning allies
and supporting the forces which stand on progressive
positions in local conflicts.2
Referring to Otegbeye's call for a united front, Eskor-
Toyo, said in rebuttal:
Rather than seek ways of bringing the devoted revo-
lutionaries around Imoudu . . . into the party,
Otegbeye is more interested in bourgeois groups
like the NCNC, and Action Group. 3
Bourgeois democracy in Nigeria is limited by colonial
and feudal survivals and by imperialism. . . . The
1This was to change with the Electoral crisis of
1964, see Chapter XIV.
2Dr. Tunji Otegbeye, "Ideological Conflicts in Nigerian
Politics," (Lagos: Socialist Workers and Farmers Party,
1964), pp. 22-23.
3Eskor-Toyo, p. 9.
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struggle for national democracy . . . has to be
waged . . . by the workers and peasants. . . . The
revolution . . . can and must lead at once to the
building of socialism.1
The Relative Strengths of the Nigerian Labour
Party and Socialist Workers and Farmers
Party
Because the two parties were short lived it is dif-
ficult to estimate their relative strength. Nevertheless,
we do have election returns for the Federal Election of
December 1964 and March 1965.
Turning to the SWAFP first, in March 1965 it received
18,141 votes out of a total of 1,549,659 cast in the
Eastern RegLon. In December 1964, it received 676 out of
410,841 in the Midwest and 1,530 out of 1,437,429 in the
Western region. It is not possible to estimate the strength
of the SWAFP in the North and in Lagos.
In the North the SWAFP was in favor of the Northern
Progressive Front but it did not contest elections on its
own ticket. The Front won 258,913 out of 2,363,554 votes
cast. In Lagos, the UPGA boycott was so successful in
December that only 500 votes were cast. In March, UPGA swept
the fieldin Lagos, receiving 82,153 votes out of 90,150 cast.2
Taking the results of the Eastern Region as being
least ambiguous, it is possible to note that SWAFP was able
to poll about 1% of the votes cast, In Enugu, where it
1Eskor-Toyo, p. 10.
2For electoral figures see Mackintosh, pp. 597,598,
601, 603.
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was most successful it was able to poll 540 out of 14,765
votes cast. One estimates therefore that about 4% of the
votes cast represents the upper limit of the SWAFP support
in the period we are considering.
Total support for the NLP is even more difficult to
estimate. The party had an even shorter life than the
SWAFP and its candidate in Lagos, Michael Imoudu was pre-
vented in showing his real strength by the boycott of
December 1964. Nevertheless, as we shall see below, 10%
of a sample of trade union leaders indicated unambiguous
support for Imoudu. Assuming the total wage earning popu-
2lation of Lagos at 120,000 and assuming that an upper limit
of 10% would vote for Imoudu if given a chance we can place
an upper limit of 12,000 supporters of Imoudu in Lagos.
Since the NLP was rudimentary in its organization in other
cities one would expect that the 12,000 figure represents
an upper limit for all of Nigeria in the period June 1964
to December 1964.
We shall resume the story of the two factions, the
SWAFP and the NLP. We now turn to a discussion of the
emergence of the Youths in the labour movement and in
Nigerian politics.
Mackintosh, p. 313.
2Annual Abstract of Statistics 1964, Table 2.3. The
upper limit of 12,000 assumes ordinary wage-earners would
vote the way trade-union leaders would vote.
CHAPTER IV
THE EMERGENCE OF THE YOUTHS I: IMOUDU AND
THE RISE OF MILITANT TRADE UNIONISM
ON THE RAILWAYS
Having introduced in Chapters II and III some of the
actors and parameters of the regionalist system and of the
labour movement, we are ready to turn to the question of the
emergence of the Youths. As was stated earlier (Chapter II)
the Youths are anti-regionalist, Marxists, and affiliated
with the labour movement in Nigerian cities. This combina-
tion of characteristics is not incidental, but the product
of Nigerian history giving rise to militancy in the trade
unions, political involvement by labour activists with the
regionalist NCNC, and political disappointment with the NCNC
turned regionalist. We tell the story of the emergence of
the Youths in the labour movement in two ways. First, we
examine the rise of Michael A. 0. Imoudu, a militant trade
union leader on the railways. Second, in Chapter V we shall
examine how this leader and other leaders became politicized
--became more than simply trade unionists--during and after
the general strike of 1945.
Michael Imoudu, the Grand Old Man of the Union
The emergence of militant trade unionism in Nigeria
revolves about a few dedicated men such as Michael Imoudu,
the President of the Nigerian Railway and Ports Workers
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Union; Nduka Eze, the former President of the Zikist Move-
ment, Amnefule Ikoro, once advisor to Kwame Nkrumah and one
of the secretaries of the Nigerian Labour Party; and Gogo
Chu Nzeribe, the General Secretary of the Posts and Telegraph
Workers Union. Of the four, Imoudu is the oldest and most
prominent. His life spans the very inception of militant
trade unionism. It is for this reason that we begin the
story of the Youths with the story of Michael Imoudu, known
as "Number One," or "the Old Man."
Imoudu is the Old Man for three reasons. In a society
which respects age he is the Old Man because he is older than
most leaders--he was born on November 10, 1902. He is an
Old Man because he is an old activist and one of the early
nationalists. Finally, he is the Old Man because in the
stories and legends of the early labour movement, he stands
out as the genuine article: the impoverished, unskilled
worker who founded a union and successfully fought the white
management. When he is being pretentious, he walks about
town in the manner of an Oba, shaking a fly whisk, the symbol
of authority. Yet, his "people" are not the Ora of Ishan
province where he was born, but those whom he calls "the
workers" and "the youth," and they come from many different
tribes to the city. And in still another sense, Imoudu is
called "the Old Man." Imoudu is not an "intellectual."
When he refers to himself, jokingly using pidgin, he says,
"I no read book;" and the young men laugh, some with affec-
tion, others with scorn.
Among the old men and the "Youths" of the nationalist
period, there are few like him. Unlike him, they came to
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the city to earn money and left the city when they became
old, or when they made enough to live in style in their
villages. Imoudu, once he came to Lagos, never left it.
He raised his children there and never bothered to send
them "home." Although he belongs to the Ora town union1
in Lagos, he does not take a leading role in it. Satisfied
with being a patron of the union, he leaves the running of
it to younger men.
Imoudu's militancy on behalf of the trade union may be
due to his being a town man--no longer a man of the "bush"--
committed to city men. How did this come about? Why do
some men live in the city with their bodies, but with their
minds inhabit the country and run to it at the first op-
portunity, while others come to the city and become metro-
politans, city men? Imoudu's past gives us some clues.
Conditions for the Self-Selection of
a Militant
As Imoudu tells the story, when he was a boy and
heard of his father's exploits in the outside world, he
was overcome by a yearning for adventure and ran away. He
was so cunning in eluding his people, that he was not
brought back for many days. Unlike other men in the city
and labour force in general, farmers, artisans, or traders,
that is, men who made their living in and from the village,
1"Town unions," "progressive unions," "family unions,"
are all terms designating voluntary associations in the city
whose membership is based on common kinship or at least
common ethnic ties.
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Imoudu's father was a soldier who, during the war of 1914,
saw something of the outside world in East Africa, Could
it be that because his father was the first to break the
crust of village life, Imoudu did not, in guilt perhaps,
have to return to it? His father had set Imoudu free for
the city. Being the second generation to have close con-
tact with the city and its ways, Imoudu is similar to many
of the much younger Youth, A break with the village allows
a man like Imoudu certain freedoms even his younger followers
find radical. For example, Imoudu has had three wives, but
only the second is an Ora from his village. The other two
are Bini-speaking and not acquainted with his people.
In 1922, both his parents died on the same day, and
the young man was left as a houseboy in the family of one
of his father's relations, Izeke, a linesman of the rail-
ways. Taking Imoudu along, this Izeke traveled from Benin
to other cities in the Midwest and East. In his early
twenties, Imoudu lived in cities like Warri, Sapele, and
Onitsha. His school fees paid by his relative, Imoudu began
his education at the Sapele Christian Missionary Society
(CMS) Grammar School and completed Standard Six at Agbo
Government College, Onitsha. In the meantime, he had also
become a Catholic, and learned fluent Ibo. In his social-
ization by a "Metropolitan" relative, his early traveling,
his acquisition of an education far from his native region,
his learning of other Nigerian languages, Imoudu is once again
suprisingly typical of Youths in the labour movement.
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One suspects that in general, education, early travel,
foreign languages, early contact with a citified relative
are all preconditions for becoming a leader of city people.
It is in having a father who had broken with the village
that allows a man to esteem city people and become a city
man.
Formation of Political Attitudes: Africanization
on the Railways and the Emergence of
Militant Leaders
In 1929, at the age of twenty-six, Imoudu came to Lagos
looking for work. He stayed a year with James Ajemai, a
townsman, before he found work as a laborer on the railways
at 3 shillings a day. A year later he became an apprentice
turne.r and thus began his career on the railway.
Imoudu says that it was during his seven-year appren-
ticeship that he began to sense the injustices of some of
the practices on the railway. For example, labourers were
hired and when no longer needed, they were sacked regardless
of how long they had been working. He sensed the all-
pervasive fear and insecurity of the African workers on a
white-run line. He called this fear, "the ugly ghost."'
A few months after qualifying as a turner, he was involved
in his first strike action, "to protest the arrogant treat-
ment by the European foreman."2 Accustomed to mady acquies-
cence, if not indeed dependence from trade unions, a
paternalistic management could not accept new types of
l 2Personal interview.
Ibid.
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leaders like Imoudu, who went out of their way to be arro-
gant, to create troubles on the railways. Consider that as
late as December 31, 1940, the secretary of the African Civil
Service Union on the railways, could end a letter to the
General Manager with the words: "My association is delighted
to feel that the relationship between them and the Honourable
General Manager are fast assuming those of a son and father,
a ward and guardian." And now one understands the conster-
nation of one Mr. T. B. Welch, who on December 1, 1943,
wrote to the Chief Mechanical Engineer:
At 9:55 a.m. I witnessed the works manager calling
Imoudu back from the carriage and wagon shop. . . .
Imoudu turned round but took no notice whereupon
the works manager sent his messenger to call him
back. Imoudu informed the messenger, "I am not
going back." About three minutes later, I saw
Imoudu outside the office . . . and stated that
either Mr. Duggan was the Manager of the workshops
or Imoudu. [To this the cheeky Imoudu replied,]
"He may be the Manager of the shops, but I am the
Manager of the men." 2
Sixteen years later, Imoudu led his union on a strike in
the railways which culminated in the resignation of the
expatriate General Manager and his replacement by a Nigerian,
for the first time in the history of the Nigerian railway.
The practicef f using the strike for quasi-political
purposes was initiated by Imoudu and others in the semi-
nationalist, semi-industrial struggles against the white
1NRC File No. GMS 28, Vol. I, Files of Nigerian Rail-
way Corporation, Lagos.
2NRC File SC 24.12, Vol. 2; RWU, Nigerian Railway Corp.
Lagos.
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imperial management. That these militants were able to
call the workers out on strike over issues which began
with "arrogance" and ended in the series of strikes in
1959, leading to the resignation of Sir Ralf Emerson, the
General Manager, is a development stemming only partly from
the capacities of the leaders or the degree of their
militancy. It is important to turn now to the changes in
industrial relations on the railways, to understand why
there existed a "market" of workers' interests which could
be "sold" the anti-imperialist appeals of the leaders.
Differentiation of the Industrial from the
Traditional Sector and Integration of
Blue Collar Workers into Trade Unions
If the two processes which characterize modernization
are differentiation and integration of institutional spheres,
structures, and roles with respect to values of achievement
and universalism, then the history of trade union growth on
the railways shows symptoms of modernization.
The development of trade unions seems to have had two
sources. One was the white management, which needed better
relations with its staff, and the other, the African workers
who needed more money and better conditions of service to
live well in the city. As would be expected, the management
thought it better to begin with the literate and "docile"
clerks, than with the illiterate and unruly, semi-rural,
daily-paid workers. Thus, in April, 1919, we have a note
sent to the General Manager of the railways, reading:
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We are requested by a meeting of the railway em-
ployees at EB [Ebute-Metta, Lagos] Headquarters
to inform you that a union of Native Staff of
Nigerian Railway has been formed which will be
worked on similar lines to the NCSUI in Lagos
2
In the same year, the First Annual Report of the Nigerian
Railway Native Staff Union (as the NSNR came to be called)
bears the entry: "It was also agreed that unskilled
labourers are not eligible." 3
The first officers were elected by a meeting of "Senior
and first class clerks of all departments."4  The President,
N. P. Willians, the Vice-President, A. S. Coker, and the
Secretary, J. D. Akihanmi were Africans. The critical post
of treasurer was co-opted by Mr. Faulkner Shaw, an officer
of the railway, and an Englishman.5
Although 'the first signs of unionization were "cordial
meetings" in the General Manager's office, called at the
behest of Mr. Faulkner Shaw, something was soon heard from
the "unskilled labourers." We have the following entry,
dated January, 1920:
There was a strike of some workmen on daily wages
in the Loco Department at EB which . . . spread
rapidly throughout the line and affected Ibadan,
Offa, Minna, Zaria . . . also members of menial
staff of the Traffic Department. The workmen in
the Public Works and the Marine Departments at
Lagos and Apapa struck at the same time.
1Nigerian Civil Service Union, founded 19 August 1912.
2
"Annual Report of NRNSU Jan. 22, 1919-Dec. 31, 1920,"
Files of Nigerian Railway Corporation, Lagos.
b5Ibid. Ibid.Ibid.
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The cause seems to have been "discontent" due to "insuf-
ficiency of wages, the cost of living having abnormally
increased." 1
Although the workers went on strike because of a wage
issue, it is interesting to note that in 1920, neither their
organization, nor they themselves were as yet segregated
from traditional influences:
A general mass meeting of mechanics and labourers
. . . was held at Lagos where Faulkner Shaw, N. F.
Williams, A. S. Coker, J. M. Okuyiga, and J. D.
Akihanmi addressed the workers, pointing out that
the strike was not constitutional and urging the
men to return to work . . .2
At this meeting Chief Oluwa, of Lagos and another white-
capped chief, as delegates from Prince Eleke were present.
They also addressed the meeting.
The conditions under which the workers would return
were conveyed to the General Manager by Chief Oluwa
who led the men to the railway yard. A labour
board of enquiry was formed . . . 3
During the strike of 1964, when Prince Oyekan, the Oba of
Lagos, asked the workers to go back to work he was listened
to politely and then ignored. In a little over a genera-
tion, the workers had learned to differentiate between the
spheres of traditional and industrial authority.
Parralleling the differentiation of industrial from
traditional authority, there occurred differentiation with-
in the industrial sector itself. The dimensions of differ-
entiation usually coincided with the needs of the workers
2 Ibid. I Ibid.
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and the opportunities open to them. First, as we have
seen, the management introduced the distinction between
the white collar clerks and the blue collar skilled and
unskilled workers. Between 1920 and 1938, there were a
number of strikes from which sprang short-lived organiza-
tions. The first ongoing organization directed and composed
of lower echelon workers was the Workmen's Association,
founded in 1938. The Railway Workers Union, (as the Work-
men's Association came to be called), founded by
Michael Imoudu, then differentiated further by job category
into the Station Staff Union and Loco Drivers Union, leaving
the mechanics and daily-paid workers in the RWU. It has
survived to the present, despite the fact that it differ-
entiated again along dimensions of skill. (The Railway
Technical Staff Association's break with the RWU is an
example.)
Labour and Nationalist Politics
Although much of the history of trade unionism on
the railways can be seen simply as the differentiation of
industrial relations from tribal affairs, another impor-
tant element enters the process when one considers that the
management of the railways represented, not only the
economic interests of management, but also the political
interests of whites and of the Empire. In reaction to
these political interests, there arose on the railways,
as in other industries, a leadership which became increas-
ingly involved in the nationalist struggle and carried that
struggle from industry into politics and back.
The history of workers' agitation on the railways and
elsewhere gives us a broader understanding of the nationalist
movement. Until now, scholars like Coleman had emphasized
the role of the elite, the clerks, businessmen, journalists,
etc. in launching the movement. This is probably true, if
the nationalist movement is seen principally in terms of
party organization and activity. The history of the RWU
would indicate, however, that limited, sullen, but none-
theless, effective anti-Imperial and anti-white struggle
grew out of the interaction of African workers with imperial
management some years before 1944, when the NCNC was founded.
Moreover, the struggle, to the extent that it was a struggle
in which ordinary men participated, occurred in the cities
where the workers and their leaders played a salient role.
Thus, it is understandable that labour leaders who had
participated in the nationalist movement feel cheated of
its victory.
The differentiated unions led by militant, second gen-
eration metropolitan leaders engaged the railway management
in struggles, whose causes were not simply industrial, but
overlapped with quasi-political and anti-imperial causes.
Anti-imperial activity, of course, was not limited to the
labour movement. Dr. Azikiwe and his early followers, a
section of the elites of Lagos, had started a series of
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actions and protests, described so well by Coleman and
Sklar, which were to lead to the founding of the NCNC and
the launching of the nationalist struggle in its party form.
At the founding meetings of the NCNC, trade union leaders
like Imoudu, Alhaji Adebola, N. A. Cole and others were
present; the nationalist movement had woven together its
two strands.
Since independence and before, the two strands have
became untangled. The old nationalist labour leaders, like
Imoudu, have either gone into opposition, or, like Alhaji
Adebola, into restless accommodation. What happened? To
understand this, we must once more tell the story of the
nationalist period, but this time from the point of view
of the labour leaders.
In 1942, while extending his trade union activities
to the United Africa Companies (UAC) and Public Works Depart-
ment (PWD) workers, Imoudu, with Dr. Azikiwe's backing in
the West African Pilot, launched what was to be the first
of a series of industrial actions which should be under-
stood as part of an incipient national protest movement.
In one such action, in December 1942, Imoudu led a march
of railway workers to protest the firing of some workers
and the over-staffing of the railways with white men. "The
march began in Ebute-Metta and soon we collected a crowd.
At the race course, we hold a mass-meeting . . . (Governor)
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Bourdillon was annoyed. "'A For such activities, threatening
the "peace of the colony," 2 Imoudu was banished first to a
prison in Benin (where he organized a strike of prisoners)
and then to Auchi, thirty-six miles from Ora. In a way, by
banning Imoudu, Bourdillon played right into Dr. Azikiwe's
hands. With consummate skill, the Pilot made Imoudu, the
labour leader, into a martyr of the nationalist movement.
This public relations work was to yield rich dividends when,
in June of 1945, a section of the TUC with the backing of
the NCNC began a general strike, lasting for thirty-seven
days.
ILIbid 
2lbid
2Ib id 
.
SIb id .
THE EMERGENCE OF THE YOUTH II: THE GENERAL
STRIKE OF 1945 AND THE POLITICIZATION
OF THE MILITANTS
The general strike of 1945 had important consequences
for the politicization of the labour movement and for the
permeation of the nationalist movement with labour people.
The strike elevated labour leaders like Michael
Imoudu to national and even international prominence.
These radical labour leaders were of great importance to
a nationalist movement which had not yet decided whether
to pursue its goals by peaceful or violent means.
If independence was to be gained by peaceful means
then the significance of the radical leaders and their
followers who were willing to riot or join military movements
would not be very great. On the other hand, if independence
was to be gained by violent means radical leaders in touch
with the masses would then be badly needed. Showing that
they had made contact with the masses during the strike of
1945, labour leaders greatly enhanced their prestige and
credibility in a nationalist movement not yet decided on
its strategy.1
1As late as April 5, 1948, Dr. Azikiwe threatened to
use violent means:
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CHAPTER V
Below we shall merely touch on the causes of the
strike and we shall briefly indicate who were the main
actors. We wish to demonstrate that in the period 1945-
1950, the period of the strike and for five years after,
the leadership of the labour movement formed an important
wing of the nationalist movement. It is the regionali-
zation of Nigeria and the awareness that independence will
come by peaceful means which destroys the labour-nationalist
alliance and sets the stage for the Youths' own venture into
politics. Since then the Youth have beencopposed not only
to' the leadership of the nationalist movement, but to the: n
very structure of Nigerian government.
Discussing the causes of the strike of 1945, Coleman
points to a series of factors associated with the Second
World War and its consequences on Nigeria. Among these
were direct involvement of the government in the economy,
the military experience, urbanization, trade unionization,
and inflation. Without repeating his discussion of the
In reading through certain excerpts from one of
Barere's speeches during the French Revolution, I
ran across the following: "The tree of liberty grows
only when watered by the blood of tyrants." In view
of what has happened in the history of many countries,
it saddens my heart to think of gaining the independence
of our country in this inhuman way. In truth, my faith
in Great Britain has waned and I am compelled to admit
openly my belief'.th&t freedom for Nigerian and the
Cameroons can no longer be expected to come to us easily
without tremendous sacrifice.
(From aiPresidential Address to the annual convention of the
NCNCwhich, was held at'the Rex Cinema, Kaduna, April5. 1948.
Zik: Selection's ifrom thev Speechesi of Nnamddi Azikiwe, Cam-'
bridge University Presis- 196
interaction of these factors, suffice it to say that the
period of the Second World War had a profound effect in terms
of modernizing Nigeria and socializing her into the world
culture.1 In .the political sphere, these global forces pro-
vided opportunities for the emergence of radical nationalism,
led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and his party, the NCNC, and in
the labour sphere these global forces provided opportunities
for the emergence of militant trade unionism.
On the eve of the strike, nationalist politics was
divided between the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) and the
more "radical" NCNC. Although other approaches are avail-
able, in what follows, we shall examine the strike from the
perspective of the nationalist movement, as manifested in
the inter-penetration of the labour and political spheres.
Two sources for such an inquiry are the Daily Service, organ
for the NYM, and the West African Pilot, organ of the budding
NCNC. From these papers, taking different positions on the
same event, supporting some leaders and opposing others,
one gets a sense .of who in the labour movement was for
whom in the party fight and vice versa.
Coleman, pp. 230 ff.
2Newspapers in Nigeria and especially Dr. Azikiwe's
West African Pilot played an important role in mobilizing
nationalist sentiment in the early forties. Contrasting
the Pilot to older Nigerian Newspapers, Increase Coker
notes:
For the first time the smiling face of a Third Class
Clerk in the Government or commercial houses appeared
side by side with that pf a lawyer or a politician.
Gone, clearly, was the day when newspaper publicity
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The Initiation of the Strike and
the Coming of Imoudu
Whatever the ultimate causes of the strike, in the
first instance the issues were articulated as a demand for
increased wages, or Cost of Living Allowance (COLA).
"During the period 1939-1942, the cost of living rose by
50 to 75 per cent in urban centers." In the forefront
of these demands were the recently formed TUC and African
Civil Service and Technical Workers Union (ACSTWU) led by
men such as T. A. Bankole, President of both organizations
and A. S. Coker, Vice-President of the TUC and President
of the Federated Unions of Native Authority Staff (FUNAS).2
Protests were made, not only by the umbrella organizations,
such as the TUC and ACSTWU, but also frequently by spokes-
men for the individual unions. For example, in the January
to June period, 1945, both the Nigerian Civil Service Union
was the prerogative of only those, at the top of so-
ciety. The mass appeal of the Pilot was faithfully
reflected in its circulation. Three years after its
debut [on November 22, 1932, the first issues appeared],
it boasted a daily circulation of 12,000 by far the
greatest in the history of the Nigerian Press.
See his "The Nigerian Press: 1929-1959" in Report on the
Press in West Africa, prepared for the Committee for Inter-
African Relations, distributed by Director, Department of
Extra-Mural Studies, University of Ibadan, 1960, pp. 77-133.
lColeman, p. 256.
2When, on June 13, the ACSTWU made its demands for
COLA, the following were co-signers: NRWU, Land and Survey
Technical Workers Union, Government Press Technical Workers,
Post and Telegraph Workers, P & T Linesmen, Electrical
Workers Union, Marine Workers Union, Medical Dept. Workers
Union, PWD Ijora Sawmill Workers Union, Nigerian Union of
Nurses, Lagos Town Council Workers Union, Locomotive Drivers
Union, PWD Workers Union, P & T Telegraph Inspectors, and
Railway Station Staff Union. On June 19, the Amalgamated
Union of Mercantile Workers, the Printers and Technical
Workers Union, and NUT came out in support.
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and the Nigerian Locomotive Drivers Union demanded that a
commission be named to investigate salaries. On February 21,
the NRWU voted "no satisfaction" in the Railway Labour and
Welfare Office.
Although at first the strike was articulated in non-
political, neutral terms, the quality as wall as the inten-
sity of the demands were to change however when Governor
Bourdillon, hoping to avert the strike, released Imoudu from
detention at Auchi. Zik, with the help of Herbert Macauley.
organized a reception for the now legendary labour leader.
When Imoudu arrived at the -Ebute-Metta station in Lagos, on
June 2, 1945, an ordinary clerk wrote in ebulient language:
there was indeed an outburst of enthusiastic cheerings
of all kinds of people irrespective of political af-
filiation, different walks of life or calling, status,
creed or religion. 1
The procession wound down Agege Motor Road to the Oke-Awo
playground which was packed with
cosmopolitan crowds of sight-seers and merry makers,
including school boys, expsoldiers, market guild-
women, all-wage earners, pensioners, money-lenders,
Omalanke-men, brickmakers, including independent
artists, artistes, and artisans, bookbinders,
printers, carpenters, and also Ministers of religion
and Ministers of State, Jur sts, Legislators,
Actuaries, and Auctioneers.
The city folk, roused by Zik and the Pilot, in a mood of
great expectancy after the war, rallied behind Imoudu and
the labour leaders of the TUC.
lP. I. Omo-Ananigie, The Life History of M. A. 0.
Imoudu (Lagos: Pacif Printing Press, 1957), p. 24.
2Ibid.
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All mustered strong to see and welcome the deported,
exiled, banished, detained, and restricted Hero,
Imoudu, whom much had been said and done and whom
they so long expected riding on the White Horse
back.1
The white horse was Zik's idea.
The coming of Imoudu gave Zik, the NCNC, and the
Pilot, a lever and a spokesman within labour ranks on the
eve of the strike. From June 6-12, the Pilot runs a front
page series "by our staff reporter" and a series of inside
page editorials on Imoudu. The following are sample
headings:
"Imoudu Recounts the Story of his Early Struggle
in the Railway Yard" (June 6)
"Imoudu Gives the Inside Story of his Confinement
in Benin Prison" (June 7)
"Imoudu Says Quest for Proper COLA Just
Beginning" (June 8)
"Imoudu Tells How He Marched with 2000 Workers to
the Government House . . . Fateful Lockout of
1941 Recalled" (June 9)
"Imoudu Concludes Dramatic Series on Events
Preceeding COLA; Says Government Will Have to
Rescue Workers" (June 12)
The Daily Service, speaking for the NYM, is conspicuous in
omitting any mention of Imoudu.
No sooner had the strike been called for midnight,
June 21, and the workers mobilized, that Erinle and Osindero,
of the ACSTWU executive, issued a bulletin postponing the
strike for 14 days, ostensibly because further negotiation
was possible. But it was too late to stop the strike now:
1lIbid.
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At 12 Midnight, the Loco Drivers gave the signal
by blowing the whistles. So far as the Government
Technical Workers were concerned, it was a total
war.1
A mass meeting of the ACSTWU voted no confidence in its
leaders, Bankole, Erinle, Abosede, and Bosah, and decided
to go ahead with the strike. The Joint Executive of the
ACSTWU and TUC was forced to resign, claiming that "the
masses of the workers had misconstrued the good intentions
of their leaders." 2
Clerical-Technical Split
Similar repudiation involving votes of no confidence
in the existing leadership took place in the RWU (where
workers hoot Bankole, Erinle, Bosah, and Osindero off the
platform), in the Lagos Town Council Workers Union, the
Posts and Telegraph (P & T) Marine Workers Union, and the
Government Press Technical Workers Union (an affiliate of
ACSTWU). However, workers employed in the private sector,
represented by the Amalgmated Union of Mercantile Workers
(AUMW), decided to give the employers more time to consider
the demand for more COLA.
Two attempts are made to halt the strike and restore
the old leadership. First, the ousted leaders, headed by
A. S. Coker, form the "June 1945 Strike Conciliation
1Luke M. E. Emejulu, A Brief History of the Railway
Workers Union, Lagos, p. 53. Emejulu was a secretary of
the Railway Workers Union and a leading figure in the
strike.
2West African Pilot, June 22, 1945.
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Committee," which tries to negotiate with the Commissioner
of Labour, but "Mr. Coker made it clear that the leaders
. . . represented nobody as they had been removed from office
by the entire working mass." 1 A second attempt at recon-
ciliation and cessation of the strike is made on July 4 by
Dr. Akinola-Maja, President of the NYM and future father
of the Action Group. Under Dr. Maja's impetus,' an "All-
Nigeria Workers Goodwill Committee" is formed. On July 5,
the ANWGC, also known as the "Maja Peace Committee," issues
a resolution proposing that: (1) the workers return to
work, (2) the Lagos community guarantee that the
strikers would not be penalized, and (3) the Peace Committee
try to get those union leaders then under arrest dis-
charged.2 On July 6, however, a mass meeting of all tech-
nical workers denounced the Maja Peace Mission, and the old
leaders stayed out for the duration of the strike.
The new group, styling itself the "Nigerian Technical
Workers Union," is led by F. 0. Coker, of the P & T Workers
Union, and Imoudu, of the RWU.
The strikers' committee held their meetings in
President Imoudu's house. Sometimes meetings
were held in the office of the RWU . . .3
1Daily Service, June, 27, 1945.
2The resolution was signed by S. Bosah (RWU), M. A.
Abosede (GPTWU), N. 0. Awolowo (R. Typographical Society),
L. B. A. Wey (NMWU), T. A. Onitiri (RRSU), 0. Okagbue (Land
& Survey Workers), A. S. Coker (Postal Workers Union), A. 0.
Bassey (PWD Electrical Workers), and J. Ajayi (LTC Workers).
3Emejulu, pp. 57-59. The committee was: Imoudu, F. 0.
Coker, S. A. George, J. Okaka, T. 0. Ododu, and L. Emejulu.
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The formation of these two committees, one led by
Bankole of the ACSTWU, and one led by Imoudu of the RWU,
highlights the division between radical blue-collar tech-
nical workers, such as those in the Locomotive Drivers
Union, and the more moderate, white-collar workers, of,
for example, the Railway Civil Service Union.
After the strike, on September 4, 1945, Azikiwe
editorialized in the Pilot on the role the trade unions had
played. His attack on the TUC and Bankole is interesting
in that it seeks to identify the leadership of the civil
service unions as inadvertent puppets of the government
itself. He accepts into the nationalist movement only those
leaders without a history of cooperative negotiation with
the government which means mostly the technical unions.
Azikiwe also calls attention to the sporadic nature of the
strike and the lack of any real central leadership. It
appears from this editorial, that the skeletal central or-
ganization that did manage to emerge was chiefly due to
the RWU and its comparatively superior organizational struc-
ture. To quote Azikiwe:
The main point is that the trade unions in Nigeria
are government sponsored . . . it explains the peculiar
psychology of those at the helm of our Labour Depart-
ment and the labour organizers of Nigeria who feel a
certain amount of inhibition and indecision in the
execution of their duties as trade union leaders. Added
to this is the fact that most trade unions are badly
organized and lacking funds. . . . The TUC, due to its
financial embarrassment, became a sort of Cinderella
subject to the vagaries of the colonial administration.
It is not to be wondered at that when matters came to
a crisis the very leader who had challenged government
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had to swallow his word when the official show-
down came and he relinquished leadership of the
TUC voluntarily.
. . . The main trade unions which went on strike
were not country-wide, with the possible exception
of the railway workers whose organization and ad-
ministration stand out as almost perfect.1
From the above discussion, one sees that the relation-
ship between the clerical unions and the colonial adminis-
tration represented the following dilemna: on the one hand,
the unions needed and wanted government recognition, not to
speak of financial assistance. But, at the same time,
peaceful co-existence with the government removed these unions
from active leadership in the nationalist movement.
The Effects of the Strike
The strike ended on 3 August 1945, thirty-seven days
after it had begun. It signified a victory for the militants
who had kept it going in the sense that the Government agreed
to call a commission to investigate the structure of wages
in the government sector.2
The strike demonstrated that workers of various tribes
could come together for joint industrial action; it raised
the saliency of the provinces in the thinking of militants
in the labour and nationalist movements; and it forged a
lWest African Pilot, 4 September 1945.
2The Tudor Davies Commission which was appointed as
a result of the strike found that the "trade unions were
fully justified in expecting" that the Cost of Living Allow-
ance keep up with the rise in the cost of living. See
Tijiani M. Yesufu, Industrial Relations in Nigeria (Published
for N.I.S.E.R. by Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 93.
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temporary but effective alliance between the NCNC and the
militants. We end the discussion of the strike by turning
to these three topics.
Tribalism
Since so much of Nigerian politics is interpreted in
terms of an ethnic calculus, it might be of interest to con-
sider whether the technical-clerical split in the trade
union movement did not in fact mask some sort of ethnic
struggle. The leaders' names are significant, because from
them, it is possible to infer their ethnic origins and thus,
test the hypothesis that the division between the technical
and general workers on the one hand, and the clerical civil
servants on the other, was an ethnic one.1
This hypothesis can be rejected out of hand. If Ban-
kole of the ACSTWU, A. S. Coker of FUNAS, Onabanjo of the
Locomotive Drivers, and Adio-Moses of the TUC were among
the Yorubas who were isolated by the events of the strike,
so were Bosah of the RWU, and Erinle of the ACSTWU, but the
latter two were Ibos. If Imoudu, Emejulu, and provincial
leaders in Enugu who were non-Yoruba came into prominence
in the ANTGWU, so did Yorubas like F. 0. Coker, Olukoya
1We do not have corresponding information for the
workers as a whole; nevertheless, thinking it too great a
coincidence that the technical-clerical split should have
corresponded to a tribal division, we reject the proposition
that the split was tribally based. One should note, however,
that the frequency of Ibos being newcomers to Lagos would
be expected to be greater among technical than among clerical
workers.
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(PWD Workers Union), and Olojo (Secretary of the Workers
Federation in Zaria.)
In short, the strike splits the ACSTWU and TUC, the
old alliances of technical (blue collar) and clerical (white
collar) workers. What is of special importance here is that
the industrial conflict in the labour movement did not seem
to coincide with any ethnic divisions. The exigencies of
organization and industrial conflict engender their own al-
legiances. This is not to say that once new divisions are
formed, they will not converge with old political or cultural
divisions outside the labour movement proper.
The Role of the Provinces
Since the strike was a national one, the All-Nigeria
Technical and General Workers Union (as the Nigerian Tech-
nical Workers Union came to be known), had to co-ordinate
its activities in Lagos with the East and North. One must
remember that communications from the strikers' central com-
mittee in Lagos to the provinces, to Enugu, Port Harcourt,
Zaria, Kaduna, and other towns were virtually non-existent.
Emejulu points out: "The Joint Committee did not notify
the workers there and they had to rely mostly on heresay
about the strike. Zik's press was then a prime, if not the
only means of communication. A striking example of the
Pilot's role is an incident which Emejulu reports in detail:
When the strike was about ten days old, certain mem-
bers of the NYM took advantage of the Goodwill
lEmejulu, p. 54.
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Committee, then holding its meetings at the house of
Bosah, to end the struggle . . . the then workers'
leaders decided to call off the strike unconditionally,
without consulting the rank and file. . . . Mr. Emejulu
and seven members of the African Locomotive Drivers
Union went to the Pilot and issued a statement that
any notice to call off the strike was unauthorized.
The message was relayed to the Comet. . . . They begged
Enahoro, editor, to see to it that his paper came out
in time to counteract the publicity of Bosah's group
in the other sections of the Press. 1
Obscure provincial trade unionists in Port Harcourt,
Onitsha, Enugu, Kaduna, and Zaria, now rose to temporary
prominence and became part of a national struggle. Among
them were men like Anyanwu, of the RWU in Port Harcourt,
S. A. George, of the Post & Technical Workers Union in
Kaduna, J. 0, Okaka, of the Post & Telegraph Workers Union,
and Oparaeke, of the RWU and President of the Workers
Federation in Enugu. As a prominent Nigerian leader reported
to Coleman: "the general strike of 1945 marked the beginning
of racial and political consciousness in the North, although
only a few northerners had participated in it." 2
Zik and the Strike
Exactly what part did thepolitical groups of the time,
in particular, Azikiwe and the NCNC, and the NYM, play in
the clerical-technical split with its subsequent shifts of
leadership? We have already called attention to the strong
support for Imoudu as a popular labour leader given by the
Pilot, in contrast to the Daily Service.
2 Coleman, p. 259.l Emejulu, P. 57.
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The Daily Service editorials, during and immediately
after the strike, support the hypothesis that trade union
conflict was mirrored by the two opposing political parties
in Lagos, the Pilot constituting itself as champion of the
strikers, the Service hesitant, if not anti-strike, and
clearly pro-Bankole and the disavowed unionists.
On July 2, 1945, a Daily Service editorial
demands a referendum on the current deadlock between
government and workers . . . both are employees of
the taxpayers. . . . As arranged by the Lagos Com-
mittee, a mass meeting will be held tomorrow where
the taxpayers will state their attitude. 1
On July 6, in its editorial, the Service quite clearly states
its position:
The Government had been able to meet the leaders
of the people half-way. . . . We cannot expect only
one side to make all the concessions. . . . We were
shocked to see some workers denouncing the men who
had called the strike off. . . . Every leader they
have they turn down.
By way of contrast, note the Pilot editorial of the
following day, July 3, 1945:
The Government should do something more practicable
now . . . it is no use hoping the workers would crack.
. . A ways and means committee, composed of neutral
observers, should be formed by the government . . .
this is essential now that the workers have denounced
most of their leaders.
It is not unlikely that Azikiwe had himself in mind as the
"neutral observer," for the next day, July 4, his column,
"Inside Stuff.," is entitled: "If I were Governor of
Nigeria." His program would be to:
1The meeting refers to the Maja Goodwill Committee,
headed by the "father" of the NYM, who was one of the "conser-
vative" forces which the workers repudiated.
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hold a parley with trade union leaders to ascertain
the wishes of the wage-earners, invite leaders of
various schools of thought to exchange views with
me, summon an executive committee of all government
departments, and repair to a lonely hideout to think
deeply. . . . I would be guided by a fair and im-
partial decision.
From the material available it would seem that there
are several cases of Dr. Azikiwe's direct involvement in
the strike. One concerns the role of the mercantile unions
in the strike. As mentioned earlier, they alone seemed to
share the hesitancy of the old leaders to go through with
the strike. The Amalgamated Union of Mercantile Workers
(AUMW) at its general meeting on June 19, 1945, passed a
resolution in support of the ACSTWU demand. The General
Secretary of the union, Makanju, blamed the Pilot for giving
its workers the impression that the executive had decided to
go on strike. The Pilot's June 19th headline in fact reads:
"20,000 Mercantile Workers Endorse All Demands of Technical
Workers Union." After Makanju had accused the Pilot of
inciting the workers, the editorial reply was:
Some of the mercantile workers have gone on strike
as a result of that resolution. . . . If anybody feels
some of the mercantile workers had been misled, it is
the fault of the leaders of the AUMW, not of the West
African Pilot.
Another incident involved an interview allegedly given
the Pilot by the Public Relations Officer (PRO) of the Nigerian
Railways. The interview sharply criticized the disavowed
trade union leaders. The PRO denied giving any such inter-
view, and in the subsequent banning of the Pilot and Comet
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(also owned by Zik's Press), the government cited this in-
cident as the immediate cause. The following is the Pilot's
account of the interview:
The PRO maintains that the present crisis has proved
the incapability and inefficiency of the trade union
leaders. . . . He emphasized that the cause of the
labour crisis had been due to the leaders not being
well-read in the laws binding workers. 1
It is impossible to ascertain on the basis of the
papers alone, whether in fact Azikiwe did incite mercantile
workers to strike in spite of their executive's hesitation,
and whether the PRO, Mr. Fletcher, in fact did criticize
Bankole and the old ACSTWU leadership so strongly. What
is certain is the popular feeling that Azikiwe was cham-
pioning the strike. The banning of the Pilot and the Comet
on July 8, 1945 assured Azikiwe of his role.
The workers were convinced that it was due to the
support given them by Zik's Press that had brought
the vengeance of the government upon them. The
"crime" of Zik's Press as workers saw it was none
than writing pungent editorials and articles which
portrayed their correct views. 2
Now, one of the conditions put down by the workers for
ending the strike was lifting the ban on the Pilot. However,
later "this was not insisted on, since the Defender was
transferred to Lagos and for all practical purposes, the
"3
Pilot was being published again.
lWest African Pilot, July 6, 1945.
Emejulu, pp. 59-6Q.
3Emejulu, p. 62.
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The Daily Service, on the other hand, was branded as
an outright opponent of the strike. Emejulu again ex-
presses the workers' opinion:
The Daily Service called them (the strikers) all
uncomplimentary names imaginable and the workers
resolved to boycott that newspaper.1
When Adedoyin, Olu Alikija, and Akintola offered their ser-
vice in negotiating with the government on the workers'
behalf, they were turned down because, as Emejulu put it,
"Olu was a member of the NYM and its organ was not with
them." The net result was to identify the momentarily
triumphant new leadership of the trade union movement, Imoudu,
F. 0. Coker, and their lieutenants, with the NCNC and against
the NYM.
The logic behind the NCNC's support of the militant
strikers and the NYM's support of the discredited moderates
follows from the very nature of the early NCNC and NYM,
their aims and positions in the community. The NCNC was
a radical congress organization, trying to bring under its
umbrella the radical nationalist forces in all sectors of
national life. By contrast, the NYM, toward the end of its
existence, came more and more to represent the gradualist
segments of non-Ijebu Yoruba elite. It was only after the
NYM had been incorporated into the nationalistic AG, that
1Emejulu, p. 57.
2Emejulu, p. 60.
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Yoruba labour radicals began to divide into those who
stayed with the NCNC and those who opted for the nation-
alist AG.1
1 It was partly in reaction to Zik's populism, that
the more nationalist Yorubas of the NYM founded the Egbe
Omo Oduduwa, a Yoruba cultural organization, which linked
the remaining nationalists of the NYM to the chiefs and
"obas" of the Yoruba people. Organizing the Yoruba political
market by means of cultural groups, these nationalists were
then successfully to found the Action Group and to articu-
late the doctrine of regionalism.
CHAPTER VI
THE EMERGENCE OF THE YOUTHS III: THE RISE AND
FALL OF THE LABOUR-NCNC ALLIANCE
Although at first the strike had divided the TUC into
a militant wing of technical and a moderate wing of cleri-
cal workers, by 1946, the two factions are once more in the
TUC.1 But the union of the rival factions was a papering
over of fundamental issues concerning the relations of
these factions and concerning the relations of the TUC to
the nationalist party, the NCNC.
In what follows we shall describe how between 1945
and 1950, when the NCNC was a unitarian and not a regional-
ist party, the militants of the labour movement stayed allied
to the NCNC. After 1950, when the NCNC began increasingly
to become a regionalist party and as others parties such as
the AG came to claim labour radicals, the NCNC-labour al-
liance collapsed, and an anti-regionalist, Marxist group,
the Youths, came to the forefront of the labour movement.
1After the strike the militants of the Nigerian Rail-
way Workers Union together with the Nigerian Technical and
General Workers Union (ANTGWU) formed the Supreme Council of
Nigerian Workers in competition with the TUC, then led by
N. A. Cole. But by June 1946, the Pilot reports friction
between Coker and the rest of the Council and Emejulu writes:
". .* . several unions felt that now the strike was over,
the ACSTWU should be resuscitated. The membership of the
ANTGWU had been reduced to the barest minimum and the govern-
ment refused to accord it recognition." (See Emejulu, p. 67).
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Three examples illustrate the nature of the Labour-
NCNC alliance. These are: (1) The Pilot-Service Rivalry
and the boycott of the Service by the militants, (2) F. O,
Coker's attempt to form a labour party, (3) the attempt to
make of the TUC the labour wing of the NCNC. The banning
of the Zikist movement and the failure of the UNAMAG strike
will illustrate the collapse of the Labour-NCNC alliance.
Boycott of the Service
The December 1945 election to the Lagos Legislative
Council intensified the press war between the Pilot and
Daily Service. The NYM backed Alakija; the NCNC backed
Olorun-Nimbe. In the heat of the struggle, there rose the
issue of which party distributing which paper had been most
supportive of the strike. Underlying it, of course, was
the deeper issue of political affiliation.
The Service accused the Pilot of being a yellow
sheet that would not stop at lies to get the support of the
strikers:
We did not just dish out news because it would
rejoice the heart of the worker. We now appeal to
the people of Nigeria to reread most of the stories
by Zik's group of newspapers and point out how many
of them time has not falsified.1
The strike leaders, F. 0. Coker, George, and Emejulu retal-
iated with a decision to boycott the Service.2 As would
1Daily Service, editorial, January 12, 1946.
20ther signatories to the boycott were : Abosede
(Government Press Technical W. U.), N. 0. Awolowo (Typo-
graphical Society), E. A. Wey (Maritime Workers Union),
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be expected, letters opposing the boycott were drafted by
Makanju on behalf of the Federation of Mercantile Workers,
and by A. S. Coker, for FUNAS. A. S. Coker wrote:
My union is no party to a resolution . . . boycotting
the Service. We cannot antagonize any section of the
press . . . members of a trade union read newspap rs
as private persons and not as members of a union.
Imoudu, F. 0. Coker, and Emejulu saw no such subtle distinc-
cions and refused to segregate their industrial from their
political roles.
Politicians were not slow in declaring publicly
that they sympathized with workers' aspirations . . .
the workers declared for the NCNC and were very proud
of it. . . It was the days of Zik-Nimbe-Adedoyin.2
Coker's Labour Party
A second example of the link between a section of
labour and the NCNC is the rejection of F. 0. Coker's bid
to found a Labour Party outside the NCNC' In September
1946, F. 0. Coker announces plans to form a Labour Party
with Imoudu as Protem President. His decision to launch
a party and contest in the upcoming elections of February,
1947, is challenged by Emejulu and the NCNC. Notwith-
standing Imoudu's involvement, the RWU denounces Coker's
Labour Party.3 "Tearfully confident that the acting
President of the NCNC cannot fail to voice workers'
T. A. Onitiri (RSSU), D. Okagbue (Land Survey Workers Union),
A. 0. Bassey (PWD Electrical Workers Union), Ajayi (LTCWU).
Daily Service, Marcy 9, 1946.
1Daily Service, February 19, 1946.
2Emejulu, p. 69 3Ibid.
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grievances of a political nature," Azikiwe himself puts
pressure on Coker to back out; ". . . perhaps my friend
Coker will see the light and beat a hasty and honorable
retreat."2 Finally, Imoudu comes around:
President Imoudu hit the mail right on the head
during his speech at the Democratic Party's ratifi-
cation meeting. He said the Labour Party is not
properly constituted. . . . We would advise the
Labour Party to return to its shell, rather than
emerge into the adult world of politics.3
The effectiveness of this opposition to Coker is
evident from the election results. Coker, running as an
independent, got 308 votes to Zik's 3573 votes. By defeating
its first bid for independent influence, the controversy had
the unintended effect of tying the militant wing of the
labour movement even closer to the apron-strings of the
NCNC.4
This development was, of course, not lost on those
like Adio-Moses and Bankole who wanted to keep the labour
movement neutral, or on others who had NYM sympathies. The
issue of political affiliation was to come to a head in a
series of developments initiated by the nearly simultaneous
annual conventions of the NCNC (April) and TUC (March) in
1948.
1 West African Pilot, January 15, 1947.
2West African Pilot, January 31, 1947.
3West African Pilot, February 1, 1947.
4 Some unions are by this time openly for the NCNC.
Among these was the old standby, the RWU, and a new union,
the UAC Workers Union, headed by the militant Zikist, Nduka
Eze.
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The Question of Political Affiliation and the
First Politically Inspired Split in the TUC
In October, 1947, a few months before the TUC conven-
tion in 1948, H. 0. Davies, a powerful figure in the NYM,
made known that notwithstanding the opinion of many, the
TUC is not a member of the NCNC. This letter coming on
the eve of the TUC conference initiated a whole series of
moves and counter moves within the TUC on the issue of
affiliation to the NCNC. The TUC divided itself into three
factions: the prc-NCNC faction of Eze, Imoudu, Emejulu;
the faction of those like N. A. Cole, then President of the
TUC, and Alhaji H. P. Adebola, then General Secretary, who
were NCNC sympathiziers but thought it wiser to keep the
TUC politically neutral; and finally those like Ogudiya
of the NYM, the Assistant Secretary, who wanted the TUC
to move closer to the NYM position.
Sympathetic to the NCNC but wanting to save the TUC,
Cole wanted to give his executive time to consider the matter
and so made an equivocal statement to the press. From this
the Pilot gathered that the TUC was a member of the NCNC;
the Service that it was not. In fact, when the TUC had been
invited to participate in the founding of the NCNC in 1944
it had sent two observers, A. A. Adio-Moses, and I. S. M.
0. Shonekan. They never formally affiliated to the NCNC
but Dr. Azikiwe took the fact of attendance for
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a declaration of affiliation. "Since then, the NCNC has
been publishing the name of the Congress as a member-union."
On November 29, 1947, the General Council, meeting
before the Conference, took the decision that since the
executive had kept silent until now, the TUC was bound to
consider itself a member of the NCNC. The former ACSTWU
people and especially Ogundiya threatened to split the TUC.
Cole appealed to the individual unions to put the question
to a vote at the Conference.
At the Conference held on March 19, 1948, Emejulu and
other NCNC people wanted the decision to be made by "block-
voting," voting strength to be proportional to the numerical
strength of the union. Had this measure been adopted the
TUC would have stayed in the NCNC since most of the big
unions were pro-NCNC. But the measure was defeated, the
big unions like the RWU walked out and the resolution to
remain independent of the NCNC was taken by the smaller
unions alone.
It is interesting to note that not all NCNC partisans
necessarily wanted the TUC to affiliate to the NCNC. Al-
ready at this early date, H. P. Adebola who is to play a
role of ever increasing importance on the side of the
politically "neutral" wing of the TUC explains the decision
not to affiliate to the NCNC in the following terms:
1H. P. Adebola, "Annual Report of General Secretary
at 8th Annual Conference of the TUC." March 19-23, 1948.
NRC Files, Vol. 3.
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It is necessary to request the Conference to con-
sider what relationship should exist between workers
and political parties. . . . Unwarranted association
with non-labour political-parties tends to siminish
the enviable positions which workers should occupy
in the scheme of things. Instead of political parties
soliciting for support of workers, the workers are
soliciting for support of political parties whose
political ideologies are at variance with those of
labouring class. Instead of affiliation I recommend
full collaboration . . . not [to] tie ourselves so
that in the face of any disagreement we may be able
to part company without embarrassment. 1
This position of political neutrality as shrewd as it seemed
when first propounded, once the regionalist system became
institutionalized, seemed tacitly to support the regime
and openly to oppose the radical nationalists who wanted
to use the labour movement to break the regime.
The pro-NCNC stand taken by the radicals was to have
a payoff the very next month, April 1948 at the Annual Con-
vention of the NCNC held at Kaduna. Out of twenty-one
members of the NCNC cabinet five were trade unionists or rad-
ical young men who called themselves Zikists. These were
F. 0. Coker, Publicity Secretary, Luke Emejulu, Assistant
Federal Secretary, Raji Abdalah, Asst. Field Secretary,
Nduka Eze, Asst. Publicity Secretary, and M. A. 0. Imoudu,
2
Asst. Field Secretary.
The leaders who walked out of the TUC conference,
Imoudu, F. 0. Coker, Nduka Eze and Emejulu formed what they
1lIbid.
2
Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 63-64, 68.
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called the Committee of Trade Unions which was supported by
the NCNC and the Zikists. On 17 March 1949 the Committee
renamed itself the Nigerian National Federation of Labour
(NNFL) with Imoudu as President and Nduka Eze as General
Secretary. In addition to the RWU and the UNAMAG (collo-
quialism for the Ammalgamated Union of the U.A.C. African
Workers), twenty other unions affiliated to the NNFL. In
May 1950, the NNFL absorbed the old TUC in a new organiza-
tion called the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC).
The NLC proved to be the high-point of labour's inter-
action with a political party, for within the year of the
founding of the NLC, the Labour-NCNC alliance broke down. The
militants of the labour movement whose power was predicated on
a nationalist and unitarian NCNC were left out in the cold.1
The Breakdown of the Labour-NCNC Alliance
To understand the causes of the sudden rise and fall
of the NCNC-Labour alliance one must be aware of certain
developments taking place in the regionalist system as a
whole, in the NCNC and in the labour movement.
As was noted in Chapter II, in the late forties and
early fifties regionalism was formed by a series of con-
stitutional reforms. The effect of constitutional
regionalization was to create a market for regional
1In 1949, there occurs the Enugu Colliery shooting
which for a year keeps the idea of a unitary nationalist
movement alive. In retrospect, however, this incident
merely delayed the collapse by one year. See Sklar, p. 83.
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politics and consequently to pose a challenge to all
political organizations to enter this market. It followed
that a nationalist party such as the NCNC which had been
until then unitarian in its outlook had to take an interest
in contesting elections on the regional level. It also
followed that, within the NCNC, the fortunes of politicians
and groups which were regionally well connected via the
tribal unions rose, while the fortunes of politicians like
the Zikists fell.
Believing constitutional advances a subterfuge, opposed
to regionalism and convinced that independence would come
only by way of revolution, the more radical wing of the
unitarian nationalists especially the Zikists decided on
direct action. Revolution would put an end to constitutional
subterfuge, weaken the hand of the regionalist party in
the NCNC, accelerate the pace of independence. In trying
to start a revolution in Nigeria the Zikists failed. More-
over, by not being able to carry Zik with them, the Zikists
isolated themselves from the NCNC. Then in February of 1950
a common labourer claiming allegiance to the Zikists tried
to assassinate Sir Hugh Foot, the Chief Secretary to the
government and the Zikists were proclaimed an unlawful
society. 2
Regionalism proved a disaster to the political fate
of the unitarians in the NCNC, but the unitarians and
2 Ibid.1Sklar, p. 79.
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especially the Zikists still had prestige in the nationalist
movement stemming from their connection to the labour move-
ment, their successful launching of the NNFL and their
presumed control over the strike weapon. This too was to
be taken away from them by 1950.
The UNAMAG Strike
Not taken in the police roundup of the Zikists in
February of 1950, Nduka Eze, the brilliant strategist
of the NLC and General Secretary of the Zikist movement,
decided on a series of strikes. His first move was to call
a strike of the Amalmagated Union of the U.A.C. African Workers
(UNAMAG).' He struck twice, the first time, in August of
1950, the strike was a success and workers won an increase
in wages. In December he struck again but this time the
workers were not prepared to follow. In ten days the strike
was crushed and with it the credibility of Eze's influence
over the workers.Ironically because Eze and the Zikists had
crossed Zik, support among member unions vanished. Anti-
regionalism had not as yet become a popular issue.
For a while Eze and the Zikists carried on. Eze and
a splinter group of Zikists and radical labour leaders formed
in January 1951 the anti-regionalist Freedom Movement. The
Movement was one of the first of the many attempts to found a
Marxist, anti-regionalist labour party outside of the frame-
work of cultural organizations and ethnic pressure groups.
1Sklar, p. 76.
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When the Movement failed in its goals and Eze was being
hounded by the colonial regime, he relinquished his post
in the Nigerian Labour Congress, the Freedom Movement and
UNAMAG. Without Eze, the UNAMAG and the Freedom Movement
disappeared and no federation of UAC unions appeared again
until 1956. The events of the 1950's turned the militants
against Zik and the NCNC. Many of them turned to Marxism,
some out of conviction and some out of friendship for those
who were convinced. For the Youths, as we have called them,
the period of isolation from Nigerian politics had begun.
It was to last for thirteen years. Not until the strike
of 1964 did the Youth think that their vigil had come to
an end.
Conclusion
The strike of 1945 propelled Imoudu and other labour
leaders to national prominence. Above all, they had the
confidence of Zik. Leaders like Imoudu and Adebola, Cole,
Nduka Eze, and others were part of the inner clique of the
NCNC. To this group were attracted radical students like
Ikenna Nzimiro and Mogwuko Okoye, and talented young workers
like Kolagbode. Some of these men were to become the core
of the Zikist movement, the fighting and incipient guerrilla
wing of the NCNC. This alliance of eilte nationalists,
headed by Herbert Macauley and Zik, with the labour movement
and the radical youths, was based on three assumptions.
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The first was that their cooperation was part of a nation-
alist movement dedicated to driving the British out of
Nigeria. The second assumption was that the British would
not leave Nigeria by peaceful means and that strike action
and even guerilla war might have to be applied to drive them
out. The third assumption was that the radical leaders had
the confidence of the labour movement as a whole, and
could call the workers out on strike if they so desired.
The last two assumptions proved to be incorrect. When
this became apparent, the Zikists left the NCNC, labour
leaders declined in power and relevance to the nationalist
movement, and many like Imoudu went into opposition, not
against nationalism, but against Zik and the leaders of
the movement.
After Coleman's work, there is no need to go into
the details of how the imperial government released Nigeria
by way of negotiations, rather than struggle. Suffice it
to say, the end result was a federated, regionalized
Nigeria, with bases of power in the parties. These began
to represent the interests of the various ethnic groups
comprising the regions. The labour people and the Zikists
were bypassed, for their sacrifices were no longer needed.
This very irrelevance of labour and the Zikists in the later
phase of nationalist activity considerably weakened the
command such groups had over the workers and the instrument
of the strike. The test-case came in the second UNAMAG
strike of December 1950, which was engineered by
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Eze with the support of Imoudu and the Zikists. The strike
failed dismally. The workers went back to work and the
credibility of the trade unionists' power was destroyed.
The Zikists and the radical labor leaders retreated in sullen
bitterness.
Loss of power and irrelevance to the burning issue of
nationalism go a long way in explaining why Imoudu and the
Zikists opposed Zik and the regional parties. The most
passionate men were left out and the political arena was
left to moderates, or even opportunists, who, until the
last, were ambivalent about seeing the British leave Nigeria.
However, this does not explain why Imoudu and some of the
Zikists then turned to Marxist ideology and the Soviet Union
and China in their pursuit of politics. We shall turn to
this question in Chapter VII.
In Imoudu's own case it is believed that this resulted
partly from the logic of being in the opposition to a pro-
West government. The logic of opposition is the latent
structure underlying much of his and his followers' views
about present-day Nigeria. Its fundamental postulate is
that Zik and the party elites have not attained true inde-
pendence; that, on the contrary, they have conspired with
the colonial power to keep Nigeria dependent. For Imoudu,
this dependence is economic; it is maintained because govern-
ment leaders are corrupt and willing to take bribes in return
for the economic exploitation of their country. "The new
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industries coming to Nigeria are not true industries,"
says he.
Take a bicycle spoke, for instance, that is a
part which is assembled with other parts to make
a bicycle. But is it made here? No, it is
imported from Britain or Germany. Placing parts
together is not real industry."
Overseeing trade unions is not realy power.
Imoudu's opposition to the status quo should not be
exaggerated. First of all, he himself is powerful and
well-connected, not only in the trade union movement, but
in industry and politics as well. (Some have rumoured
that Dr. Ikejianni, the former General Manager on the
railways was in alliance with Imoudu. This seems to have
some substance, because when the railway was threatened with
investigation, Imoudu threatened a strike in protest.)
Secondly, although there is bitterness toward Zik and the
NCNC, it is the bitterness of a spurned friend who, in his
old age, can recall the past with some affection. Imoudu
recalls when Zik used to live a few blocks away from him
of Herbert Macaulay Street:
The young men would come at all hours to discuss
politics with him. If you had any complaints, you
would go to him and he would flash it in the Pilot.
He was on our side then. Things aren't that way
now. He is the President and we never see him
again.
Imoudu was not the only militant labour leader not to see
Zik again. In the following chapter we shall turn to the
question of who were the Youths and of how they understood
Nigerian politics.
CHAPTER VII
LIFE-PATHS TO IDEOLOGY
In Chapter VII we do two things. First, we try to
answer the question asked at the end of Chapter VI, why
did some of the militants in the labour movement turn to
Marxism. Secondly, the discussion will serve to introduce
Chapter VIII in which we construct a model of Nigerian
Marxism. In order to accomplish these goals we turn to
biographical data which we call "Life-Paths to Ideology."
Turning to the problem of why militants became Marxists
we will argue that with the regionalization of the NCNC
militant labour leaders became interested in Marxism as an
alternative to nationalism, and Marxists who had been in
the NCNC became interested in the labour movement as an
alternative to the political base in the nationalist move-
ment. Since the early 1950's these have been the two main
origins of Marxism in the labour movement.
If anti-regionalism is a necessary condition, it is
not, however, a sufficient condition for adopting Marxist
views in the labour movement. Although we have no theory
stating the sufficient conditions, it may be of interest
to consider the biographies of five Youths, leaders of
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their various factions, to note at which point in their
lives and for what reasons they became Marxists.
Turning to the introductory function of Chapter VII,
we note that in Chapter VIIIwe shall try to construct a
cognitive and an evaluative model whose primitive terms are
usually associated with a Marxist point of view. Here, in
Chapter VII, we turn to the question, whose model is it
that we are constructing? What factions among the Youths
would subscribe to the model?
To deal with the second set of questions, biographical
data are useful for two reasons. First, we can determine
the thought of a faction by asking what the thought of the
leader of a faction is, and for our purposes we shall assume
that the Marxism of the leader of a faction is equivalent
to the Marxism of the faction. Second, biographical data
can tell us something about the intensity of commitment with
which these five Youths believe in Ideology. This will be
especially important for subsequent chapters where we shall
try to relate Marxist beliefs to perception and to action.
A word about commitment to ideology is important.
There can be no doubt that by the time of the general
strike of 1964 the labour movement including the Marxist
wing had attracted to it not only persons who were committed
to the movement but scoundrels and charlatans who were
making money out of the communist issue either by posing
as true Marxists and getting money from the Eastern bloc
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or by posing as true anti-communists and getting money from
the Western bloc. Consequently, it is important that when
one speaks of Youths applying Marxist categories to Nigerian
politics, that one keep in mind which Youths and how firmly
committed to the theory they were. Of course, it would be
fascinating from an empirical point of view to have surveyed
the opportunists in the labour movement and to have noted
how persons who are completely uncommitted to a theory apply
that theory. (To some extent we shall try to do just that
when we discuss the inconsistents in Chapter XII below.)
But here we are interested in identifying Youths who were
truly committed to the theory and in noting how they applied
that theory. It could be expected that if they were not
committed to the theory there would be no behavioral con-
sequences to their theory.
In what follows we concern ourselves, therefore, with
five Youths whom we judged to be committed to a Marxist
interpretation of politics. We based our judgment on the
following factors: (1) They are all Youths who have been
involved with the Marxist model for a number of years; (2)
they are all men who have either lost financially by com-
mitting themselves to the model or they have nothing to
gain financially by committing themselves to the model;
(3) they are men who have a reputation within their various
factions of being serious and committed. Their positions
and prestige within the factions depends on their commitment
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to the model and to what they are willing to suffer in order
to continue in their belief. This will be an important
point to remember when we turn to changes in ideology in
Chapter XIV.
The five leaders are Gogo Chu Nzeribe, now secretary
of the Labour Unity Front and Secretary of the Post and Tele-
graph Workers Union. In 1953-56 he was secretary of the
ANTUF and founder of the Nigerian Peoples Party; Asuqua Ita
(known as Eskor-Toyo) founder and secretary of the Nigerian
Labour Party; Tunji Otegbeye, Secretary of the Socialist
Workers and Farmers Party and President of the Nigerian Youth
Congress. Joseph T (a pseudonym which is used here on the
request of the interviewee) a Trotskyite (part of a group
of young men Eskor-Toyo calls, "Left-Wing Communists" and
Dr. M. E. Kolagbodi, an assistant secretary in the Nigerian
Labour Party in which Eskor-Toyo is secretary and Imoudu is
President. Dr. Kolagbodi spent thirteen years in East Germany.
Gogo Chu Nzeribe, Eskor-Toyo and Joseph T are examples
of Youths who easily could have become part of the privileged
class of the Nigerian regionalist system but did not. Gogo
did not because he gambled early on the side of the Zikists
against the NCNC, Eskor because his life in business con-
trasted too strongly with his beliefs, and Joseph did not
because he is a mystic. Consider first Gogo Chu Nzeribe.
Why he became a Marxist and the intensity with which he is
a Marxist is related to why he rejected the NCNC.
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Gogo Chu Nzeribe
Gogo Chu Nzeribe, the General Secretary of the Post
and Telegraph Workers Union,was born in 1932 into the royal
lineage among the Oguta, an Ibo speaking people. Because
his grandfather had been a paramount chief, Gogo's father
was among the first to be educated. After finishing
secondary school, the father became trading representative
for John Holt Company in the Eastern region.
Thus, Gog is born into a respected, relatively well
to do and well educated compound. Gogo spends the first
six years living with his mother in Oguta, and, except for
a short time, he spends the next six years living with his
father in Aba. Upon the fathers death in 1944 when Gogo
is twelve, the family decided to send Gogo to the elite
King's College in Lagos. At King's College Gogo excels.
He becomes first class debater and college librarian. Mean-
while he and some friends become intensely interested in
the nationalist movement and in politics. All read Zik's
Renascent Africa, and some participate in a socialist study
group organized by a journalist who works for Zik's
West African Pilot. As his interest in politics develops
Gogo spends his library hours reading such books as Baers'
Fifty Years of Socialism and Dr. Hughlett Johnson's The
Socialist Sixth of the World. Already at fifteen Gogo is
impressed by the socialist ideas which he thinks are much
superior to the Fenner Brockway type of Fabianism. At about
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this time he reads Burnham's critique of socialism, The
Managerial Revolution, but "I was not impressed."
Coinciding with the strike of 1945, Gogo and forty-
one other students are expelled from King's College for
nationalistic activities such as organizing for Zik and for
storing arms within the college.
The subsequent period for Gogo is a period of intense
political activity within the Zikist movement and of ideo-
logical development within study circles which he organizes
with other similarly displaced and interested young men.
Meantime, of course, he needs to support himself. He enters
a surveyors school in 1949 and promptly gets himself elected
General Secretary of the Survey Workers Union. Through the
union he meets other young radicals in the labour movement.
The dominant power in the labour movement of the late
forties was the NLC run by Imoudu, Eze and the Zikists.
"They of course were not Marxists but simply nationalists.
Their bible was Zik's Renascent Africa," says Nzeribe, some-
what patronizingly. "They knew nothing else." But not all
Zikists were unideological. Certainly not the group which
hung around Nduka Eze. With Eze as guru Gogo Nzeribe and
others in the group learned the doctrine that the
workers and the working class were in the forefront of
social and political revolution. If he was not convinced
immediately, subsequent history and especially the break
with Zik (which he and other Youths consider a betrayal)
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convinced him that real revolution lay not with Ziks and
the constitutional nationalist but with Eze and the working
class.
Eskor-Toyo
Eskor-Toyo's real name is Asuqua Ita. "Eskor-Toyo"
he uses as a nom de plume "the way Bernstein used Trotsky"
he says, but in the movement he is known as "Eskor."
Like Gogo, Eskor was born into a relatively well to
do and well educated Effik family. In 1930, when the boy
is one year old, his father dies and he is sent to live with
his father's brother., a notable in Calabar politics.
Like Gogo, Eskor finishes secondary school and like
Gogo winds up in the radical wing of the NCNC. In the late
forties he "moves with" people whom he is to know for the
next twenty years. In this group are Nduka Eze, Amafule
Ikoro, Aniedobe, Gogo Chu Nzeribe, and Ola Tokunboh ("the
most intelligent of us all"). "We Youths would meet in
bookshops around Tinubu square. We would buy books. Borrow
books. Lend books. We would talk, talk, talk. And argue."
According to Eskor the books that made an impression were
Crossman's Government and the Governed, Joad's Introduction
to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics, Laski's Introduc-
tion to Politics, Lindzey's The Modern Democratic State,
Cobbans' The State and Nation from Idea to Reality, and
Row's The Ship of State. "I became fascinated with the
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French Revolution, with the ideas of La Salle, with German
anthropology. I was torn between politics and continuing
my reading."
Between 1949 and 1956 Eskor-Toyo taught school and
participated in some of the organizational experiments of
the Youths. Thus in 1949 he joined the NNFL and the Marxist
Study Circle. In retrospect, Eskor-Toyo labels as ideo-
logically immature the many attempts to found labour parties
in the late forties and fifties. He notes that most such
parties had a tendency to "left-wing communism." They had
no public support. No one contested elections. No activist
or guerrilla cells were organized." He finally became dis-
enchanted with these attempts when the United Workers Peoples
Party (UWPP)split due to personality differences among leaders.
With the break-up of the UWPP, Eskor-Toyo drops out
of the socialist movement. He resumes his studies for an
external degree in economics, which he received from London
University in 1957. He is perseverant enough so as to gain
his Masters in 1959. In the same year that he gets his
Masters, he is hired by the Nigerian branch of Lever Brothers
as a Personnel Manager, and is soon promoted to Planning
Manager. He succeeds very well. Too well." "After all Lever
Brothers is the most obvious example of monopoly capital
in Nigeria and here I was working for them." This situation
became especially intolerable when the friends who had
dropped out of sight after the UWPP debacle began once more
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to meet and to discuss post-independence politics. Soon
after independence Eskor-Toyo quits to devote himself fully
to party activities.
Joseph T
Joseph T is the pseudonym of a Youth who has very
little power, who is at the head of no party, who commands
almost no following. He is of interest to us because, like
Gogo Chu Nzeribe and Eskor-Toyo he has abandoned a comfortable
life for the rigors and uncertainties of the Marxist labour
movement, but unlike Eskor-Toyo and Gogo Chu Nzeribe who
have learned to become "mature Marxists" over the years,
in the sense that they both realize the limitations on their
powers and are both fairly cautious and pragmatic in their
tactics, Joseph T is much more of a purist, Instead of
gradually moving closer to an accommodationist position with
the regionalist parties, he has, on the contrary, veered
steadily leftward until today he considers himself a
Trotskyite. He would be the first to start a Chinese wing
of the Marxist party in Nigeria if only the Chinese were
not proStalinist. He argues that the Chinese position is
much closer to the Trotsky position than to the Stalin
position. His early religious experience may be a source
of his later left-wing puritanism.
Joseph T was born in Ghana to a Ghanaian mother and
an Ijaw father. His father was one of the first Africans
to reach high position in the Ghana civil service, and
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so Joseph T went to the elite Achimoto college in Ghana
from which he received his higher school certificate. He
was expected by everyone to go on to a university degree.
But this was not to be.
Perhaps it was the influence of his maternal grand-
father, the Reverend, perhaps it was the early traveling
or his parents mixed marriage, but from an early age,
Joseph was a dreamer, subject to religious meditations.
He recalls with a smile that his mother used to call him,
"Joseph, the dream boy." Like other young men of religious
talents, Joseph experiences a crisis in the one year between
leaving Achimota and coming to London to study engineering.
I was a very religious Catholic and a celebrant at
Mass. I used to believe the teachings of Christ most
literally and longed for the chance to prove my faith.
One day I noticed for the first time in my life the
misery of poverty and especially of beggars. Of
course I had seen many beggars before but for some
reason I had taken them for granted, now I was shocked.
This did not have to be, I thought. Immediately I
went home and prayed to God to make beggars rich.
I prayed for many days and after prayer I would go to
the market to see if my prayers had been answered.
As I was praying I wanted to see results, but it seems
that the more I prayed the more beggers there were.
(During this period Joseph T would spend long hours in reli-
gious exercises and meditations. One such exercise was to
spend long hours concentrating on the image of the Virgin
in the hope that "if the father would not raise the beggars,
then the mother would.")
Joseph T's interest in religion was overtaken by a
growing awareness that there were great things happening
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on the Gold Coast. The UGCC had invited Dr. Nkrumah home
and asked him to assume the secretaryship of the party.
The boys at Achimota were to get to know the General Secre-
tary well for in addition to coming to the school to lecture,
Dr. Nkrumah was able to maintain direct contact with some
of them through the various secret clubs organized on cam-
pus. Joseph T was one among the boys who was very much
taken by the inspiring young leader. "I realized that when
Nkrumah spoke to us about poverty and weakness and about
the future of Africa that he spoke the truth. It was through
action I would see the end of poverty and beggars." Before
leaving for England Joseph T managed to meet Dr. Nkrumah
and from him he got a letter of introduction to a professor
of Economics at Birmingham. Upon arriving in England he
met the professor who then urged him to join the young Com-
munist League. "There you will be trained to cure the
disease that makes beggars," said the professor.
In England, Joseph T lived the life of a gay young
African student who went about in his own car, who was
attractive to women and who seemed little concerned with
politics. Nevertheless, his activities in the YCL became
known to his father. After a few warnings his father cut
off his allowance, but Joseph did not quit the YCL.
From living the life of a young blade, Joseph T was
forced to take on a series of hard and sometimes humiliating
lUnited Gold Coast Convention
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odd jobs in order to exist. At one time or another he was
a miner, a labourer, a sweeper, but he stuck to the YCL.
He found that all his friends belonged to the league and that
his once rich social life was curtailed only to that of the
league. After some two years of this precarious existence
Joseph T was only too glad to receive a scholarship through
the YCL to study engineering in Moscow.
He remained in Moscow for four years but ironically
it was in Moscow that he became disenchanted with Soviet
communism. Most of his friends were bitterly anti-Stalinists.
He witnessed one of his best Russian friends being arrested
for what seemed to him innocent political talk. From Moscow
he traveled to China and returned to Britain after the
20th Congress of the Communist Party.
Once in Britain he quit the party for about a year,
but he found his interests in Marxism rekindled when a
Nigerian friend urged him to read Trotsky's Revolution Be-
trayed and The Theory of Permanent Revolution and urged
him to join the Socialist Labour League, a Trotskyite organ-
ization. Before the split in the BCP the League was con-
sidered to be a puerile organization (left-wing communist);
after the 20th Congress and the split, however, some people
who had been in the BCP now joined the League. Joseph T
found in addition to his Nigerian friend many of his old
friends in the League. He too joined.
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Throughout his period abroad Joseph T had made con-
tacts with Nigerian trade unionists including Michael Imoudu.
Already during his Moscow period he had written to Imoudu
and had gotten a reply inviting him to come to Nigeria to
work in the Imoudu wing of the labour movement. After a
few months of activity in the League, he took up Imoudu's
invitation and came to Nigeria where he has been active
in both the party and trade union wings of the movement.
Dr. Mayirue E. Kolagbodi
Unlike Gogo Chu Nzeribe, Eskor-Toyo, or Joseph T,
Mayirue E. Kolagbodi is not born into a family headed by
a literate and well to do father. He and Dr. Otegbeye were
both born into families where the father was a peasant.
This point is not lost on Kolagbodi, he is proud of the fact
that while he was in school he was able to get double pro-
motions, "while sons of clerks and lawyers had to stay
behind." Dr. Kolagbodi's commitment to Marxism cannot be
inferred from his giving up opportunities. His and Oteg-
beye's commitment cannot be inferred from original conditions
of conversion but from his long term involvement with the
movement and from his living a life consonant with the move-
ment. Thus, whatever his earlier reasons for Marxism, it
is clear that his living in East Germany for thirteen years
and his marrying a German girl have had some effect on the
seriousness of his purpose.
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Kolagbodi was born in Warri in 1926 but he schooled
in Lagos. He was able to attend four years of secondary
school but because of lack of funds he had to quit. At
nineteen the proud and bitter young man goes to work for
the Public Works Department as a messenger. While in the
PWD he joins Porbeni's Public Utilities Technical and Gen-
eral Workers Union and is soon made an organizing secretary
for the union.
There is not much information about his early organi-
zational activities but he exchanged a few letters with the
General Secretary, F. Porbeni. These letters seem to indi-
cate that Kolagbodi was quite sensitive to status distinc-
tions. For example, in 1949, Porbeni sends around a circular
to his organizing secretaries. On this circular he lists
Kolagbodi's name after that of an organizer's from the North.
Kolagbodi promptly called this to Porbeni's attention:
I still appeal to you in respect to my relative con-
dition as an employee. I was engaged before my
comrade-in-arms, the Northern District Organizer,
as a matter of fact I was his coach; but yet the
Circular letter under reference makes him my senior
I may also add that in the list of the names,
my Northern comrade's name came before mine. 1
Coinciding with his work in the trade union movement
Kolagbodi develops an interest in politics and Marxism.
He joins the Zikist movement and like so many other Youths
he becomes one of Nduka Eze's acolytes. In 1949, the East
1M. E. Kolagbodi, district organizer, Lagos and Colony
District, to the Working Committee of the PUTGWU (29/12/49)
PUTGWU Files.
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German government distributes a few scholarships to the
Zikists for study in East Germany. Among those chosen by
Eze is Kolagbodi.
In East Germany he studies economics and related sub-
jects at the Humboldt University and the Karl Marx University.
He completes university work in four and one half years and
in 1955 he visits the Soviet Union and in 1959, China. Upon
his return from China he resumes his studies and begins
writing a dissertation on "The Problem of Freedom in Nigeria."
Unlike Josept T, who changed his attitudes on Marxism
after his trip to the East, Kolagbodi is reinforced in his
Marxism. It is indicative of his seriousness that not even
the death of Stalin or the 20th Congress changed his views.
For example, after some of the dictators excesses are made
public, many of Kolagbodi's friends in East Germany felt
greatly disillusioned and shocked. His reaction is, "they
were sentimental. I have never been a hero worshipper."
In 1963 Kolagbodi, his wife and children, come to
Nigeria. He notes with satisfaction that there is a growing
class consciousness among the workers" and he feels good
to be back. "Of course I am a Marxist; I do not need to
work only in Nigeria. I could work anywhere, in Cuba, or
in Europe for that matter." Commenting on his relationship
to Nigerian workers, however, Dr. Kolagbodi remarked his
presence had raised the morale of the movement. "After all
they know that I started as a mere messenger. They know
that I am one of them."
Dr. Tunji Otegbeye
Like Dr. Kolagbodi, Tunji Otegbeye is born into a
poor farmer's home but unlike Dr. Kolagbodi his involvement
with Marxism is fairly recent. Former Zikists, among them
Eskor-Toyo and Gogo Chu Nzeribe, are not on the best terms
with Dr. Otegbeye and the group of Youths he has created
around himself in the Nigerian Youth Congress and the
Socialist Workers and Farmers Party. Unlike the former
Zikists, Dr. Otegbeye is not familiar with a certain nos-
talgia for the Zikist days and a certain lingering affection
for Zik. To the radicals in tne labour movement it is a
bit galling to see the leadership of an important faction
in the movement pass to a man who had not known the bitter
years of waiting and frustration, when the labour movement
was completely isolated from politics. While Eskor-Toyo
and Gogo Nzeribe were doing the organizational work in
Nigeria and keeping the hope of a Marxist party alive, Tunji
Otegbeye was studying at the university of Ibadan and getting
his MD in London.
Tunji Otegbeye was born in 1929 in Ilaro, Western
Nigeria, a few miles from Abeokuta. The people of Ilaro though
closely related to the Egbas form part of the Egbado group.
Both his parents but especially his mother were eager
that he become well educated. His father though illiterate
in English was semi-literate in Yoruba and a deeply com-
mitted Anglican. Tunji was made to spend many hours in
prayer and meditation.
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Although the parents were poor, Tunji was an extremely
gifted child and won scholarship after scholarship, first
to secondary school at the Government College, Ibadan and
later at Ibadan University where he first became interested
in politics. Otegbeye entered Ibadan to study agriculture
but his main interest was student activities. Although
coming from deeply religious parents, Tunji himself was only
nominally religious; nevertheless, he did participate in
Church sponsored activities. He became a member of the
Student Christian Movement and represented Ibadan University
at debates and conferences.
His second year at Ibadan he joined a select group of
students calling themselves the "Thinkers Club." It was
while having to prepare a paper on communism for the club
that Tunji got interested in the subject.
In 1952 Otegbeye left for London to study medicine.
In London he became active in African student affairs. He
was made an executive member of West African Student Union
and President of the Nigerian Union of Students. In London
he made friends with young Yorubas who were to play an im-
portant part in Action Group activities. Also in London
he made friends with a young lawyer, Kunle Oyero with whom
he would work closely in the Marxist movement.
In 1957, his studies in medicine completed, Dr. Oteg-
beye came home. Until 1960, he did not join any parties but
kept up contacts he had made in London with friends who were
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returning home for independence. Meanwhile he was working
as a government doctor and getting to know such personalities
as Gogo Chu Nzeribe, Joseph T, and Wahab Goodluck of the
NTUC. In 1960, the Zikists called a meeting to establish a
socialist body which would bring together young Marxists
irrespective of their party position. The body was to be
called the Nigerian Youth Congress. To his surprise
Dr. Otegbeye was elected to the executive of the Congress.
After his election to the executive of the Congress, Dr.
Otegbeye joined the Goodluck faction in a fight against
Imoudu, Ikoro, and Eskor-Toyo.
Life Paths to Ideology: Some Observations
The five Youths we have discussed are all committed
to their individual interpretation of Marxism.
We have no theory which will explain why a particular man
chose a particular belief system and why he believes in
its elements with the intensity that he does. We can, how-
ever, make some observations which may be valid not only
for the five persons we have discussed but for other Youths.
Our observations can be divided into two classes. One we
shall call "knowledge is power" and the other we shall call
"rejection and regionalism."
Under the label of "knowledge is power" we would place
the following observations. The committed Youth is a man
who places great value on ideas, education, and learning.
He is also extremely critical of ideas and beliefs
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which he does not consider valid and applicable directly
to his problems. Ideas for the Youth do not have merely
theoretical meanings; ideas are evaluated on what practical
consequences they might have. One cannot understand the
long history of the Youths trying to form study groups and
parties without understanding that the Youths were convinced
that by thinking through political problems they would come
up with a solution which would then give them immediate
power to change their environment.
For the Youths it is axiomatic that if one has correct
ideas, one will then be able to change one's environment
and conversely, if one does not have the right ideas, one
will not be able to change one's environment. Joseph T was
by no means the only Youth who had abandoned Christianity
for Marxism because Christianity had "not worked." And
Dr. Otegbeye noted:
The intellectual is faced with two broad choices
to support the present regime however reactionary.
. . . Or to study society, analyse the forces and by
summarizing the experiences of the struggle of the
people and use the intellects [sic] to guide the
masses along the path of progress.1
Turning to "regionalism and anti-regionalism," we
recall that Youths like Gogo Chu Nzeribe and Eskor-Toyo
were either in the Zikist movement or were closely connected
to the Zikist movement. We also recall that the Zikists
and other unitarian nationalists became irrelevant to the
1Tunji Otegbeye, Ideological Conflicts in Nigerian
Politics (Lagos: Socialist Workers Farmers Party Publica-
tion, 1964), p. 25.
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nationalist movement in proportion to the strength of
regionalism. Consequently, Youths like Gogo Chu Nzeribe
and Eskor-Toyo rejected regionalism and were in turn rejected
by the regionalist parties. One can understand the fas-
cination with ideology not only because knowledge is power
but also because between 1950 and 19b4 knowledge and ide-
ology had to be power, it was the only power available to
the Youths. What was this knowledge that the Youths had
and how did they formulate it? We turn now to describing and
explaining what the Youths believed.
CHAPTER VIII
WHAT THE YOUTHS BELIEVED ABOUT NIGERIAN POLITICS
In the introduction, following other writers, we have
pointed out that all belief systems can be analytically
divided into cognitive, evaluative, and affective dimensions.
This means that to be fully understood any proposition in
any belief system must be assigned cognitive, evaluative,
and affective values. Thus a proposition such as "the NPC
is a feudal party," can be fully understood only with
reference to the more fundamental cognitive beliefs from
which the term feudal derives its meaning, from the value
system which stipulates rules of behavior with respect to
"feudal parties" and from the emotional processes which
assign positive and negative valences to the terms of the
proposition.
Although all statements are three dimensional in
this sense, some statements are more clearly cognitive
while others are more clearly evaluative or affective. For
the sake of simplicity of exposition, therefore, we have
chosen two sets of statements, the first best illustrating
the cognitive meaning and the second best illustrating
evaluative meaning. For the first we have chosen mainly
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to examine, Dr. Tunji Otegebeye's Ideological Conflicts in
Nigerian Politics (published by SWAFP, Lagos, 1964), and
Gogo Chu Nzeribe's, The Manifesto of the Nigerian People's
Party (Private Mail Bag 1050, Yaba, 1961). And for the
second or evaluative set of meanings we have chosen, Eskor-
Toyo's, The Crisis in the Nigerian Youth Congress (a Nigerian
Labour Party Publication, 1964) and Kunle Oyero's Role of
Youth in Republican Nigeria (N.Y.C. Publication No Date). 1
In places where we find it appropriate we shall rely on
interview material with other Youths to clarify a point.
Except for noting that the four Youths in question
are committed to their beliefs (have affective investment
in their beliefs) we shall not discuss the intensity of the
affective dimension of meaning since we do not know how
valences were assigned to published statements.
Cognitive Meanings
In discussing the cognitive dimension of the Youths
beliefs about Nigerian politics we shall assume that the
stage of translation from ordinary perception to ideological
conceptualization has taken place. We shall be looking at
how the primitive terms of Marxist theory are constructed to
fit Nigerian conditions. We shall be looking at the appli-
cation of this terminology to a model of the present which
we divide into the emergence of "the neo-colonist system,"
1 Kunle Oyero was one time President of the Nigerian
Youth Congress.
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and "post-independence struggle between classes and ideol-
ogies." We should warn, that here we are not looking for
logical consistency or valid insight. There may be little
consistency or there may be many insights. We are not con-
cerned how "well" Youths applied Marxism but with how they
applied Marxism.
The Neo-Colonialist System
The following description, thought typical of the
Youths, of the neo-colonialist system was culled from an
interview with a nineteen year old trade unionist and cadre
of the Nigerian Youth Congress. Asked what he meant by
the "neo-colonialist system," he replied that "the neo-
colonialist system is a product of historical forces which
go back to the colonialist period." The conceptual scheme
in terms of which he understood this period follows:
In prehistory the Nigerian peoples lived in peace
and plenty. In some places like the North there was
Feudal exploitation by the Fulani invaders but the
Fulani were not Africans and so one can't speak of
exploitation in terms of African social relations.
Then the Europeans came and began raiding for slaves.
These they took to America where even now they are
persecuted. But the Europeans brought with them new
methods of production and the markets system which
together with slavery, conquest and attendant humili-
ations destroyed the traditional order. Together
with their economic and military power the whites
brought with them Christianity and education. Taking
advantage of education some of the wealthier bourgeois
were able to send their children to school. These
educated young became the men who led the nationalist
fight for independence. Among these were Azikiwe,
Awolowo, etc. The nationalist movement was a success
as far as it went, but basically it was only a stage
in the process of African development. For the
nationalist leaders soon divided the spoils of the
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old regime (after first having been duped by the
British to accept regionalization which effectively
divided the country and made it accessible to control
from outside). Political office now means corruption
pure and simple. A politician gets into power to
get rich quick. And how does he get rich? By becoming
an agent of the United States government which has
come to Africa to colonize economically the way
Britain colonized politically. But of course since
economics is politics it really amounts to'the same
thing. We are given the trappings of independence
but the substance is denied us.
Echoing this view, Dr. Otegbeye notes that real power, eco-
nomic power is kept in the hands of the "colonialists" who
are able to rule through their intermediaries, the Nigerian
politicians:
Although, Nigeria won independence in October 1960,
thanks to the struggle of the masses of our people
led by men of the calibre of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and
Chief Obafemi Awolowo, colonial ideology has not
been wiped out. . . . Nigerian economy was and
remains an appendage of monopolies, an area of
colonial exploitation, a market for the sales of
manufactured goods and a source of profits . . .1
The Post-Independence Struggle Between
Classes and Ideologies
The period of independence marks a period of the struggle
for power by various groups and by the "ruling circles."
The "ruling circles" are divided into two warring groups,
"icapitalists" and "feudalists." "Capitalists" are
1Otegbeye, p. 9.
2Although throughout this subsection we are quoting
from Dr. Otegbeye's pamphlet, compare this to Gogo Chu
Nzeribes warning that: "The Nigerian People's Party fully
recognizes the immense dangers inherent in the setup where
an indigenous Nigerian Capitalist Feudal class has emerged
as the virtual successor to the British colonialists."
Gogo Chu Nzeribe, p. 2.
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southern businessmen, professionals, politician and civil
servants, whose interests are represented by southern
political parties such as the NCNC- and the AG. Feudalists
are the Northern Emirs whose interests in turn are repre-
sented by the NPC. In contrast to the "ruling circles"
there exists the farmers and the workers who are not repre-
sented by the parties of the "ruling circles." Quite on
the contrary, the workers and farmers have only recently
been able to organize such parties as the Socialist Workers
and Farmers Party which defends their own interests.
"Everyone of these parties seeks to reap the fruits of inde-
pendence."1  It follows from this that every party in Nigeria
has a class base and represents an ideology. Thus the NPC
is the party of the feudal class and the carrier of feudal
beliefs. The NCNC and AG are parties of the southern
capitalists and are the carriers of capitalist beliefs.
The socialist parties are representative of the view of the
workers and are the vanguard of socialism. From this premiss,
the characteristics of the parties and beliefs follow.
The Feudal NPC cannot be compared to the socialist parties
because they are diametrically opposed, but it can be com-
pared to the capitalist parties. Once the comparison is
made, however, it is clear that its ideology is even more
backward than that of the capitalist parties. It goes with-
out saying that the NPC cannot usher in socialism but it
1Otegbeye, p. 10.
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cannot even organize a simpler form of social relations
namely democracy.
Feudal nobility the world over, have no respect of
or understanding of democracy. They establish
nepotic, despotic and arbitrary rule and oppose
any attempt by the people to extend democracy.1
Eloquently citing instances of NPC misrule, Otegbeye proposes
the following to be true: Emirate system is feudal and
therefore undemocratic, the NPC represents the interests
of the Feudal nobility, therefore the NPC is undemocratic.
"Is it strange" he asks, that
. . . only a handful of selected people have controlled
the fortune of the NPC which has held no congress or
election for over five years? Is the abolition of
individual liberty and the abolition of women's suffrage
strange? Is it any stranger that the Emirs and their
immediate relations control the Native Administrations
and the law courts. . . . No, these things confirm the 2
character of the NPC as a party of Feudal nobility. . .
Having marshalled his facts about the NPC and having there-
fore "proven" his point about the NPC's being a feudal
party, Otegebeye, like the mathematician proving the validity
of a theorem creats a climate of valid assumptions about
his antecedent arguments linking the colonial period to the
feudal nobility and the feudal nobility to the NPC. Turning
to the "capitalist" parties he creates a climate of expected
veracity about his subsequent statements criticizing the
NCNC and the AG.
1Otegbeye, p. 11.
2Otegbeye, p. 12.
152
Dr. Otegbeye has few nice things to say about the
NCNC. "The NCNC, formerly a mass movement . . . has degen-
erated into an instrument of unbridled capitalism .
He imputes to the party a philosophy of "oragmatic socialism"
which is the philosophy of "business circles in the United
States."2 This philosophy or ideology of pragmatic social-
ism has some real consequences for political action and for
political morality:
By its failure to recognize the objective difference
between truth and falsehood and by identifying truth
and utility, pragmatism encourages unprincipledness
and enables the governing class to justify any prof-
itable lie and every criminal act . . .3
Just as the ideology of feudalism has led to the "backward-
ness and despotism of the NPC" so pragmatism has led to the
opportunism and callousness of the NCNC.
If bad groups lead to bad ideology and bad parties then
good groups lead to goo ideology and goo parties. This is
the basis for rejecting the "ruling circles" and their
parties and for supporting the "workers" and their parties.
Thus both Gogo Chu Nzeribe and Dr. Otegbeye identify the
Youth and the workers as the vanguard of progress and the
representatives of the correct point of view. Gogo Chu
Nzeribe points out that the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP)
"has emerged out of the experience and devotion of several
years of practical activity, research and study of the
Nigerian political scene.
1Otegbeye, p. 12. 2Otegbeye, p. 13.
3 Ibid. 4Nzeribe, p. 3.
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On the working class, Dr. Otegbeye writes, "In Africa the
working class is the most rapidly developing class. The
historic mission of this class is to become the leading force
in the struggle for socialism." 1 By "socialism" Otegbeye
means,
. . . the public or communal ownership of the means
of production and distribution with a view to ending
the exploitation of man by man . . . equalizing op-
portunity and making real democracy possible.
We socialists aim at abolishing class distinctions
and all social inequalities . . 2
The Marxist Model
Briefly to summarize, the Youth think that membership
in what they call "class" determines ones belief and that
ones beliefs determine political action. There are pro-
gressive classes and retrogressive classes. Retrogressive
classes are outmoded not only by their relationship to the
means of production, "feudal,means" and "capitalist means,"
as the case may be, but also by their beliefs. What makes
the workers progressive is both their inevitable rise to
power and their capacity to believe in progressive programs.
And their capacity to believe in progressive programs stems
from their work experience during which they become "skilled
and educated as they become acquainted with the technology
of modern production." 3 Most importantly, unlike the feudal
1Otegbeye, p. 21. 2Otegbeye, pp. 20-21.
3 Otegbeye, pp. 21-22.
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and the capitalist classes who have created tribal discord
in order to further their own ends, "the sentiments of
tribal discord are alien to the working classes."1 Applying
these terms to Nigeria, we have (1) the NPC represents the
feudal classes, and has a feudal ideology, (2) the NCNC and
AG represent the rising professional and business classes
in the South and they have a capitalist ideology, (3) the
Socialist Workers and Farmers Party represents the poor
farmers and workers and it has a socialist ideology. Workers
and farmers are not tribalist and therefore safe from the
tribalistic appeals of the feudalist and the capitalists.
This last inference was to cost dearly when some Youths
predicted that "workers" would support a "socialist party"
after the General Strike of 1964.
The reader will note that we have very briefly sketched
out the cognitive point of view of the Youths. We could
have been more detailed in outlining the various positions
that Youths took with respect to the nationalist parties.
For example, from Otegbeye's denunciation of the NCNC and
AG one would think that the last thing he would consider
would be an alliance with them in the forthcoming elections.
But one would be wrong because that is precisely what
Otegbeye was proposing in the very pamphlet we quoted. In
this he was opposed by Youths such as Imoudu and Eskor-Toyo
who, although viewing Nigerian politics from the same
1lIbid.
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perspective, inferred non-cooperation with the Southern
parties. Eskor-Toyo quit the Nigerian Youth Congress
precisely on this point and denounced Otegbeye for being
an "opportunist."
Whatever meaning is given the primitive terms of
Marxism and however inferences are drawn, it is clear that
the way Youths apply the Marxist terms does give them a
first approximation to what is happening in Nigeria. Whether
or not they can refine this approximation depends on what
predictions they make with what success. The applications
of congitions we shall see in Chapters X-XIV. We turn next
to Eskor-Toyo's writings to discuss the evaluative and
specifically the moral dimensions of the Youths concerns.
Morality and Ideology
In discussing the morality of the Youths we shall have
to distinguish between their moral critique of the region-
alist system from a self-criticism. The former contains
an implicit code of conduct with respect to the political
system and the latter with respect to the individual Youths.
Thus the Youths wish Nigeria to follow certain goals and
to do this by using certain means. The Youths also expect
that they themselves fulfill certain personal goals by cer-
tain means. But personal goals and means in their way of
thinking are not to be thought of as being independent from
See Chapter III, pp. 74-80.
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public goals and means. The Youths discipline themselves
in personal ways in order to be able ultimately to affect
the public goals and means of Nigeria. In what follows
we shall briefly sketch out the public morality of the
regionalist system, the Youths criticism of it and the self-
discipline they demand in order that they might act polit-
ically and thus restore, or better, create a moral order.
Morality of the Regionalist System
In parts of traditional Nigerian society one allied
oneself with one's family against the rest of the village,
with one's village against the rest of the province or
district, with one's nationality against other nationalities.
This principle seems to have been extended to present
Nigerian society. Within the region a "Nigerian" supported
his townsmen against other towns, his district against
other districts, at the interregional level,he supported
his region against other regions and especially he supported
his own language group and nationality against other nation-
alities. At the local or village level the system of seg-
mentary morality made gentle by tradition may have protected
local institutions and powers. At the national, urban,
federal level it produced unchecked conflict known colloqui-
ally as "tribalism."
Other Nigerians need not have been acquainted with
the segmentary system of morality to react similarly at the
inter-tribal level. And thus, whatever the traditional
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mores of the Nigerian acting in the city, in the modern mar-
ket place, in politics, his actions were governed by few
explicit norms.
Tribalism, however, was only one of the phenomena of
normlessness. There were other types of interaction in
Nigeria which were not necessarily based on ethnic loyalties,
but which were also essentially normless. Thus there existed
no moral code between the rich and the poor, the rulers and
the ruled. Powerful unscrupulous men rose to the top.
Whatever one thinks of the Youths rhetoric and of their
understanding of Nigerian politics, the Youths retreated
neither into privatism nor did they make their peace with
normlessness. Driven by a moral vision of a puritan and
powerful society, the Youths have been able to survice, in
spite of (or because of) the discrepencies they see between
what they wish Nigeria to be and what she is.
Gogo Chu Nzeribe, for example, laments that:
The ravages of colonialism and foreign rule have left
behind a legacy of filth and squalor, poverty and
degradation and disease . . . bribery, corruption,
and graft have become the main features of our every
day life. 2
1It should be made clear that the term refers to norms
with respect to the national system and with respect to the
role of 'citizen of Nigeria." We do not mean to imply that
political actors did not have values. For example, the es-
pousing of "regional security" by some actors could be
interpreted as a national value. But on the whole, the
scope of values and norms included most often only the eth-
nic group. It is a bitter irony of Nigerian politics, how-
ever, that the strong moral code governing intra-ethnic
relations was not generalizable to the nation.
2Nzeribe, p. 2
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"Looking at the Nigerian situation," Dr. Otegbeye sees:
the political jobbery of the politicians in power,
the grab and corrupt practices leading to the primitive
accumulation of wealth by a few at the expense of the
masses, the ten percent on contract of the "pay me"
before you come in to foreign infestors, the taxation
on second hand clothing, the refusal to increase
wages and salaries of workers . . . the fabulous
allowances and salaries of parliamentarians and their
hangerson . . .1
The Youth see their mission as primarily that of trans-
forming the way Nigerians and Africans in general perceive
themselves and their own society. In a basic way, all Ni-
gerians must go from "docility" to "dynamism." Thus, for
example, Gogo Chu Nzeribe writes:
The Nigerian Peoples Party recognises the fact that
formal independence is not enough. Nigeria will
remain backward, economically dependent, and polit-
ically docile, unless a vast process of change, a
transformation, reaching deep down into and stirring
and changing the lives of the great masses of slum-
bering rural and "tribal" peoples is rapidly set in
train . . .2
Not only the "masses" but also the "intellectuals" have been
affected by "psychological defeatism and . . . humiliation"
as a result of colonial rule ("these years of spite"):
Our intellectuals [are] . . . hampered from developing
their full stature and initiative as a result of the
social disadvantages of age long complex imposed on
the African and on the black race by years of colonial
rule and white supremacy aimed at destroying the con-
fidence of the African in the future ability . . . of
his peoples and race. 3
The solution to this humiliation and docility is seen to lie
in "dynamism." The word has many connotations but in this
setting it implies energy, and action for the sake of action,
sometimes divorced from any moral restraint. Thus, some
1Otegbeve, P. 20. Nzeribe, p. 1. pNzeribe, . 5.
w d
159
young cadres would exclaim that they admired Hitler or Stalin
because they were resolute and destroyed their enemies.
They were "dynamic" leaders. Mature leaders like Gogo
Nzeribe or Eskor-Toyo would, of course, not use the word in
that amoral sense but there is an element of this desire
to tap sources of "free energy" even among those who are
better versed in Marxist-Leninist dialectics.
A similar theme to that of "docility and dynamism" is
one revolving about the two poles of trust and mistrust.
According to the Youths to be naive is to be duped and to be
at the mercy of more sophisticated people. It follows from
this that Nigeria (which has been docile and duped in the
past) must be cunning and sophisticated. The world in which
Nigeria operates is above all a world of neo-colonialism, a
world in which appearances are deceiving, in which only
those trained to see latent under manifest content can hope
to survive. An example of what Nigerians must learn to
mistrust is the government's claims of having produced eco-
nomic development.
A Youth noted:
We are told that Nigeria is growing economically but
we know that the industry coming here is not real
industry. Take the bicycle assembly plant at Apapa.
That's not real industry because the wheels, the body,
the steering wheel and so on are made in Britain. We
are used only to put the thing together again. And
anyway the profit all goes abroad to the corrupt
politicians.
Real industry would be industry which would break the link
between the Western white countries and Africa, The Youth
see all interdependence in terms of exploitation.
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A common theme through this moral vision is that of
Africa as being completely at the mercy of external manipu-
lators whether they be colonialist or neo-colonialist. The
theory of corruption of politicians fits, in the sense that,
it saves the old theory of exploitation. Because if
politicians were not corrupt how else could the neo-
colonialists control events. And if they were not corrupt
the nationalist movement would then have been the be all
and end all of politics. There would be no more room for
those who can see the latent content beneath the manifest.
The only answer to powerlessness and mistrust is a
socialist state. There workers will be taken care of and
will live like brothers under a government which "will treat
us like our fathers." Above all the socialist state is seen
in welfare terms: a worker remarked "children have educa-
tion and medical care, all men have the right of employ-
ment, housing and transport are provided for." Also there
will be no need to be mistrustful because a socialist state
is free of all conflicts. "People work together for the
future like brothers. There is no conflict" because there
are no traitors, like Krushchev "who want to compromise
with the capitalists."
The Good Youth
Since their criticism of the regionalist system gives
us only an indirect idea of how Youths should act, we turn
to Eskor-Toyo's criticism of Dr. Otegbeye's leadership in
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the NYC and Kunle Oyero's pamphlet on the "Role of Youths
in Nigeria" briefly to sketch out how a leader should act,
and how a young cadre in the movement should act,
The context in which Eskor-Toyo attacks Dr. Otegbeye
is the conflict that develops in 1963 between the Eskor-
Toyo- Ikoro-Imoudu faction and the Otegbeye-Goodluck-Bassey
faction. Eskor-Toyo who is the type of leader who will
share his home and his income with the young men who follow
him is among those Youths most convinced of the ethical
content of socialism. Confronted with the observation that
the Youths have no developed theory of economic development,
he countered by saying, "I am not interested in building
skyscrapers in Nigeria. In fact, socialism stands for
principles or it is nothing." It is not farfetched to sub-
stitute the term "ethical standards" for the term "socialism"
in the following context.
It was obvious that the young men who gathered at the
NYC Convention of 1961 to elect scientific socialism
as their ideology knew very little of anything of its
principles. What they did want was something that
could effectively challenge feudal and bourgeois
ideology.2
Retreating from a normless society, the young men
sought rules of conduct within the NYC. Eskor-Toyo who is
a teacher by profession, saw himself as exemplar and a
lSee Chapter III, pp. 74-80.
2See Eskor-Toyo, p. 1.
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teacher of socialism which would challenge this normless-
ness. In his words:
My mission in the Youth Congress was to create
Marxists out of non-Marxists . . . for there can
be no socialist change and therefore no real freedom
and democracy where there is not a large body of
Marxists.1
But however he defined his own mission in the NYC, Eskor-
Toyo claims that Dr. Otegbeye, the president of the NYC,
did not live up to socialist principles of leadership.
Specifically Eskor-Toyo makes five charges against
the then President. These were in essence that
(a) Otegbeye had come in possession of substantial
funds belonging to the NYC without acquainting the
Secretariat . . .
(b) . . . Otegbeye . . . had property ambitions
embarrassing to the socialist movement;
(c) . . . disposing of other property of Congress
without reference to the Secretariat;
(d) . . . he had been conducting a one-man bureau-
cratic style of leadership which was incompatible
with the principle of collective leadership;
(e) . . . he had bourgeois connections embarrasing
to the socialist movement. 3
One notices from this list that three of the five charges
made against Otegbeye deal with the question of money and
property. It goes without saying that the NYC was not the-
only organization in Nigeria having troubles over the con-
trol of money; however, we have already noted how the
socialist movement differentiated itself most strenuously
from the "corrupt" political parties. Consequently, it was
a grave accusation indeed for Eskor-Toyo to accuse the
1lIbid. 2Eskor-Toyo, p. 2. 3Ibid.
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President as he did. In effect he was pointing out that
Otegbeye was not any different from the regionalist
politicians. To be worthy of being a socialist leader
Eskor-Toyo warns one must be able to live without property
and security:
. . . the hunt for super-security, the scramble for
bourgeois property in the highest bourgeois style
is incompatible with the role of a general secretary of a
socialist party [SWAFP. . . . If a man has got plots
of land and is ambitious to build them, then he
will either have little time for revolutionary activity
or will run away from such activity when it threatens
his property ambitions.1
Unlike the leaders of the regionalist parties like Zik
and others after him, a socialist leader must be careful
not to emphasize his personal qualifications and decisions.
He must put the collective decisions of the party above his
own interpretations and ambitions. In the phrase current
among the Youths of the time a socialist leader must eschew,
"personality cult ."
Personality cult must not be allowed to take root
in our movement and young people who come over to
socialism from the Zikist Movement, the Awo
Brigade, the Okpara Brigade and so forth must be
told in plain language that there is not room for
any-one's brigade in the Socialist Movement.
From Eskor-Toyo's charges and his comments it is
possible to list what a socialist leader should be:
lEskor-Toyo, p. 5. The reference to plots of land is
based on a rumour to the effect that Dr. Otegbeye was
building houses and buying land on Ikoyi Island, the very
bourgeois quarters of politicians, rich whites and higher
civil servants.
2Ibid,, p. 6.
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honest, self-sacrificing, and austere. Above all he should
be selfless, substituting the goals of the party for his
own.
Moral lessons are, of course, not limited to the
leadership of the socialist movements, they are above all
addressed to the young cadres who are looking for directions.
But in essence the morality appropriate to cadres is the
same as that which Eskor-Toyo applies to leaders. That such
consensus on morality exists can be seen from readings and
observations of the activities of the anti-Eskor-Toyo camp.
In the following, Kunley Oyero, a Lagos lawyer, at the time
of writing President of the NYC, and close friend of Dr.
Otegbeyers, lays down principles for the younger cadres which
are almost id'entical to the principles of Eskor-Toyo.
Younger Cadres
Throughout his lecture on the "Role of Youth in Repub-
lican Nigeria," Kunle Oyero emphasizes the puritan virtues
such as frugality, cleanliness, dignity of manual work, and
promptness. In his pamphlet he mentions the following
precepts:
1. On Frugality and Austerity:
The new Youth should abrogate all forms of osten-
tatious living. A happy life is our aim. But when
enjoyment reaches the beginnings of orgies, of
superfluity, or excesses then it cannot be an
attribute of the economical, pushful and decent
Youth out to eradicate the showiness and false
life and sense of value plagueing our country .
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2. On Hard Work:
The new Youth, . . . [should] strive towards per-
fection in each individual field of labour and study;
to work hard and indefatiguably, in every place they
find themselves, be scrupulously honest, firm, fair,
and friendly in carrying out their jobs, whatever
these are . . .
3. On the Dignity of Manual Labour:
. . . to acclaim the dignity of labour not by word of
mouth alone but also with practical examples and
unconscious acceptance of the fact; for example that
Sweeping our houses, front steps, gardens or office
or carrying our own boxes, mats or bags of shopping
is no disgrace and that all who feel self-conscious
while doing these or escape from doing them for fear
of "lowering their status' are not among the true
youths, the New Youth that can take over in their
hand the morality of this nation and clean it.
Presumably frugality, austerity, hardwork, cleanliness, and
respect for manual labour are virtues applicable to all
phases of life. There are certain virtues however such as
self-discipline, punctuality, self-sacrifice and selfless-
ness which are especially of relevance to the party. Thus
we can continue the list of virtues keeping in mind that
what follows is especially needed within the party.
4. On Discipline and Punctuality:
. . to be disciplined not only in our manner of
living but also in our minds, and in our work is the
mark of the New Youth. [The New Youth] should be
regular and punctual at meetings, at subscriptions,
at activities of the organization . . .
5. On Self Sacrifice:
The New Youth need in their ranks boys, girls, women,
and men who will from day to day prove their loyalty
to their organization by unselfish and fearless
sacrifices and be prepared for reverses and even
persecution.
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6. On Selflessness:
To act as an individual author of precepts of rules,
or of directives is to kill the organisation. To
refuse to accept themajority decision or act on it,
to bring "self" into the affairs of the organisation,
to seek for positions, . . . to criticise outside
the meeting of the organisation, to fail to criticise
oneself as an individual . .'. with genuine intentions
are to reject the basis of the New Youth.
We conclude this section with the observation that for the
old Youth and for the new Youth, the party represents not
only an instrument for gaining power but is an arena in
which to sort out a normative code and is a refuge from
the normlessness of the wider society.
Ideological Factions Before the Strike
Having briefly outlined the cognitive and evaluative
orientation of the Youths and having indicated that among
them we are considering people who are committed to their
beliefs we can now turn to see how and why Youths applied
their beliefs to the general strike of June 1964 and the
Federal Elections of December 1964.
Although the Youths agreed in general terms that the
strike indicated the beginning of the end for the regionalist
system, different factions derived different strategies from
their interpretations. Three factions straddling three
positions can be distinguished. The Otegbeye-Goodluck-Bassey
faction and their followers in the SWAFP, NYC, and NTUC
thought that the strike coming so close to the Federal elec-
tion, could give them bargaining power within the Southern
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alliance (UPGA) with which they wanted to form a popular
front of socialists and capitalists against the "Feudal"
NNA. The Eskor-Toyo-Imoudu faction and their friends were
opposed to "opportunistic" alliances with the regionalist
parties. They, of course, had no illusion that they would
win national power in the forthcoming elections, but they
reasoned that if Imoudu could get elected on a Labour Party
platform in a workers quarter of Lagos then time indeed was
on the side of a class-oriented politics against the tribally
based regionalists parties. A third group of Youths saw
revolution to be imminent. They banded about Joseph T, and
tried to get funds and weapons. To their dismay, however,
they were betrayed by a prostitute and were all arrested
in the week following the strike.
In subsequent sections when we shall be discussing
how the Youths acted on their understanding of the strike
and the election, we shall be concerned above all with the
Eskor-Toyo-Imoudu faction. This is the faction which could
be best studied, it was on the one hand not submerged in
the UPGA and on the other hand, it was not as secretive as
the more revolutionary factions.
Before we return to the Youth and the strike, it is
of interest to consider how the strike began and what were
the issues involved.
CHAPTER IX
INITIATION OF THE GENERAL STRIKE OF 1964
Having discussed what the Youths thought about politics
and why they thought as they did, we now turn to the problem
of how they verified their thinking in the real world of
politics. The period from June 1964 to December 1964, from
the general strike to the Federal elections, gave the Youths
the opportunity to verify their views of politics and the
observer an opportunity to understand how they went about it.
The antecedents of the strike date back to 1963 and
earlier. We will briefly describe them later. Our real
interests, however, do not lie in describing the causes of
the strike, but in seeing how the participants understood
it. Since Youths, non-Marxist labour leaders, and workers
all participated in the strike, at least three different
perspectives may emerge.
The Youths are of special interest because th.ey have a
theory about the strike; one, moreover, which purports to
explain the motives and perceptions of the other partici-
pants. Simply stated, the theory says: The strike was pos-
sible because the participants were aware of their class
interests and have turned against the political regime. From
this the Youths infer that the striking workers will follow
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a labour party representing the worker's viewpoint and
opposed to that of the political regime. Were the Youths
right? By following just six months after the strike, the
Federal elections allowed the Youths to put their plans of
launching a labour party into practice. Before discussing
the fate of that party and in general, the political conse-
quences of the strike, it may be of interest to describe
how the strike itself came about.
In what follows, we shall describe: (1) the changed
political climate after independence, making possible joint
action among the various labour factions; (2) the events
of September, 1963 and the formation of the Joint Action
Committee (JAC) and of the Morgan Commission; (3) the JAC
memorandum to the Morgan Commission, and the sequence of
events leading up to the strike action itself. Following
this discussion, we shall return to ideology and turn to
the political consequences of the strike.
Independence and Forces for Unity
in the Labour Movement
The peaceful struggle for independence had some unfor-
seen and unintended consequences for post-independence
politics. The colonial system left behind, not only region-
alism, the administrative and political structure highly
resented by the unitary nationalists, but also a class of
privileged civil servants and parliamentarians. Ironically,
many of their privileges were won by popular strikes in
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the forties and fifties. With the exit of the colonial
power, the difference between the standard of living of
this privileged class and that of the mass of Nigerian
workers became a point of great resentment among the workers
and their leaders.
During the 1950's, most of the leaders of the neutralist
faction had been accomodationists toward the regionalist sys-
tem and supporters of their ICFTU connection, which paid their
salaries. By the early sixties, however, the neutralist ULC
split into two factions, both still pro-ICFTU, but one in-
creasingly anti-regionalist. The issue uniting Youth and neu-
tralist and indeed the whole laboour movement was the gap in
wages and life styles between the ordinary workers and the
political class profiting from the regionalist system.
Therefore, it is not surprising that, by 1962, barely
seven months after independence, the ULC, the faction af-
filiated to the ICFTU and opposed to the Youths, published
a pamphlet indicating that, at least on domestic issues,
its views were not far from those of the anti-ICFTU and anti-
regime factions:
Independence Day, October first 1960, freed us from
colonial domination. It did not, unfortunately, free
us automatically from colonial institutions. The
edifice of privilege remains; only its proprietors
are different. . . . This situation, in which a senior
official may receive fifty times the salary of a
1For example, the "Emerson Must Go" strike of 1959 led
to the retirement of Sir Ralf Emerson as chairman of the
Nigerian Railway Corporation and his replacement by a Niger-
ian, Dr. Ikejianni. Imoudu led the strike. See Report of the
Elias Commission of Inquiry, Government Printer, Lagos, 1960.
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junior official, or a daily labourer, is politically
explosive and economically intolerable. . . . The
U.L.C.N. will fight against the continuation of this
exploitation of class by class as fervently as it
fought against imperialism . . 1
When articulated in terms of economic class, rather than
straight politics, all factions can unite on a program and
they do.
Th Formation of the Joint
Action Committee
In the month of September 1963, the ULC, the Youths
in the NTUC and LUF, and others came together to form the
Joint Action Committee (JAC). JAC pressured the government
to form the Morgan Commission, whose terms of reference
included wage structures in ,the governmental and pri-
vate sectors of the economy.
The formation of the JAC came after a year of trying
to get the Federal and regional governments to negotiate a
new wage agreement. By September 1963, the ULC decided
"to prepare for industrial action:"
We know from experience that very often Nigerian
employers including government, will always wait for
workers' patience to be exhausted and attract indus-
trial action before the workers are taken seriously
aboat their demands . . .2
1 U.L.C.N. Policy Statement, "A Programme for the
Future" (Lagos: U.L.C.N., May 25, 1962).
2ULC memorandum, September 6, 1963. Signed by L. L.
Borha. The memo was distributed to all central labour
bodies, including the NTUC and LUF. It called for a meeting
of "all unions to signify their support for a country wide
industrial action."
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By September 12th, representatives of all labour factions
met at the invitation of the ULC at their headquarters and
agreed to form "a joint action committee in order to pros-
ecute the wage issue."1
By that time, too, the ULC had made a distinction,
crucial in this context, between the "government" and the
"authority of the state:"
The Governments are unwilling to grapple courageously
with the basic and fundamental question raised by the
Congress' demands . . . it is necessary to re-emphasize
that the Congress did not address its demands to the
Governments necessarily as employers, but as the
authority of the state which not only has direct
responsibility to protect workers in all sectors [this
is an allusion to the private sector] . . . but also
the obligation to bring about a more rational economic
structure the first steps towards which in our view is
a complete overhaul of the existing colonial wage
structure . . .2
By making this distinction, the ULC came closer to the posi-
tion of the NTUC and the Youths in general. Labour was now
ready to confront the government, not as an employer, but
as "the authority of the state." Under such a slogan, both
1Memorandum from H. P. Adebola, President of the ULC,
to affiliated unions, September 1963. Note that on September
12, the term, "joint action committee" is still used inform-
ally, but by September 17, a meeting is called under the
direction of the Joint Action Committee. From September 21,
the informal alliance between the ULC and the other central
labour bodies is called "JAC." Ref: JAC 1/63. Note that on
the initial "memorandum committee" of the JAC, at least four
of the ten members were Youths. The committee consisted of
W. 0. Goodluck (Chairman), L. L. Borha (Secretary), S. U.
Bassey, G. Nzeribe, F. N. Kanu, A. Kalejaiye, Senator Chief
Fagbehro-Beyioku, E. N. Okongwu, S. 0. Oduleye, and Dr. M.
E. Kolagbode.
2L. Borha, "Government on Workers' Demand," September
12, 1963.
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the Youths who wanted to destroy that authority and the less
radical unionists could join, and did.
By September 19, 1963, the ULC, with JAC's concurrence,
called on the government to appoint:
a high-powered commission for the carrying out of
an upward revision of salaries and wages . . . the
complete overhaul of the existing colonial wage
structure . . . the introduction of a national
minimum wage and the abolition of the zonal wage-
rates and the daily rated labour systems.
JAC warns that if such a commission is not called by 25 Sep-
tember it would call on all its member unions to go out on
strike "with effect from 00 hours 27 September 1963."l With
excellent public relations, the JAC rejects all of govern-
ment's proposals and calls for a strike for the week preceding
the anniversary celebrations of Nigeria's Independence Day.
The Strike of September 1963
On 26 September 1963, without consulting JAC, the
Ministry of Labour publishes the terms of reference of the
committee which is to study the JAC demands. Next day Borha
receives a letter from the Permanent Secretary, chastising
him for not going to a meeting with the Minister of Labour.
"The purpose of the meeting was to explain the terms
approved by the government." 2
1Resolutions passed by the Federal District Council of
the United Labour Congress, 19 September 1963.
2Federal Ministry of Labour, Ref. No. ML.Co/128/Sec 80.
Signed A. I. Obiyan, 27 September 1963. The terms of refer-
ence that the government proposed were as follows: (1) To
examine the principles and system of wage fixing in all parts
of Nigeria and to make recommendations with a view to re-
moving any defects, including the differentials between
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Tn answer to the letter from the Ministry of Labour,
Borha, the Secretary of the ULC,but writing in the name of
the JAC, has this to say:
You . . . released to the general public the terms
of reference before they were brought to the notice
of this committee. You will admit in all honesty
that your action constitutes a serious breach of
faith.1
Contrary to the terms of reference suggested by the govern-
ment, Borha in the name of JAC makes the following demands:
There should be appointed a high-powered Commission
to be assigned the task of carrying out . . . (a) an
investigation into the existing colonial wage struc-
ture, remuneration and other conditions of service
. . . (b) an examination of the demands for (1) a
general upward revision of salaries and wages of jun-
ior employees in both Government and Private Estab-
lishments [Author's underline]; (2) the abolition of
the daily wage system and the introduction of a
national minimum wage. (c) On the basis of (a) and
(b) above the Commission should make recommenda-
tions . . . 2
In this letter, Borha again states a principle, which
is to become the major theme of the General Strike of 1964:
The Commission's work should result in the complete
overhaul of the existing wage structure arbitrarily
drawn up by colonialist exploiters of the past so
Federal and Regional wage rates in the same area, and
ensuring an effective machinery for the review of wage rates
on a continuing basis consistent with national economic wel-
fare. (2) To examine the principles underlying the employ-
ment of daily paid labour, and to consider whether any ad-
justment of present wage rates is justified and to make
recommendations. (3) To examine the existing salary and
to indicate whether there are, in fact, inequities.
1Letter to the Hon. Minister of Labour. Ref JAC-02/63.
Signed L. L. Borha, 27 September 1963.
2Ibid.
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that the politically dangerous and economically and
socially harmful effects inherent the inbalance
between the foreign oriented upper stratum and the
domestic-oriented lower stratum vis-a-vis the
national economy may be permanently removed.1
Special attention should be given here to the explicit
nature of the JAC's demands for an upward revision in wages
which includes the private sector. This is quite important
because from the beginning, a major bone of contention be-
tween JAC and the government is the inclusion of the private
sector in future negotiations. By the very nature of the
JAC it claims to represent all unions including those in the
private sector. But the government is legally not empowered
to negotiate in the name of the private sector. JAC solves
this problem with the distinction we have already listed
between "government" on the one hand and "the authority of
the state" on the other. Thus when Borha makes demands on
the government he is making such demands on the authority
of the state. Too much should not be made of this wording,
but one should note that because JAC was trying to represent
all the workers, it was placing the government in the embar-
rassing position of insisting on the law and risking a major
strike, or not insisting on the law and having to risk its
already weakened authority.
At first the government rejects the terms of reference
suggested by JAC. For his own part Borha, "regrets" that the
strike "will proceed to take effect in certain sectors and
may spread unless our demands are met without further delay."2
1lIbid. 2Ibid.
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Some unions are alerted to go on strike by 30 September 1963.
The government backs down. On 3 October 1963, Borha an-
nounces, "Country-wide strike called off." Negotiations take
place between the JAC and representatives of the Ministry of
Labour, the Ministry of Establishments and the Ministry of
State in the office of the Prime Minister: "The governments
have agreed to set up a high powered commission for the pur-
pose of revising wages and salaries on terms of references to
be agreed upon." 1
The Formation of the Morgan Commission
On 14 October 1963 the Government in consultation with
the regional Governments appointed a commission of inquiry
to be chaired by Sir Adeyinka Morgan, Chief Justice of the
Western Region Supreme Court. The terms of reference of
the Morgan Commission were as follows:
(i) To investigate the existing wage structure, remu-
neration and conditions of service in wage-earning
employments in the country and to make recommendations
concerning a suitable new structure, as well as ade-
quate machinery for a wages review on a continuing
basis.
(ii) To examine the need for (a) a general upward
revision of salaries and wages of junior employees in
both Government and private establishments; (b) the
1See ULC files 1963. In the circular of October 3, Borha
commends the following unions for effective action during the
September strike warning: Railway and Port Transport Staff
Union (Alhaji Adebola's union in the ULC), Lagos Municipal
Transport Workers Union (Bus drivers in the ULC), Aeronautical
Workers Union (ULC branch), but significantly he also singles
out Wahab Goodluck's, Meteorological Workers Union (NTUC)
and the John Holt's African Workers Union (Private Sector
ULC).
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abolition of the daily-wage system; and (c) the intro-
duction of a national minimum wage; and to make
recommendations.1
The Commission held a private meeting in Lagos on the
23rd and held its first public meeting on 24 October 1963.
The JAC Memorandum to the
Morgan Commission
The Morgan Commission listened to a variety of witnesses
and deliberated for seven months. In a memorandum to the
Commission the JAC stated its case. Since some of the Youths,
especially Gogo Chu Nzeribe, Eskor-Toyo, and Dr. Kolagbode,
participated in the working of the memorandum we can infer
that they and through them the other Youths shared the views
of the memorandum. Above all, the memorandum argued, there
exists an income gap between the very rich and the bulk of
Nigerian workers. The memorandum strongly argues for
"closing the gap."
As an illustration of what is meant by income gap, the
report notes that
in the Federal Ministry of Works . . . 6 watchmen and
gatekeeps earn between them4 710 . . . by contrast the
Minister of Works earns/2700, the Director of Federal
Public Works 43,180 and the Technical Engineering
Office .3,64o . . . earnings of salaried persons range
from more than f1O,000 p.a. to less thanX48 p.a.
in Nigeria.2
1Report of the Commission on the Review of Wages,
Salary and Conditions of Service of the Junior Employees
of the Governments of the Federation and in Private Estab-
lishments. Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, 1964.
2The Joint Action Committee Memorandum to the Morgan
Commission. ULC 1963, p. 10.
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The report traces the beginnings of the gap to the
colonial period and to "prestige factors." Administrators
had to be induced to join the colonial service and do ser-
vice in Nigeria. Part of this inducement was high salaries
and allowances. The colonial administrators and other
European civil servants created a privileged caste in colo-
nial Nigeria. It was one of the goals of the independence
movement to make this caste permeable to Nigerian ambitions.
When Nigerians became Ministers of State and Par-
liamentarians they argued that they should maintain
a social status at least equal to that of the top
colonial higher civil servants. Again when Nigerian-
ization started, Nigerian officers insisted on not
being paid any incomes ower than those of their
expatriate equivalents.
While Ministers, Parliamentarians, and Senior Civil
Servants had replaced the Europeans as a new privileged
class, ordinary workers were still living on their colonial
wages. The problem was not only in income but in style of
life and in relations between the two groups:
There was a pronounced master-servant relation ex-
pressed not only in a prestige income structure but
in social snobbishness. All this has been carried
into the new period. The task of the Commission
. . . is to overhaul this structure.
In order to close the gap, JAC recommends a minimum annual
wage of (180 and an upper income scale varying between
4500 and f960. This reorganization of the wage and salary
structure should be done by cutting salaries, and by estab-
lishing the principle that, "Nigerians can and should earn
less than expatriates of equal skill and experience."2
1lIbid. 2Ibid.
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The Strike
Having heard evidence from JAC, the Government, Nigerian
Employers Consultative Association (NECA) and various ex-
perts, the Morgan Commission together with two minority re-
ports presented its findings to the government in April. It
was now up to the Government to publish a White Paper on the
report, but this the government continually delayed until on
Monday, 1 June, JAC called the workers out on strike. The
General Strike had begun.
Within a week the Government published its White Paper.
The wage increases that the White Paper suggested were well
below those demanded by JAC and recommended by Morgan. Con-
sequently, the recommendations of the White Paper were re-
jected out of hand by the JAC and the strikers. The strike
did not come to a halt for another week until it was finally
agreed to hold tripartite negotiations among JAC, represen-
tatives of all the Governments, and NECA.
The results of the Okotie-Eboh negotiations (as the
negotiations came to be known after the Chairman, the late
Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, the Minister of Finance) were favor-
able to the strikers. One can compare the Morgan, the White
Paper and the Okotie-Eboh recommendations in Table 8.1 below.
lNECA is an employers association formed in 1957 in
Lagos. "The Association aims at providing a means for con-
sultation and exchange of information on questions arising
out of relation between Employers and their work people, and
promoting co-operation . . . between Associations of Em-
ployers . . . and between individual Employers." (See NECA
News, January 1965.) The significant point about NECA during
the Okotie-Eboh negotiations was its lack of constitutional
or any other powers either to enforce or even to represent
TABLE 8.1--Government Minimum Monthly Wage Rates.*
Previous Morgan White FinaL
Final Rates Recommendation Paper Agreemernt.
Agreed
Zones Per Index Per Inde Index P IndexMonth Month Month Month
1. I Lagos 7.11. 8 100 12. 0. 0 158 9. 2. 0 120 10. 0. 0 13Z
2. II Ibadan, Benin, Burutu
urban areas 7.11. 8 100 10. 0. 0 132 7.16. o 103 . . 6 109
3. II Western Nigeria and Mid-Western
Nigeria excluding 2 7.11. 8 100 . . 0 105 7.16. o 103 S. 2. 6 !09
4. II Port Harcourt urban area 6.10. o 100 12. 0. 0 185 7.16. 0 12D 8. 2. 6 12T
5. II Enugu, Aba, Onitsha and
Umuahia urban areas 6.10. 0 100 10. 0. 0 154 7.16. o 120 . 2. 6 L27
6. II Eastern Nigeria excluding 4 and 5 6.10. 0 100 . o. 0 123 7.16. 0 120 8. 2. 6 12
7. III Kaduna and Kano urban areas 5.10. 6 100 10. 0. o 181 6.12., 2 120 6.18. a 125
8. IV Jos (including mines field)
and Zaria urban areas 5. 1.10 100 10. o. 5 196 6. 1. 4 119 6. 7.10 125'
9. IV Sokoto, Gusau, Bauchi, Gombe and
Lokoja urban areas. Katsina,
Bene and Kano Privinces (ex-
cluding urban areas above) Kabba
Div. 5. 1.10 100 6.1a. o 128 6. 1. 4 119 6. 7.10 125
10. V Zaria, Plateau, Sokoto and Bauchi
Privinces (excluding urban areas
above) Gashaka/Mambilla N.A. 4. 8.10 100 6.10. o 146 5. 6. 2 120 5.10. 6 124
11. VI Northern Nigerian excluding
7, 8, 9, and 10 4. 2. 4 loo 6.1o. o 158 4.15. 4 116 5. 4. o 126
Effective date of increases -- 1-10-1963 1-4-1964 1-1-1964
*Adapted from table titled "Government Minimum Monthly Wage
Commerce, August, 1964, p. 9.
Rates," Economic Trends. Lagos Chamber of
'At
181
The Government and the General Strike
We can discuss the political meaning of the strike from
the perspective of the Government and its enemies within and
without the Labour movement or from the perspective of the
actors in the strike.
From the perspective of the Government and its enemies,
the very magnitude of a general strike such as the Nigerian
strike of 1964 is of significance. Since no collective bar-
gaining machinery existed to deal with a general strike, the
magnitude of the general strike, including approximately
800,000 workers both in government and the private service,
precluded any responses based on collective bargaining ma-
chinery. The government was forced to negotiate at levels
high enough to ensure authoritative decisions which would
satisfy the strikers and stop the strike. Thus, the respon-
sibility for dealing with the strike shifted dramatically
from the office of permanent secretaries to that of the Min-
ister of Labour and Establishment and finally to the office
of the Prime Minister and then to the Prime Minister himself.
In his response to the strike, the Prime Minister was
not at his best. He miscalculated the seriousness of the
the various employers in Nigeria. NECA sent representatives
only on the insistence of the Government after it itself had
been warned by the JAC that it would not come to a meeting
unless employers in the private sectors were also represented.
Once NECA did attend the post-strike meetings, JAC argued
that the raise in wages accepted by the Government was equally
binding on all employers who were NECA members. Many em-
ployers refused to accept this interpretation, and in the
private sector strikes went on for another two months.
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event and the fortitude of the strikers. When he issued an
ultimatum demanding that the workers return to work, no one
budged and the JAC started to issue its own ultimatum to the
Government. This was not the first nor the last in a series
of blunders which seriously placed in question the wisdom of
the Government.
The events of the strike filled the radio and the news-
papers and thus raised the saliency of the issues involved
to national issues and focused national attention on the
leaders of the strike: Borha, Goodluck, Imoudu, Adebola,
Gogo Chu Nzeribe, and others on the JAC. It was lost on only
a few that the JAC was led by Southerners who represented
predominantly Southern workers who-were confronting a Northern
dominated government.
Indeed as the strike progressed into its second week
it began to attract not only Youth, but dissident elements
from everywhere in the regionalist system. Thus, for ex-
ample, dissident NCNC and AG and members of the Zikists
National Vanguard who were in opposition to the NPC-NCNC
coalition began to converge on the JAC headquarters in all
the regions. They brought with them not only advice and
1On June 9, the late Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa
Balewa warned the strikers: "In the present circumstances,
my Government will be failing in its duty to the nation if it
does not take all necessary steps in its power to avoid a
dislocation of the economic life of this country. . . . The
present position cannot be tolerated any longer." Daily Times.
In response, the Western Nigerian Branch of the JAC called
on the Prime Minister, "To resign within 48 hours." Daily
Times, 10 June, 1964.
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support but money and cars essential to keeping the strike
.1going.
Finally, without exhausting the list of political
meaning the strike could have for the political regime, it
should be noted that by including the private sector the
JAC and the Youth placed the government in an embarrassing
position of having to choose between Nigerian workers and
expatriate employers. The Youths had a field day in pointing
out how the government was "pocketed" by "Imperialists."
For the duration of the strike the Government had to defend
itself against accusations of "neo-colonialism."
1We infer such party activity from personal observation
in Ibadan and Lagos. We cannot vouch however that the same
pattern repeated itself in the East, in the North, and in
the Mid-West.
CHAPTER X
IDEOLOGICAL PREDICTION I: THE POLITICAL
MEANING OF THE GENERAL STRIKE
Having discussed some of the events and issues
leading up to the General Strike, we shall now return to
the main line of the argument. We are concerned less with
the causes of the strike than its perception by the Youths
and what consequences the Youths inferred from their
perceptions.
To understand the meaning of the strike for the
Youths we should keep in mind some of the cognitive and
evaluative standards which the Youths applied to Nigerian
politics as a whole. For the Youths the strike is a
specific event which can be understood only with respect
to the general moral and cognitive principles of their
beliefs.1
To the Youths the timing, extent and discipline of
the strike are most important. That the strike comes so
soon after independence seems to the Youths to verify
their theory about Nigerian politics entering a phase of
revolutionary class conflict. That the strike comes so
1See, for example, Wahab 0. Goodluck, "Nigeria
and Marxism," The African Communist, 19 (Oct/Dec.,
1964). 184
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near to the Federal elections seems to the Youths near
Imoudu, an excellent opportunity to launch a truly anti-
regionalist labour party. The Youths imputed motives to the
workers which they derived from observation and from the
Marxist model discussed in Chapter VIII.
The Meaning of the Strike for the Workers
Let us consider two motives which the Youths saw as
fundamental to the strike and which fit in with their theory
of what was happening in Nigeria.1 The two motives for going
on strike can be paraphrased as follows: (1) the workers
went out on strike because they withdrew consent or affect
from the political system and (2) the workers went out on
strike because they were opposed to the gap in wages and life
styles which existed between them and the politicians and
the senior civil servants. For the sake of our discussion
let us call these two motives, "withdrawal of consent" and
"egalitarianism," respectively.
For the Youths it followed that if one had gone out on
strike because one had withdrawn consent from the political
lAn example of the rhetoric of the time taken almost
at random comes from a pamphlet distributed at a mass meeting
in Ibadan:
The Nigerian Labour Party wants you to come forward
and join its ranks because you are also a suffering
worker. You are always thinking of how to free your-
self and your family from slave wages. . . .
We are convinced that Workers of this generation can
form the Government and rule this country. . . . Or do
you still want to suffer more. Is the cup of your
suffering not long overflowing?
"Workers Here Is The Way!" Issued by the Bureau of Workers
Agit-Propo, Lagos Area Committee of the Nigerian Labour
Party.
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system and because one was egalitarian then one was class
conscious and one was ready to support a labour party. The
Youths were right about the workers' motives but wrong in
the inferences that they drew from such motives.
In order to understand how the Youths derived ideolog-
ical meaning from their ordinary perceptions, let us consider
what the workers communicated to the Youths. But since any
communication the workers transmitted to the Youths would be
based on the perception of their own experience, what the
workers perceived to be their own motives for going on strike
was the information transmitted to the Youths.
In discussing the motives of the workers consider three
questions: (1) did workers perceive themselves as having
withdrawn affect from the political system after independence,
(2) did workers perceive themselves as having withdrawn af-
fect from the political system after the strike, (3) what
did the workers perceive as being the causes of the strike.
Withdrawal of Consent After Independence
In September 1964, when we asked our questions, evi-
dence for a post-independence crisis in Nigeria was so
manifest that one could be quite direct in asking questions
gauging its existence. Respondents were asked: "What is
lWe call the reader's attention to Questionnaire B
in the Appendig. The group on the basis gf which,,we
generalize to workers (recall that the workers that
concern us are not the universe of Nigerian workers but
those who were most likely to be in contact with the Youths,
see Introduction) are a class of thirty-eight ULC trade-
unionists who were taking a course in industrial relations
at the ULC headquarters in Lagos. A possible source of
bias is this group's unrepresentativeness of the type of
workers communicating with the Youths. But since these are
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your opinion about politicians (senior civil servants,
government, trade unionists) now that Nigeria is inde-
pendent?" They were given three options which were:
(1) I trusted our politicians (senior civil servants,
government, trade unionists) more before independence than
now, (2) I trust our politicians (etc.) the same way as I
did before independence, (3) I trust our politicians more
now than I did before Independence. The same question
with the same options was repeated for "senior civil ser-
vants," "Government," and,"trade union leaders." The
results are listed in Table 10.1.
We note that, on the whole, workers trusted poli-
ticians and Government less after independence than before.
With respect to the least political category, the senior
civil servants, 47% felt that their trust had increased or
stayed the same. These results bring us to the conclusion
ULC trade unionists and not "Marxist" trade unionists one
would expect that their motives would be less likely to reflect
(1) withdrawing affect from the political system after
independence, (2) withdrawing affect from the political
system after the strike, (3) going on strike for reasons
of "class struggle." Consequently we suggest that to the
degree that this group does show motives 1-3 above, it is
representative of the more radical workers who would pre-
sumably be in touch with the Youths, and who would even
more strongly articulate the motives cited.
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that workers trusted government less after independence
than before and that they trusted the political aspects
less than the more neutral civil service aspects.
Table 10.1--Workers' Views of Politicians, Senior Civil
Servants and Government After Independence.
Percentage saying Senior Civil
that Trust since Politicians Servants Government
Independence has
Increased 10 18 29
Remained the Same 13 29 10
Decreased 63 45 50
N.A. 13 8 11
Total 99(38) 100(38) 100(38)
If, after independence, workers said that they trusted
politics less than before, did workers seem to be turning
to their own leaders?
-4
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TABLE 10.2--Workers Views of
Trade Union Leaders After Inde-
pendence.
Percentage Saying Trust Has
Increased 52
Same 23
Decreased 19
N.A. 6
Total 100(38)
From Table 10.2 it would seem that the beneficiaries
of workers mistrust of politics after independence were
their own leaders, the Youths among them. What was the
effect of the strike on this turning away from government
and party politics toward workers' representatives?
Withdrawal of Consent After the Strike
There are at least three possibilities. The strike
could have had a cathartic effect driving workers closer to
government and politicians; it could have had no perceivable
effect either way; it could have driven workers even further
from the political regime.
Consider the first possibility, the strike was a
success for the workers, and 52% thought so as against 34%
who thought that it was neither a success or a failure.
It is not out of the question then that having fought suc-
cessfully with government, strikers would have been appeased
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and felt more sanguine about politics. One could argue
in terms of the second possibility, because one could claim
that workers saw the strike in neutral economic terms.
Here, however, we shall be testing the third possibility.
One gets the general impression that on the whole workers
were driven further away from the government and politicians
after the strike and that the workers who indicated a drop
in trust after independence were more likely to perceive
that the strike had alienated them even further. In this
sense the strike had an accelerating effect on the delegit-
imizat'on of the political system after independence.
Paralleling the set of questions we asked about trust
after independence, we asked the same sample of respondents
questions about trust after the strike. Thus we asked
respondents, "Now that the strike is over do you trust
politicians more than before the strike?" Respondents
were given the options: (1) more than before the strike,
(2) the same as before the strike, or (3) less than before
the strike. We asked the same questions with respect to
"senior civil servants," and "government." As in Table 10.1,
our results are listed below in Table 10.3.
From Table 10..3 we can surmise that indeed the strike
did have an effect on the attitudes of our respondents. In
particular the strike was perceived as having more frequently
decreased trust in politicians and government than in having
increased it or in not having affected it either way. With
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respect to civil servants, the least political category,
the strike was seen as having least effect in reducing
trust.
TABLE 10.3--Workers Views of Politicians, Senior Civil Ser-
vants and Government After the Strike
Percentage Saying Politicians Senior Civil Government
that Trust Has Servants
Increased 7 14 14
Same 34 55 34
Decreased 45 24 45
N.A. 14 7 7
Total 100(38) 100(38) 100(38)
Post Independence Crisis and the General Strike
We have already indicated that the strike came on the
heels of the Western Region emergency, the break-up of the
NPC-NCNC coalition and the census crisis, and that it was
followed five months later by the Federal election crisis
of 1964 and 1965. Each of these crises were indicators as
well as causes of a deep-seated malaise which came upon
Nigeria after independence. The question arises, was the
strike part of these post-independence crises in the minds
of the workers, or was it perceived as an independent event?
On the face of it the timing of the strike and its
success seemed to indicate that it was not an independent
_ _ - -4
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event. Nevertheless, one could argue that unless workers
felt that it was part of the chain of political crises and
unless they acted in terms of their feelings, its coinci-
dence in time with the other crises was coincidental.
We deal with this problem in two ways. First we know
already that a majority of our sample felt that the strike
further alienated them from politics and we know that a
majority of our sample felt a decrease in trust for politics
after independence. To what extent do the two groups inter-
sect? If they do, Youths could claim that the strike was
part of the decrease in trust for politics after independence
and that it accelerated this decrease. Secondly, we can
ask workers the direct question, "What do you think were
the major causes of the strike?" And we can see to what
extent political, especially recent historical crises, are
cited. Let us consider the first procedure for the three
categories of our former discussion, "politicians,"
"senior civil servants," and "government."
Instead of discussing separately the results for
each of the three categories, it is simple to group the
results together in Tables 10.4, 10,5, and 10.6 below.
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TABLE lO..4--Trust Toward Politicians After
Strike by Trust After Independence.
Trust After Increased Same Decreased
Strike
Increased 2 0 1
Same 2 4 7
Decreased 0 1 15
TABLE 10.5--Trust Toward Senior Civil Servants
After Strike by Trust After Independence.
Trust After
Strike Increased Same Decreased
Increased 3 0 2
Same 4 10 4
Decreased 0 1 8
TABLE 10.6--Trust Toward Government After
Strike by Trust After Independence.
Trust After Increased Same Decreased
Strike
Increased 4 0 0
Same 6 3 4
Decreased 1 1 14
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It is possible to conclude from the above results
that the strike exacerbated the workers' mistrust of
politics after independence. Noting that the frequency
of "decrease" is greater than the frequency of "increase"
one can say in broad terms that the strike was felt to be
part of widespread mistrust of politics after independence.
If workers withdrew affect from politics after inde-
pendence and after the strike, did they channel this affect
toward their labour leaders?
TABLE 10.7--Trust Toward Labour Leaders
After Strike by Trust After Independence.
Trust After Increased Same DecreasedStrike
Increased 17 2 1
Same 2 6 5
Decreased 1 0 1
From Table 10.7 we further conclude that the stock
of trade union leaders rose after indepencence but we
are less sure that the strike contributed to the rise.2
1By eliminating the "same" category, three 2 x 2 tables
were constructed, and Fisher's exact test applied. For
Table 10.4 the probability of a distribution of frequencies
under H0 is P = .02. For Table 10.5, P = .03 and for Table
10.6, P = .001.
In Table 10.7 with "same" eliminated P = .02. Thus,
we accept H0 and conclude that with respect to labour leaders,
post-indepencence and post-strike attitudes are not related.
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Few understood better than the labour leaders them-
selves, and especially the Youths, that the stock of labour
leaders was high. After the strike, as Imoudu and the Youths
were ready to launch a labour party, the question arises for
us as it did for them, could they transform workers' support
into political power? The Youths were convinced and rightly
so that for the workers the strike signified a withdrawal of
affect from the political system. But why did the workers
go on strike, and could their motive for going on strike be
transformed into allegiance for a labour party?
To the Youths, drawing on their Marxist model, the
answer seemed obvious: the workers went on strike because
of the "gap, " the difference in wages and life styles that
existed between them and the ruling elite. In terms of their
analysis, it followed that the workers would support a party
that would abolish the elite and in abolishing the elite,
abolish the gap. To test their first proposition it was a
simple matter of asking the workers why they went on strike.
We shall test the second proposition in Chapter X, below.
Radical Egalitarianism and the
General Strike of June 1964
The JAC, that marriage of convenience between activists,
Youths, and neutral trade unionists, invented the slogan of
the "gap," and carried it to the workers. To what extent did
this slogan find resonance? That is, how did the workers and
their immediate representatives view the strike? Table 10.8
carries the story.
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TABLE 10.8--The Causes of the General Strike as Perceived by
the Workers.*
Percentage Saying the Strike was Caused by
1. The Census Issue 3
2. Corruption in Government 28
3. Low Salary of Workers 92
4. Bad Treatment of Minority Groups 12
5. Arrogance of Those Who are on Top 50
6. High Salaries of Senior Civil Servants as Com-
pared to What the Workers Get 79
7. The Crisis in the Western Region** 0
8. High Salaries of Politicians as Compared to
What the Workers Get 77
9. Other 0
Total (N=38)
*The actual question we asked was, "Which do you think
were the most important causes of the recent general strike?"
The question was closed and the items were presented in the
order of the above table. Note that percentages add to more
than 100% because respondents were allowed more than one
choice.
'**We have reservations about the wording of this ques-
tion (especially alternative 7), but results are in the
expected direction.
What is of special interest is that in spite of the
strike coming after the Western Region Emergency, the Census
Issue, and other national political issues, these issues are
cited with extremely low frequency. On the other hand, issues
which are purely economic such as the "low salary of workers,"
92%, and issues which refer to the "gap" such as the "High
Salaries of Civil Servants as Compared to What the Workers
197
Get," 79%, and the "High Salaries of Politicians as Com-
pared to What the Workers Get," 77%, are cited with greatest
frequency.
Thinking that the strike may be a special case of their
involvement with public issues, we were curious to see if,
in a different role the same respondents would view current
political and party issues more from the perspective of
regional politics. Thus they were asked: "As a citizen of
Nigeria which issues make you particularly angry?" As many
as 65% were concerned about "the high salaries and allowances
of those who are on top." 1
In articulating the issues of the "gap," the JAC and
the Youths found an issue with resonance in the rank and
file. It can be surmised that the perception of the dis-
crepancy between what "those who are on top" earn and what
they should earn had some consequences for mobilizing the
workers. However, what is of interest to us here is not
whether this egalitarianism "caused" the strike, but whether
this perceived grievance is translatable into political terms.
Are those who are most opposed to the political class also
most likely to support the Youth and a labour party?
It would seem that in the post-strike workers the Youth
had found a movement which could be used for political ends. For
131% indicated that they were concerned with the bad
treatment of minority groups, 21% with the census issue, 8%
with the freedom of the press, and 0% with the Western Region
Emergency.
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example, out of 38 respondents surveyed, 70% thought that
no regionalist party represented their views. Out of 61
other respondents surveyed, 88% answered that they would
support a labour party and only 5% indicated unequivocal
support for one of the regionalist parties.
In summary we can say this about what the workers
thought about the strike: (1) they perceived it as further
withdrawing their consent from politicians, (2) they
thoughtcfthe strike 'as an expression of their opposition
to the gap and to privilege, (3) they seemed to reject
strorgy regionalist political parties and to encourage a
labour party; but, (4) they did not see that
the strike was connected to the other crises besetting
the Federation at the time. Item (4) should have been a
clue that perhaps the strike was not being perceived in
clear-cut political terms. But the Youths were not doing
surveys. They were content with the post-strike cli-
mate of opinion which seemed to indicate that the workers
had radically rejected the regionalist parties and that
they were evidently waiting to support their labour leaders
and a labour party.
1See Questionnaire A in the Appendix. The sixty-one
trade unidnists cited above were sent by their unions to
attend a series of lectures given by the extra-mural staff
at the University of Ibadan.
CHAPTER XI
FAILURE OF IDEOLOGY: THE GENERAL STRIKE AND
THE FAILURE OF THE NIGERIAN LABOUR PARTY
From what we have learned about the General Strike
of 1964 we conclude that it was both an indicator and an
accelerator of the deligitimizing of the regionalist system.
The political stock of politicians and Government fell,
that of trade union leaders rose. By staying away from
their jobs in thousands workers had demonstrated better
than any survey their dissatisfaction with their conditions
of work, with their low standard of living, with the
growing and unjustified gap in standard of living between
themselves and their rulers, and with the morality of
their rulers. One would have thought that all this could
have been further translated into political ,action,' into
a support for a labour party. So it also seemed to Imoudu
and Eskor-Toyo and the other Youths who broke with the
SWAFP. Using Imoudu's great prestige as rallying point and
catalyst they formed a labour party in preparation for the
December Federal Elections. Eskor-Toyo wrote:
There is not the slightest doubt that in going into
the next stage of the Morgan struggle the working
class will be immensely helped by the emergence of
a real workers' party. . . . It is a matter for
happy reflection that the workers themselves during
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the strike saw in their hundreds the need for such
a party.1
The Youth felt that they were being pulled into power by the
vacuum of the disintegrating political system and pushed
into power by the real force of egalitarianism of their
followers. "A good party grows out of a real need," said
Eskor.
And so indeed it seemed in the period right after the
strike and preceding the Federal elections of December, 1964.
In July, a month after the strike, 88% of a group of trade-
unionists indicated that they would support a labour
party in the Federal elections. 2
The General Strike and the Federal
Election of 1964
Coming as it did on the heels of the general strike,
the Federal election of 1964 proved to be an excellent
opportunity for the Youths of the Nigerian Labour Party
to test their theories of politics and attempt to win power
at the polls or at the very least to show themselves to be
more than a splinter or crank group. If Imoudu could be
elected from his district in Lagos or even if he could show
that he had a political following then there was some
meaning to their theories. It would be verified that class
struggle was an incipient force in Nigeria, that workers
would not follow their ethnic leaders. Once they had acted
1Eskor-Toyo, Internal Memo.
Of sixty-one trade-unionists interviewed, see Ques-
tionnaire A in the Appendix.
in concert and proved their strength in the strike, workers
would reject their ethnic leaders at election time and
follow their true friends, the Youths and Imoudu.
What happened during the election is now history. We
know that the political divisions between North and South
which had been deepening since the Western Region Emergency
and the breakup of the NCNC-NPC coalition was transformed
into an electoral struggle, The two sides were divided be-
tween the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), composed of the
NPC and its Southern allies, and the United Progressive Grand
Alliance (UPGA), an electoral coalition of the NCNC and the AG.
We also know that a true contest never took place.
Appalled by the conduct of the election and faced with im-
pending victory of the NNA at the polls, UPGA leaders decided
to precipitate a crisis by boycotting the election. Imoudu
and the Nigerian Labour Party never had a chance to prove
their mettle. Nevertheless from the Nigerian Labour Party's
conduct during the election and from survey data, we have
some indication of how well Imoudu and the Youths succeeded
in mobilizing the workers during the period June - December,
1964.
Given this data we shall ask what was the political
meaning of the strike. Since it seemed that the strike was
among other things an indication of withdrawal of consent
from the regionalist system and the regionalist parties and
politicians, was the Nigerian Labour Party, by appealing to
the workers as workers not as tribesmen, an alternative for
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the workers and their trade union leaders? Secondly, since
the strike seemed to be an indication of protest against the
gap in income and life styles between the workers and the
emerging elites of the civil service and the political par-
ties, was this protest, call it "egalitarianism," translatable
into political support in December?
Limiting ourselves to survey data, the answer to both
questions is "no." No, Imoudu and the Nigerian Labour Party
did not serve as a political alternative to the workers; no,
egalitarianism was not translated into political support in
December.
Let us first consider in more detail the second ques-
tion of egalitarianism.
Radical Egalitarianism, the Youths and
Support for a Labour Party
Radical egalitarianism as it was manifested in the
general strike is a political attitude derivable from the
situation of the Nigerian worker. It was there for all to
see, including the Youths and the Nigerian Labour Party,
that Nigerian workers in the junior service category and
in the daily-paid category were unhappy with their wages
and with the differences in wages between what they earned
and what the politicians and the senior civil servants
earned. This kind of egalitarianism had nothing to do with
tribe, or primordial sentiments, but was it political?
Of course the strike had already shown that the "gap"
is translatable into political terms. By simple logic, if
the gap was instrumental in mobilizing the strike, and if
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the strike further withdrew consent from the political regime,
then the gap was instrumental in decreasing the legitimacy
and stability of the political regime. But was the gap
translatable into party terms? For the Youths this was a
crucial question.
For the Youth the term "gap" was always a euphemism
for "class consciousness" and the strike was of course an
expression of class struggle. It followed therefore that
since "class consciousness" existed in Nigerian society and
since success during the strike was a verification of its
existence, the "gap" could now be translated into political
party terms, and the Youths, the vanguard of the "proletariat"
would lead the party. *
Were the Youth correct? Was resentment of privilege,
seemingly manifest in the strike, translatable into a polit-
ical force in support of the Youths and the Labour Party?
We went about trying to answer this question by constructing
a measure of egalitarianism and by proposing that workers
who were higher on the scale of egalitarianism would be more
likely to support a labour party than were workers lower on
the scale.
1Some writers on labour affairs seem to want to limit
the term "political" to electoral or political party affairs;
the term of course has a much wider meaning. See, for ex-
ample, the use of the term in Elliot J. Berg and Jeffrey
Butler, "Trade Unions," Political Parties and National In-
tegration in Tropical Africa, ed. James S. Coleman and Carl
G. Rosberg, Jr. (Berkeley, California: University of
California Press, 1964), pp. 340-381.
2o4
In order to find those who are most opposed to privi-
lege we asked the following two questions:
1. "How much do you think an average politician
earns in a year?"
2. "Many people have suggested that the salaries
of politicians should be reduced. What
should be the salary per year of a politician?"
Dividing the response to Question 1 by the response to
Question 2 gives us the factor by which the politiciads sal-
ary is felt to be in excess of what it should be.
We think that this factor which we shall call "egali-
tarianism" is an index of class opposition to the political
regime. This may not be so for every political system but
from an inspection of how grievances are articulated in the
Nigerian labour movement, the gap in salary between the
worker and the politician and between what the politician
earns and what the politicians should earn is as we have
seen the most frequently ascribed reason for opposition.
Dividing our sample into two groups, those who suggested
that the salaries of politicians should be cut by a factor of
at least one-third and those whose cut was less drastic, we
were able to compare how the first group, "the high egali-
tarians" differed from the second group, "the low egalitar-
ians," with respect to support for a labour party1 (Table
11,1).
1For a description of the sample and the questions used
to elicit political party allegiance see the Introduction and
Questionnaire D in the Appendix.
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TABLE 11.1--Support for a Labour Party by Egalitarianism.
Support for Per Cent Per Cent Per Cent
Labour Party High Low- PterCnEgalitarians Egalitarians Other
Unqualified
support for
Labour Party 33 26 35
Opposition to
Labour Party
or Support for
Regionalist Party 67 74 65
Total 100(45) 100(23) 100(14)
These results must be a disappointment to any who
thought that egalitarianism is translatable into electoral
power. Of course one would expect that 33% of the "highs"
as against 26% of the "lows" would support a labour party,
but what is of significance here is the result that 67% of
the "highs" would not support a labour party. It is pos-
sible to conclude, therefore, that egalitarianism, as we
have defined it following the clues of the "gap" and the
strike, was not translatable into support for a labour party.
Support for a Labour Party and Support
for a Regionalist Party
Turning to the question of Imoudu and the Nigerian
Labour Party, we asked workers' representativep
to indicate which parties they were supporting in 1964 and
1Note that here we did not ask who supported Imoudu's
Labour Party, but who supported a labour party in general.
Presumably fewer respondents would support a specific labour
party.
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whether or not they supported Imoudu and the Nigerian Labour
Party. Our results follow from Tables 11.2 and 11.3.
TABLE 11.2--Support for Regionalist Parties by Allegiance to
Imoudu's Labour Party.
Allegiance to Labour Party
Support for
Regionalist Parties Per Cent Per Cent Per Cent
Support Imoudu Oppose Imoudu
Support Regionalist 58 (14) 66 (22) 55 ( 8)
Oppose Regionalist 29 ( 7) 28 ( 9) 20 ( 3)
Other 13 (3) 6 (2) 25 ( 4)
Total 100 (24) 100 (33) 100 (15)
N=72
1We call the reader's attention to Questionnaire C in
the Appendix. The questionnaire was distributed to two
groups which make up the quota for the above discussion.
The first group of 56 were respondents to the mailed ques-
tionnaire sent out in December, 1964, and the second group
of 18 were respondents attending a University of Ibadan
lecture series on industrial relations, in June, 1965. Ex-
cept for the difference in timing, both groups were made up
of trade unionists and especially members of the executive
committees of their unions. The salient difference was in
the timing of administration of the instrument. In order
to account for the timing we changed the tenses of the verbs
in Questionnaire C. For example, instead of, "Which parties
are most helpful to the workers in 1964?" item 52 was changed
in June, 1965, to read: "Which parties were most'helpful to
the workers in 1964?" Similarly, item 63a, reading, 'Do
you think Mr. Imoudu's labour party is useful for workers?
Why?" was changed to read, "In December of 1964, did you
think that Mr. Imoudu's labour party was helpful for workers?
Why?" The reader is cautioned to note that in the responses
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From Table 11.2 we note that at the least 10% (7/72)
of our sample indicated support for Imoudu and that at the
most 33% (24/72) indicated support for Imoudu. From Table
11.3 we note that at the least 30% (22/72) of our sample
supported a regionalist party and that at the most 61%
(44/72) supported a regionalist party.1 We also note that
19% (14/72) indicated support for both options. It is clear
that by December, when this quota was drawn, even if all
those indicating support for both options had voted for
Imoudu, it still would not have given Imoudu majority sup-
port among the workers. Assuming in this context "support"
means "vote," we conclude that the Youths' prediction that
the Nigerian Labour Party would be able to elect Imoudu or
show strong qupport among workers was-false. In this sense
we can say that the Youths failed in their ideological pre-
dictions, and that the majority of workers by December were
returning their support to the regionalist parties.
Before we arrive too quickly at the conclusion that
the strike had no electoral consequences (we have already
indicated what other political consequences the strike did
have) we should examine our survey results not from the
of the second group there may be bias stemming from a
selective rearrangement of memory or from simple forget-
fulness.
1In this context, support for a regionalist party
meant overwhelming support for UPGA. Of the 44 respondents
declaring support for the regionalist parties, only 8
indicated support for the NNA.
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TABLE 11.3--Support for the Labour Party by Regionalist
Party Allegiance.
Regionalist Party Allegiance
Labour Party
Allegiance Per Cent Support Per Cent Oppose Per Cent
Regionalist Regionalist Other
Support Imoudu 32 (14) 37 ( 7) 33 (3)
Oppose Imoudu 50 (22) 47 ( 9) 22 (2)
Other 18 ( 8) 16 (3) 44 (4)
Total 100 (44) 100 (19) 99 (9)
N=72
perspective of the Youths who were hoping for an over-
whelming support from the workers but from the perspectives
of the regionalist parties and the nature of the support
that the regionalist parties got from the workers. After
all, 32% of those who indicated support for a regionalist
party did at the same time register support for the anti-
regionalist Imoudu, while only 30% of the total sample
(22/72) indicated unambiguous support for a regionalist
party. In a conflict between ethnicity and class, the
workers chose ethnicity but they chose it under special cir-
cumstances and they chose it without great enthusiasm. To
the extent that the Youths made their anti-regionalist and
anti-elite message felt they succeeded in weakening the
already weak allegiance of the workers, not to ethnicity,
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but to the men and the structures which represented
ethnicity.1
The Failure of Imoudu's Labour Party:
Segregation of Loyalties and Politics
There are at least two explanations for the evapora-
tion of Imoudu's support. First and most obviously one
turns to the election and its issues, and second, one
considers in somewhat more detail the nature of Imoudu's
support.
The Federal Election of 1964
From 1959 until the fall of 1963 Nigeria was ruled by
a coalition of a northern party, the NPC, and a southern
party, the NCNC. After the census-issue crisis, the coali-
tion began to come apart so that by the time of the Federal
Election of 1964, the UPGA (a coalition of the NCNC, AG and
their allies) faced the NNAiL(a coalition of NPC, NNDP and their
allies).: By the'.time of the election, the anti-regionalists
including Imoudu's supportersihad a choice of backing Imoudu
all the way and thereby weaken&g'thejUPGA or strengthening the
UPGA against the NNA. Even the more doctrinaire Youths
saw the point of the dilemma, and some eschewing the argu-
ments for southern loyalty could argue their support for
UPGA on ideological grounds. Dr. Otegbeye and his group
for example cooperated with the UPGA because they saw the
1That this was the case can be clearly seen from the
enthusiasm with which most southern workers supported the
anti-regionalist military coup of January, 1966.
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issue in terms of a "bourgeois" party struggling against
the "feudalistic" NPC.
But we believe that this explanation falls short of the
truth, because one could argue that even had the NCNC stayed
in coalition with an unpopular NPC, and had it not wooed the
labour vote, workers whose hometowns were in NCNC areas, in
spite of the strike and in spite of registering support for
Imoudu, would nevertheless have not supported Imoudu and would
have voted NCNC. We are saying that the nature of the crisis
aggravated an already fundamental separation between labour
and politics. It was the workers' capacity for separating
their labour attitudes from their political attitudes and not
their calculating election odds which evaporated Imoudu's
support.
We cannot use the Federal elections as a test case, but
we can use survey material gathered a few months after the elec-
tion when the issues were less salient to elucidate our point. 1
"Do you believe trade unionists should support political
parties?" our respondents were asked. The options open to
them as well as the distribution of answers is given in Table
11.4. By inspection, note that respondents choose least
frequently to translate labour identifications or attitudes
into support for an existing political party, and that on
the other hand they most frequently choose to separate,
segregate, or compartmentalize "not mix" their labour
1Questionnaire D was administered in April, 1965, to
eighty-nine respondents. Fifty-two were trade union executive
members in Gogo Chu Nzeribe's union, the Union of Post and
Telegraph Workers, and thirty-seven of a similarly constituted
group meeting at the same time were trade union executives in
the N.W.C.
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identifications with their party identifications. Since
their party identifications converge or stand for their
ethnic identifications, this result demonstrates that most
of our respondents try to segregate their ethnic from their
workers' role.
TABLE 11.4--Labour Opinion on Support for
a Political Party.
Percentages Who Say
Trade unionists should form
a labour party
Yes, trade unionists should
support one of the existing
political parties
Trade unionists as trade
unionists should not mix in
politics although they may
do so as private citizens
Inconsistent responses
(combinations of the
three options)
N.A.
Total 100(86)
It seems that workers did not define their choices
as narrowly as the Youths had. To the Youths the alter-
natives seemed to be obviously those between supporting a
labour party and supporting its opposite--a regionalist
party. If they were aware of the choices open to them, and
not all workers were, then a majority had a simple way of
reconciling this conflict in loyalty. As workers they would
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support their leaders, For example they might support the
Youths in a general strike, but as "sons of the soil" of
this or that ethnic group, they would support the region-
alist party which best represented their nationality in the
Federation.
The Nigerian general strike was for Nigerian Youths
and Marxists, on a smaller scale, what the First World War
was for European Marxists: a demonstration of the weak-
ness of occupational ties when in conflict with ties of
ethnicity or nationality.
Given the strong nature of ethnic ties in Nigeria
and the polarizing effect of the election, in retrospect,
it seems peculiar that the Youths thought that a labour
party could succeed in winning workers' votes and coming to
power in Nigeria. Why did the Youths not see what everyone
else seemed to see, namely that the workers would vote for
the regionalist parties? The answer lies in what the
Youth were prepared to see and what they were allowed to
see.
Youths were not unwilling to believe that after the
strike the workers would abandon class consciousness for
"tribalism" and support a regionalist party. If reality
were that simple then the Youths could verify their theories
and note that their support had dissipated. What the Youths
were not prepared for, however, was the possibility of
workers communicating support both for labour parties and
for regionalist parties.
CHAPTER XII
IDEOLOGICAL PREDICTION II: THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE
YOUTHS AND THE INCONSISTENCY OF THE WORKERS
In asking why did the Youths not see that the Nigerian
Labour Party could not win, we are asking what the Youths
perceived, how they perceived it, and why did they perceive
as they did. But perception is only the second half of a
process which starts with the transmission of information
from a source. In asking why the Youths perceived that the
workers would support them we must ask what information did
the workers transmit to the Youths and how did the Youths
understand this information. In particular let us consider
how the workers indicated their political allegiances to
the Youths. 1
lThroughout this chapter we are assuming that Youths
had access to information similar to the survey information
from which we infer workers'support for a labour party.
The reason for making this assumption follows from the method
by which we selected Sample D. Recall (Introduction )
that Sample D consists of 89 respondents. Fifty-two were
executive members of a trade union run by Gogo Chu Nzeribe,
a Youth (for Nzeribe's background see Chapters VII and VIII).
Thirty-seven were executive members meeting in Lagos at the
same time. Although the second group was not controlled by
Youths, in Lagos these and other workers mixed freely with-
out regard to the ideological position of their leaders.
We and the Youths, therefore, had access to the same workers.
From this we conclude that we both had access to the same
transmitters of information. With some reservations, there-
fore, we conclude that we both had access to the same
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Consider again Table 12.1 (below). Note the third
option. If Nigerian workers are placed in a situation of
a conflict of loyalties, they choose most frequently the
option to segregate, "not mix," their workers and their
political roles. In that sense they answer like "cross-
pressured" voters who indicate that they are not sure how
they will vote in a forthcoming election, or that they
don't know, or that they have not as yet decided. Without
more information about the Nigerian political system, all
that one could say is that those workers who choose to
compartmentalize their roles do not volunteer information
about their loyalties. The "compartmentalizors" of course
represent an element of latency in political calculations
but it is important to note that they do not give false
information about the system. In America they would not
be the ones who would say I support Truman believing really
contents of information. Among the reservations we have
about this last conclusion, two stand out. First, it may
be expected that when communicating with Youths, the
workers would be more likely to voice support for a labour
party. Secondly, our awareness of the inconsistents
derives from an analysis of the survey data; it is to be
expected that Youths would not have this type of infor-
mation available to them.
1
"Cross-pressures are combinations of character-
istics which, in a given context, would tend to lead the
individual to vote on both sides of a contest." Bernard
Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfled, et al., Voting (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 283.
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that they support Dewey, nor would they be the ones who
would be so misinformed about an election that they would
say that they will vote both for Dewey and for Truman.
TABLE 12.1--Labour Support for a Political Party.
Percentage Who Say
1. Trade unionists should form a labour party. 30
2. Yes, trade unionists should support one of
the existing political parties (regionalist). 6
3. Trade unionists as trade unionists should
not mix in politics although they may do so
as private citizens. 39
4. Inconsistent responses: (a) trade unionists
should not mix in politics and they should
support a labour party, (b) they should not
mix in politics and they should support an
existing party, of(c) they should support a
labour party and they should support a
regionalist party. 19
5. N. A. 6
Total 100 (86)
But, for argument's sake, assume that the cross-
pressured bloc can be divided into two groups, the compart-
mentalizers who keep their views to themselves and the in-
consistents who do not keep their views to themselves but,
on the contrary, seeing no contradiction in supporting both
-- A
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candidates, they support both candidates and to an outside
observer say they will vote for both.
Assume further, for argument's sake, that American
politicians are more or less rational men who do not believe
it possible for voters to support both parties at the same
time and especially to vote for both candidates at the same
time. And assume further that the voters who support both
candidates do not volunteer information to both parties
that they are being inconsistent but that on the contrary,
to Dewey supporters they say that they will support Dewey,
and to Truman supporters they say that they will support
Truman. One should not be then terribly surprised to find
that both candidates believe that they have the votes of
the inconsistent.
Depending on how the inconsistents will behave during
the election, both candidates may be deceived or one candi-
date may be deceived. Both candidates will be deceived if
the inconsistents do not bother to vote, or if they equally
split their vote and one candidate will be deceived if
most or all of the inconsistents support his rival after
having said that they also support him.
Presumably the voting studies found so few inconsist-
ents that they did not bother to divide the "cross-pressured"
into two groups. One should not classify the two groups
together. Although both groups may ultimately behave the
same way, during the decision making period they transmit
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quite different information to politicians. It is to the
information the Nigerian inconsistents transmitted to the
Youths that we now turn.
From Table 12.1 it is seen that the cross-pressured
or undecided group among the workers can be divided into two
sub-groups: those who indicate that they "do not mix" their
political and workers' roles (without, however, indicating
how they will vote or what party they support), and the in-
consistents (option 4) who indicate possible contradictory
opinions. We call the reader's attention to option 4, named
here the "Inconsistent responses." This category has
appeared throughout this study. For example, we indicated
that after the strike, 88% of a group of trade unionists in-
dicated support for a labour party. We should have also
mentioned that 75% of the labour party supporters at the
same time indicated support for a regionalist party.
The reader will recall that in Table 11.2 we indicated
that 58% of Imoudu's supporters also supported a regionalist
party. The frequency varies (and below we shall try to show
how) but the pattern remains the same: ask workers if they
support a labour party and a not insignificant number will
tell you "yes" but a fraction of that number will be at the
lWe call attention to item 32 in Questionnaire D. It
may be that what we call "inconsistents" is a by-product of
the question. It is possible that not understanding the
question, workers ticked-off options in a random fashion.
We argue against this interpretation by noting below that
however options were chosen, the group doing the choosing
did not behave in a random fashion. For example, the fre-
quency of inconsistents declines the nearer our sample is
to the Federal elections (see p. 226 below).
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same time supporting a regionalist party. Here lies the
clue to the Youths' misreading their support. Let us first
consider, however, in what sense we mean the "Inconsistent
responses" to be inconsistent.
The Inconsistency of the Inconsistents
In the literature on attitudes and attitude change,
four types of inconsistency may be distinguished: (1)
logical inconsistency, (2) psychological inconsistency
between two attitudes, (3) psychological inconsistency
between an attitude and an action, and (4) informational
inconsistency. The first case is clear. For a discussion
of the second and third case, see the literature on cog-
nitive dissonance or cognitive balance or congruence. For
example, Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
(California: Stanford University Press, 1957), Chapter I.
In this chapter we are mainly concerned with the last
case. By "informational inconsistency" we mean inconsistency
as perceived by receivers of information. This type of in-
consistency may be a function of the predispositions of the
perceiver, and the information transmitted to the perceiver.
If it is a function of the information transmitted, then
that information itself is inconsistent as a function of
logical or psychological inconsistency in the mind of the
transmitter or the mind of the channel. However, for in-
consistent information to be received by the receiver, it
need not be so perceived by the transmitter. Let us turn
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to a discussion of the interpretations that Youths gave
to possibly inconsistent information.
There are of course contradictions and contradictions.
From the point of view of the Youths, who opposed all region-
alist parties, to support Imoudu and to support the regional-
ist Action Group or NCNC was not consistent and therefore
not possible. But from the point of view of the individual
worker it was not so contradictory to say that one supported
the fiery Imoudu (keeping in mind that one would not vote
for him) and that one supported the NCNC (since one's towns-
men were voting for it, keeping in mind that one would vote
for it).
From the point of view of the Youths, there were at
least two reasons why it was inconsistent and therefore not
possible to say that one would not mix one's worker's loyalty
with one's political loyalty and still insist that one
supported a labour party. First, it was inconsistent because
at the very core of the Youths' Marxist model, if a worker
chose not to mix his worker's and his political role he had
not acquired "class consciousness" and consequently would
1Here we refer the reader to Chapter VIII and es-
pecially the discussion of the cognitive model of the Youths.
Although we do not have data directly referring to a Youth's
decoding the message of a worker, we do make inferences
such as the ones below based on the already mentioned cog-
nitive model. For example, Otegbeye divides Nigerian poli-
tics into ruling circles and workers. It is conceivable
in Otegbeye's system to be a duped worker and support the
ruling circles, but once one gains class consciousness,
supports a labour party, one is then opposed to ruling
circles. There is no room here for being both class con-
scious and supporting ruling circles.
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not support a labour party. Secondly, it was clear that the
option "trade unionists should not mix in politics" was at
the core of the political program of the ULC and of the
government. "A politically neutral trade union force" they
called it. And so to declare at the same time that one was
supporting a labour party was to be inconsistent with the
well known ULC position. The way the Youths saw it, one
could not support the Labour Party and its enemies at the
same time, but many workers did not seem to see the point.
At issue here is what the Youths perceived and what
they were ready to perceive as Youths and as Marxists. Two
predispositions affected the Youths' perception: the one
was a logical application of Marxism with its divisions
into "conscious" workers and those who were still tied to
rural life and the second was the selectivity of partisans
who were predisposed to view contradictory information as
favoring their own side. 'Both predispositions so operated
on the Youths so as to enable them to perceive that any
indication of support whether consistent or not tended in
their favor.
To the Youths caught up as they were in the political
struggle, any sign of support was of course not questioned
1Nevertheless, a worker whose union belonged to the
ULC and who felt some allegiance to Alhaji Adebola, the
President of the ULC, might say that workers should not
mix in politics. On the other hand, the same worker out
of admiration for Imoudu might say that workers should sup-
port a labour party. Informational inconsistency need not
be so perceived by the transmitter of inconsistent information.
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for its hardness and validity. If a worker said he sup-
ported a labour party, that was enough. To question his
real motives would be taken as a sign of mistrusting the
workers and of being a defeatist. As Marxists the Youths
were not prepared to deal with inconsistency in a worker's
allegiance. A worker either was conscious of his rights and
of his role (i.e., he supported a labour party) or he was
still a dupe living out "the idiocy of rural life" (i.e.,
he supported a regionalist party). But that a worker would
be both in support for a labour party and for a regionalist
party--that was clearly out of the question.
The Political Consequences of the Inconsistents
The relevance of the inconsistents to the perception
of political support lay in their representing a sizable
fraction of the total distribution. Clearly, if the incon-
sistents formed a tiny fraction of labour support, their
effect on the over-all distribution would be tiny, but they
formed a sizable fraction, 19%, and given the relative
division between the respondents who consistently supported
the labour party and consistently chose to say that they
would not mix in politics as workers, the inconsistents
played the role of the swing vote in an American election.
This changeability of the inconsistents need not have inter-
ested the Youths, had the 19% swung ultimately in favour of
a labour party, but this was not to be the case. Let us
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now consider the relative importance of the inconsistents
for the distribution of labour party support.
We must now show two things. First, we must show that
the inconsistents form the swing vote which affects the
distribution of labour party support, and second, we must
show that in fact they did so swing. To show that the
inconsistents form the swing vote consider two hypothetical
cases: one in which all those who hold "contradictory"
attitudes finally indicate that they support the "not-mix"
option and one in which they indicate support for the "labour
party" option. Turning to the first hypothetical case,
Table 12.1 then looks as follows:
TABLE 12.2--Trade Unionists' Support for a Political Party
with Those Holding Inconsistent Opinions Choosing the "Not
Mixed" Option.
Percentage Who Say
1. Trade unionists should form a labour party. 30
2. Yes, trade unionists should support one of
the existing political parties. 6
3. Trade unionists as trade unionists should
not mix in politics, although they may do so
as private citizens. 60
4. N.A. 4
Total 100 (86)
From Table 12.2 we see that the "not mix" option out-
numbers the "labour party" option almost two to one and
constitutes 60% (51/86) of the sample. On the other hand,
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if the contradiction is resolved in the direction of the
labour party, Table 12.1 looks as follows in Table 12.3
TABLE 12.3--Trade Unionists' Support for a Political Party
with Those Holding Inconsistent Opinions Choosing the "Labour
Party" Option.
Percentage Who Say
1. Trade unionists should form a labour party. 50
2. Yes, trade unionists should support one of
the existing political parties. 6
3. "Not Mix." 38
4. N.A. 5
Total 99 (86)
Although they constitute only 19% of the sample, the
effect on the distribution of attitudes of those who hold
contradictory opinions can be gauged from the two tables.
In one limiting case, 60% of trade unionists seem to ad-
vocate not mixing in politics while only 30% advocate the
setting up of a labour party. In another limiting case,
only 38% of trade unionists advocate not mixing in politics
while 50% advocate the forming of a labour party.
In the two limiting cases of inconsistents going to
the labour party and inconsistents going to the "not mix"
option, the relationship between the distribution of those
who hold a contradictory view and those who choose the labour
party or the "not mix" option can be seen in Table 12.4.
If the inconsistents move toward the labour party, the
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distribution reflects labour party preponderance; if the
inconsistents move toward the compartmentalized option,
the distribution reflects a compartmentalized option.
TABLE 12.4--Resolution of Inconsistency by Support for Labour
Party.
Inconsistency is Resolved Toward
Distribution
The Labour Party The Not Mix Option
Labour Party Supporters 43 26
Not Mix Option
Supporters 34 51
X2 = 5-5
P < .01
In theory, at least, it has been shown that the incon-
sistents could form the swing vote. How they resolve the
inconsistency of supporting a regionalist and labour party
could determine which party or parties are most popular.
But the limiting cases which we have discussed above are
"ideal types." What remains to be shown is that the incon-
sistents do in fact swing together in systematic ways, and
do not opt out of politics or do not distribute their
choices equally between the "not mix" and the "labour party"
options.
The Inconsistents are the Changers
Like the rich Irish American, the Nigerian worker of
whatever nationality was cross-pressured between his ethnic
225
allegiances and his economic situation, Most Nigerian
workers by choosing the "not mix" option consistently
opted out of the pressure by not recognizing that their
occupational roles had any political correlatives. Some
Nigerian workers, those we have called the inconsistents,
did not resolve this strain as simply.
From Berelson and Lazarsfeld we know something about
how American voters act under conflicting loyalties.1 A
major finding of their study shows the frequency of cross-
pressured tended to decrease with the election and that the
cross-pressured changed in the direction of the pressure
which was most in line with their primary groups. The cross-
pressured are the changers.
Let us apply this thinking to our sample. Since the
general strike of 1964 increased the saliency of occupational
groups and the desirability of a labour party, one should
expect a high frequency of support for a labour party right
after the strike. Since in Nigeria, however, primary groups
were linked by means of tribal unions to the parties, one
would expect that as the saliency of the Federal elections
increased and the saliency of primary groups increased, both
types of cross-pressured voters, the compartmentalizers and
the inconsistents shifted in the direction of the regional-
ist parties. With rising saliency of issues, inconsistents
would perceive their inconsistency and shift their allegiance.
1 Berelson estimates that a "quarter to a third" of the
electorate is cross-pressured, p. 320.
pThe timing of the general strike and the Federal
elections, one coming in June, the other in December,
provides us with an approximation to the laboratory situa-
tion in that we can test these ideas. Please consider the
results in Table 12.5. We note that the frequency of in-
consistents (we do not have data for the compartmentalizers)
decreased from 69% of the sample right after the strike in
July, to 19% of the sample by the time of the election; and
that the frequency of persons rejecting a labour party and
declaring only for a regional party increases from 5% in
July to 41% in December. The inconsistents like the
cross-pressured are the changers.
TABLE 12.5--Attitudes to Politics under Varying Saliency of
Occupational and Primary Group Identifications.
Occupationsl Primary Group
Percentage Identifications Identifications
Who Say Salient (General Salient (FederalStrike, Elections, b
July'1964)a December 1964)
Labour only 19 22c
Regional only 5 41
Both Labour and
Regional: Inconsistent 69 19
All Labour
Row 3 + Row 1 88 41
All Regional
Row 3 + Row 2 74 63
Other 7 17
Total 100(58) 99(72)
aBased on Sample A
bBased on Sample C
cSee Table 11.2, Imoudu supporters (7) + oppose Imoudu
and regionalist (All SWAFP) (9) = 16, 16/72 = 22%.
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Conclusion
Consider the political market place from the point of
view of a political entrepreneur such as Imoudu and the
Youths. In July, Imoudu would ask his friends, trade union
acquaintances, and fellow workers whether or not they would
support a labour party, and he would get the impression that
an overwhelming majority (from Table 12.5 our estimate is
88%) would say yes. By December, should he, however, ask
the same question, he would find his support drastically
reduced (41% would say that they supported a labour party,
22% would really support some labour party, and only 10% would
support Imoudu himself). Thus, what seemed like a viable
proposition in July turns into a rout in December, and this
miscalculation is at least in part due to the changeability
of the inconsistents.
The inconsistents are changers in two ways. From the
point of view of the individual they are changers because
they are more likely to change their minds and their support
for a labour party. They are changers from the point of
view of the group because by changing their mind in a sys-
tematic way they affect the distribution of attitudes, and
thus the political market place of the labour force. By
oscillating in their private views, they make the political
market oscillate between seeming to indicate that a labour
party could succeed and that a labour party would fail.
A
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We should like to call the readers' attention to an
important distinction between the inconsistents and those
who compartmentalize their roles. The inconsistents say
that they would support a labour party but they don't
deliver, those who compartmentalize their role do not say
they would support a labour party. This does not mean that
the compartmentalizers do not represent latency in politics.
It does mean that they do not give out information that can
be falsely perceived by political actors. The inconsistents,
perhaps because they do not perceive inconsistency the same
way as "logical" Marsixts do, communicate false information.
Here lies the root of the problem for the Youths and
perhaps for all ideological thinking about Nigeria. To
an ideologue "X" and "not X" are mutually exclusive in theory
and therefore not tenable in real life. But in real life
of course "X" and "not X" need not be "mutually exclusive."
An example from another area of thinking may perhaps be
illustrative. Babatunde, a Yoruba friend, was sometimes a
Muslim and at other times a Christian depending, of course,
on the holiday and what part of his family was participating
in what festival. To the rigid Muslim or to the rigid
Christian this would, of course, be inconsistent and there-
fore "not possible," but it was possible for 'Tunde.
It is a minor point to note that Marxism as a theory
does not have an effective way for discussing social psy-
chological phenomena such as corss-pressure, role
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segregation, and the existence of persons who hold on to
contradictory points of view. And it would be an even more
minor point to note that because the Youths were Marxists
they were cognitively unprepared for the inconsistents. The
point is that perhaps no ideology, whether Marxist or non-
Marxist, selectively assuming logical consistency in received
information, could have correctly translated the information
communicated by the inconsistents.
To understand why the Youths grasped at this infor-
mation, one must keep in mind that they were politicians who
had staked their fortunes on the possibility of ideological
politics in Nigeria. The general strike coming as it did on
the eve of the Federal election left them no "out," they
had finally to test their theory of Nigerian politics or face
the reality that their planning and scheming beginning with
the fiasco of the UNAMAG strike in 1950 had no political
relevance.
CHAPTER XIII
WHO ARE THE INCONSISTENTS?
The inconsistents make ideological prediction dif-
ficult in Nigeria. In terms of the introduction the
presence of the inconsistents can be called the encoding
problem in countries with underdeveloped systems of
interest aggregation and articulation. Their ultimate
significance in terms of this thesis is in their role of
preventing ideological prediction and ultimately political
learning and political goal seeking. Before turning to
the last Chapter dealing with how some of the Youths ver-
ified their predictions after the election, it may be
appropriate to devote one more chapter to the inconsistents.
In what follows, we shall be looking at what could
be some factors making for inconsistency. For data we
lIn contrast to Chapter XII, here we are interested
in what goes on in the minds of workers (transmitters) such
that inconsistent information is communicated to the Youth
(receivers). For example, Festinger (above) calls psycho-
logical inconsistency 'dissonance" and he defines it as
follows: ". . . two elements are in a dissonant relation
if, considering these two alone, the obverse of one element
would follow from the other." Festinger's basic hypothesis
is "the presence of dissonance gives rise to pressures to
reduce dissonance." In what follows, we shall be relying
on this theory in a heuristic way only. We are, above all,
interested in factors facilitating or impeding the recog-
nition or perception of logical inconsistency. We are not
set on proving or disproving the existence of strain to
reduce dissonance.
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shall rely on a sample D of workers and on a case history
of Peter A, a Youth and a member of the NLP. In turning to
A. we note that inconsistency is not limited to "ignorant"
workers but can become the style of political communica-
tion of a rather sophisticated Youth.
Inconsistency and Knowledge
There are at least two reasons for being inconsistent.
First, one is inconsistent because one does not notice
that one is, and second, one is inconsistent because one
is not committed to being consistent. Let us consider the
first case first.
To be aware of inconsistency one must be aware of
the issues involved. A worker who supports both Imoudu
and a regionalist party must realize, for example, that
Imoudu does not belong to the regionalist party. A number
of workers thought that Imoudu, who had at one time been
a founding member of the NCNC, still belonged to the NCNC,
and so for them there would seem to be no inconsistency in
supporting Imoudu and the NCNC. Many workers were unaware
of the arguments over "ideology" between the Youths of the
NLP and the officials of the ULC. One could be in the ULC,
subscribe to the motto of the ULC, "not to mix in politics"
and yet admire Imoudu and therefore say that one supported
the Nigerian Labour Party.
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One would imagine that awareness of the issues and
therefore consistency would vary with accessibility to in-
formation, and that accessibility to information would vary
as a function of education on the one hand and duration in
the labour movement on the other. Consider the results in
Table 13.1.
TABLE 13.1--Consistency of Political Attitudes by Education.
Per Cent Per Cent
Primary Only Some Secondary
Inconsistent 28 (10) 13 ( 6)
Consistent 72 (26) 87 (40)
Total 100 (36) 100 (46)
X 2 2.2
P< .08
Note that the rate of inconsistents is more than twice
as great among those with primary education only as it is
among those with some secondary education.
In Table 13.2 note that the rate of inconsistents is
more than three times as great among those with less than
five years experience in the labour movment as it is among
those with more than five years experience.
It comes as no great surprise that an ordinary worker
who is not up on the latest ideological quarrels within the
labour movement is inconsistent. But what is of interest is
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that some workers and especially some Youths who were well
aware of such quarrels and who ostensibly belonged to one
or the other side were also inconsistent. This second type
of inconsistency comes not from a lack of knowledge but from
a weak commitment to the issues involved. In the dis-
cussion below we shall tell the story of Peter A to illus-
trate the point of a Youth's being inconsistent. Concom-
itantly we shall try to show how ideology is most frequently
not associated with friendship and thus of limited import-
ance to Peter A and the other Youths, those whom Eskor-Toyo
called the "opportunists."
TABLE 13.2--Consistency of Political Attitudes by Duration
in the Labour Movement.
Duration in the Labour Movement
Per Cent Per Cent
Under Five Years Five Years of Over
Inconsistent 36 (11) 10 ( 5)
Consistent 64 (19) 90 (47)
Total 100 (30) 100 (52)
2
X = 7.2
P < .01
Inconsistency and Commitment
One is inconsistent because one is unaware of the incon-
sistency or because one is not committed to being consistent.
Presumably one tolerates inconsistency either because one must
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(one likes and dislikes one's relatives) or because one is
so weakly committed to the objects of one's beliefs that
inconsistency is not much of a strain. Consider the case
of Peter A., a Youth, who called himself a communist but
who contested elections for the NCNC. First consider how
A. became "communist."l
A. was born in 1935 in the Midwest not far from Imoudu's
home town. He attended secondary school in Warri where he
graduated in 1949. In 1951 he came to Lagos where he worked
as a journalist for the Nigerian Daily Times. In 1953, his
brother who was working in Accra wrote him to come to Ghana,
promising him a scholarship at the University. Upon
arriving in Ghana he found, much to his chagrin, that the
scholarship had been awarded to someone else. Having to
make a living he became a clerk in an agent's office in
Kumasi. Because he was well educated and passionate he was
elected to become a secretary of the union in his office.
During agitations for independence his union was called out
on strike by the CPP. For his activities during the strike,
A. was "given the sack' but he was lucky in that the Ghana
TUC gave him a job as a full-time trade unionist.
In 1956 the Ghana TUC awarded him a scholarship to
study in Israel where he spent eighteen months. He liked
Israel and was impressed by the cooperatives, "where every-
one is happy being taken care of by the state." After
1Questions were based on Interview Schedule F which in
turn was based on the "Dogmatism scale" of Milton 4okeach. See
his The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960),
pp. 71-U0.
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coming back and working for a few more years in Ghana, in
1960 he returned to Nigeria. Upon his return to Nigeria
A. looking for a job, approached Lawrence Borha, General
Secretary of the ULC. Because Borha is also a Bini speaker
from the Midwest and because of his long experience with the
TUC in Ghana, A. felt sure that Borha would give him a job.
But Borha refused, and called him a communist and an agent
of Nkrumah. Rejected by Borha he went to see Imoudu, also
a Bini speaker. Imoudu was glad to see him. With Imoudu
and the Youths his Ghana experience gave him prestige.
People called him "comrade" and assumed that he was a
Marxist, "That's when I became a Marxist," says A. And
that's how A. became a Marxist.
What is the meaning of "Marxism" for Peter A.? At
the very least it is the rhetoric with which he defends his
trade union friends in the NTUC and the Labour Party against
their enemies in the labour field. Thus when asked to com-
ment on the statement: "It is said that the NTUC and the ULC
have nothing in common," Peter A. answered: "That is true,
they are miles apart in ideology and Adebola (the President
of the ULC) is an upper class somebody earning up to (2000
per year. "It is not inconceivable that had he received his
first trade union job from Borha, the General Secretary of
the ULC, he would have segregated the two groups just as
sharply but would have criticized Imoudu or Goodluck instead
of Adebola.
236
Asked whether Marsixm allows one to understand the
present state of Nigeria and to predict the future, Peter A.
answered as follows: "Yes, Marxist-Leninist literature such
as State and Revolution is very useful in understanding pres-
ent day Nigeria." He gives the following example:
Look at the Railway Corporation. They have been losing
money because they have competition from private trans-
port such as lorries, etc. In a socialist state such
competition would be regulated. The railways would be
saved and the workers would not have to fear unemploy-
ment.
Asked whether people fail because of their own faults or be-
cause of the system in which they live, he answered, after
some hesitation, "They fail because of the system." Asked if
it is true that some of the hardest battles man has to fight
are against his own nature, he answered, "It is true that
some of the hardest battles a man must fight are against his
own weaknesses, but the question is, are there alternatives
for him?" Asked if he was fearful of the future, he answered,
"It is not natural to be fearful of the future, but I am fear-
ful of the future." By predicting the future, Marxism dimin-
ishes its fearsomeness and in allowing A. to make predictions,
it gives him a sense of control over a system which is unjust,
and full of conflict. All this is familiar enough from more
committed Marxists, it is in the next set of questions that
A. leaves the familiar pattern.
Turning to questions of ideological consistency and
rigidity, he warned rather lugubriously that within the party,
"One should be very careful of traitors within one's own
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ranks. Charity begins at home as well as death. A party
which tolerates too many differences will be destroyed."
And yet Peter A. is an example of a person who is rather
successful in "tolerating.differences." Asked whether there
is only one true philosophy, he answered, "Since I do not
know all the philosophies in the world how can I tell that
there is one one which is correct?" Asked if one should
leave all important decisions to "leaders and experts," he
answered, "No, one should not leave all decisions to leaders
and experts. One should always promote discussion."
Asked whether the present generation should be sacrificed
for the sake of future generations, he answered, "No, I do
not believe in that. One should not sacrifice the present
generation for the sake of the future. We all must live well."
We already have some indications that Peter A. is not
one of the most strongly committed Marxists, and like other
inconsistents (remember A. says that he also supports the
NCNC) he does not demand ideological congruence from his
friends. Asked, "Is it your view that best way to live is
to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are
the same as one's own?" A. answered, "Not at all. What does
friendship have to do with politics. As a matter of fact,
I am now staying with my best friend (a townsman). He does
not believe as I do. Of course I might persuade him that
my views are right." Unlike those of true-believers, A.'s
easy attitude toward ideology is shared by other inconsistent
within the ranks of the Youths.
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We asked the same question of a group of trade union-
ists: "is it your view that the best way to live is to pick
friends and associates whose political beliefs are the same
as one's own?" Respondents were given the following options"
1. I always choose friends whose political
beliefs are the same as my own
2. Although I prefer people who share my
beliefs, most of my friends need nob hold
the political beliefs that I do
3. My friendship with a man is not at all
dependent on his political beliefs
In asking this question, we had in mind the following
proposition. In general, we thought that a person who tries
to homogenize his political environment is more committed to
his political beliefs as against a person who does not.2
Being more committed to his beliefs a person who chooses
friends whose political beliefs are the same as his own would
be less likely to be changeable in his political allegiances.
Consider the results in Table 13.3.
The results are in the expected direction. One notes
that consistents are three times (38%) as likely to choose
ideological friends as are the inconsistents (11%) but the
inconsistents are five times as likely (41% to 8%) to be in-
consistent not only with respect to party choice but with
respect to friendship. That is, inconsistents on party
choice tend to say that (1) "I always choose friends whose po-
litical beliefs are the same as my own" together with (3) "My
1Quota Sample D, see Appendix and Introduction.
2See Berelson, "The Political Conviction of the Individ-
ual is closely bound to the political character of his per-
sonal relations--or at least his perception of their political
complexion." p. 98.
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friendship with a man is not at all dependent on his political
beliefs." In passing, one should observe that both incon-
sistents and consistents most frequently indicated that
friendship and ideology were independent. Both groups chose
with greatest frequency option (3) "My friendship with a
man is not at all dependent on his political beliefs."
This last result dovetails with the result of Table 11.4
in which it was indicated that persons most frequently
prefer to compartmentalize their workers' roles from their
political roles.
TABLE 13.3--Ideological Friendship by Inconsistent and
Consistent Commitment.
Percent Who Inconsistent Consistent
Choose ideological friends,
or prefer ideological 11 38
friends
Think friendship independent
of politics 48- 54
Contradictory: Always choose 89% 62%
ideological friends but
think that friendship in-
dependent of ideology 41- 8 -
Total 100(17) loo(65)
These results further confirm our belief that the
inconsistents like the cross-pressured are the changers,
because if they do not make friendships based on a firm
commitment to ideology they are free to change from political
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opinion to political opinion, from supporting a labour party
to saying that they are opposed to workers mixing in politics.
But friendship is only one way that the inconsistents
differ from the consistents. We would expect that if the
inconsistents do not have a firm commitment to their beliefs
that they would be less likely to have a strong commitment
to norms of behavior. One is reminded of Eskor-Toyo's warning
against "opportunism" in the labour movement. For example
the same Peter A. who answered that his friendship with a
man had little to do with his friend's beliefs, told the
following story:
A. tried to contest in the last Federal election. He
went to his home town where he addressed a meeting of his
clan. He would be a great help he explained in getting amen-
ities for the town. He distributed4 500 in gifts and since
no one in the clan challenged him, he expected to get the
NCNC nomination. All his adult life he had been a member of the
NCNC and had been a member of the Zikist movement from its
inception. He was changrined, therefore, when he discovered
that the local NCNC refused to endorse him. When A. heard
that someone else had been endorsed by the NCNC, he hurried
to get the endorsement of the opposition party, an ally of
the NNA! The point of the story is how irrelevant ideology
or loyalty to the party was to A. He switched to the oppo-
sition as soon as it became clear to him that the NCNC would
not win. He did this during an election which was said to
pit socialism and capitalism against the "feudal" North!
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If it is possible to generalize from this story we
propose that one may be more likely to be inconsistent if
one is not committed to a normative or moral view of the
world. Peter A. was no Eskor-Toyo.
After the election, Peter A. came back to Lagos to
try to organize workers. But K. of the ULC had turned
management against him such that it became impossible for
him to go to the site. When, in spite of that, he tried
to organize, he was imprisoned and warned not to come back.
As an unemployed Youth he has much time for rumination. He
was born a Catholic but he has long since given up his
father's religion. He feels that there is much truth in
Rosicrucianism, because, as he puts it, "men in general have
many forces and potentialities, but we do not use them."
CHAPTER XIV
ACCOUNTING FOR FAILURE: A STUDY OF
IDEOLOGICAL VERIFICATION
In our discussion of ideological prediction we noted
that the Youths failed to predict accurately the fate of
the Nigerian Labour Party and the nature of their support
in the Federal Elections because they drew the wrong infer-
ences from the perceived motives of the workers and because
they were misinformed about their support. In this chapter,
we turn to the question of ideological verification, in
particular we deal with how the Youths of the Nigerian
Labour Party accounted for their predictions.
It will be recalled that at the end of the general
strike of June, 1964, the Youths made a prediction and a
commitment. They predicted that Imoudu would either win
election in Lagos or at least that the NLP would successfully
show that it had strong popular appeal. They made a commit-
ment to a strong anti-regionalist strategy. This commit-
ment could itself be viewed as a type of prediction: the
NLP said that unlike the SWAFP it would not join in any
1
united front with so called progressive parties. To an
See Chapter III, pp. 72-81 below.
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outside observer neither type of prediction came true.
But here we are not concerned with views of outside ob-
servers; we are concerned with how the Youths accounted for
the events of the election and whether in fact they per-
ceived that they had failed. We proceed as follows: first
we shall recapitulate briefly the role of the NLP in the
elections, second we shall turn to the reaction of the NLP
to the events of the elections and third we shall consider
an explanation that Eskor-Toyo gave for the election and
for the role of the NLP in the election.
The Nigerian Labour Party and
the Federal Election
It will be recalled (from our discussion of the Region-
alist System in chapter II), that the Federal Election of
December, 1964, was scheduled to take place at a critical
time in the evolution of the Nigerian political system.
The party system had started out as a coalition of the
Northern NPC and the Southern NCNC against the Western Action
Group, By 1964, however, the NPC-NCNC coalition was dead.
The Action Group had been split in the Western region into
a branch, the NNDP, in colusion with the NPC, and into a
branch, still calling itself AG, which out of necessity
allied itself with its old rival, the NCNC. The end result
of these crises and maneuvers was to polarize Nigerian
politics between a Northern and a Southern party alliance.
The Federal election took place under special circumstances.
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The United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) decided to
boycott the election, because it charged the Nigerian
National Alliance (NNA) with fraud and with rigging the
election. Neither the labour movement as a whole, nor the
Nigerian Labour Party were exempt from the effects of this
polarization.
By the middle of December Imoudu himself made it clear
where his sympathies lay, and on the eve of the UPGA boy-
cott he made statements to the press indicative of his
changed position. "The rigging of the election by the NNA
has precipitated a national crisis." l At the UPGA rally in
Lagos announcing the boycott of the election, Imoudu was
2present as were representatives of the SWAFP. And then on
December 29, Imoudu speaking in the name of the Joint Action
Committee calls for a general strike in support of the UPGA
boycott.
The General Strike of December 1964
For the Nigerian Labour Party and for the other Youths
who had called it the general strike of December 1964 was a
failure. After the call on December 29, A. lkoro and four other
Youths traveled to the Western and the Eastern region seeking
support from local unions and local leaders. In Ibadan, for
3
rDaily Times, December 27, 1964.
Dailye Expressg, 28 December, 1964.
3West African Pilot, 30 December, 1964.
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example, the Secretary of the Western Region Branch of the
ULC (who did not consider himself a Youth but was a strong
NCNC supporter) called on the General Secretaries and the
Presidents in the Ibadan area to come to a meeting where
going on strike would be debated. From the beginning, the
meeting was divided into those who had pro-UPGA and those
who had pro-NNA sympathies. Depending on which faction one
believes, two decisions were made at that meeting. The
first was to go on strike and the second was not to go on
strike. The result was no strike in Ibadan. With some varia-
tions the story repeated itself in the East and the North.1
There were various reasons why the strike failed.
The Youths claimed that it failed because Alhaji H. P.
Adebola, President of the ULC, refused to support the strike.
Others claimed that the workers were not ready to go on
strike again so soon after the general strike of June. But
whatever the causes, the failure of the strike converging
with the electoral failure of the party, had significant con-
sequences on the solidarity of the NLP and on the explana-
tions given for the failures.
1Most Southern workers in the North were members of
the ULC; when the ULC did not call its workers out on strike,
the strike did not materialize.
2
Following the Festinger model, Professor Paul Hiniker
has suggested that Imoudu may have called a strike as a way
of reducing the dissonance of the electoral failure.
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The Reaction of the Nigerian Labour Party
After the December election, The Nigerian Labour Party
fragmented into two factions. The first faction, maintaining
the name of the NLP, rallies about Imoudu and Eskor-Toyo
and supports their interpretation of the events of December.
The second faction, calling itself the Revolutionary Nigerian
Labour Party (RNLP), rejects the Imoudu and Eskor-Toyo interpreta-
tion, denounces the UPGA, rifles the files of the NLP and
opens its own branch in Ibadan.
It is interesting to note that from our observations
there were very few renunciations of ideology by formerly
committed people. The one example of possible renunciation,
an exception which proves the rule, is -Peter A. whose case
we discussed in chapter XIII above. But -Peter A. was so
inconsistent and uncommitted that his recent flirtation with
Rosicrucianism is no more serious than his first flirtation
with Marxism. The majority of the NLP stayed with Imoudu
but it is our impression that they did not perceive the
importance of the events of December. One young man, for
example, stopped talking about Nigerian politics because
most of hi's attention had been taken up with the forthcoming
World Youth Congress in Algeria. Those who did perceive
the events of December as needing an explanation were satis-
fied with Eskor-Toyo's explanation (see below). And it
It was later agreed to postpone the December Federal
election until March, 1965, in Lagos and in the Eastern
region, but by March the NLP was not contesting in Lagos.
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seemed to us they were further confirmed in their beliefs
by this explanation.
The group that split from the NLP did not accept this
explanation, and did perceive the events of December as
failures for the NLP, but instead of reinterpreting events
and changing the primitive terms of their ideology as Eskor-
Toyo did, the RNLP reaffirmed in even stronger terms the
necessity for non-cooperation with the "bourgeoisie."
Ironically they seemed to take some pleasure in the failure
of the NLP. This failure meant that as before they, as
"mature Marxists" would have to endure powerlessness. They
seemed to welcome failure and the stance of men outside and
above politics " like Lenin in Switzerland." The failure
proved that tactics not ideology were wrong, electoral out-
lets in Nigeria were of no use, revolution and coup d'etats
were the roads to socialism.
Eskor-Toyo's Explanation
Eskor-Toyo unlike many Youths did perceive what hap-
pened and tried to give an explanation for the events of
December. Our comments are based on an article he wrote
for the Labour Vanguard entitled, "Is Nigeria's Crisis
Really Over. In order to understand the quotes we have
lifted from his article it is necessary to keep the following
1Labour Vanguard, Vol. 2, No. 3 (March 25, 1965). The
paper was first founded by the NLP after the general strike
of June, 1964.
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points in mind. Eskor-Toyo had to "solve" two "problems":
(1) he had to explain why his and the NLP's early commit-
ment not to join united fronts was violated during the
election. After all, his bitter denunciation of Dr. Otegbeye
was based on just this point. Otegbeye and SWAFP gave UPGA
their support from the beginning; Eskor-Toyo and the NLP
at first refused to give this support. (2) He had to
explain why it was that the NLP did not get the popular
support expected after the general strike of June, 1964.
In looking at Eskor-Toyo's explanation, let us keep
in mind in what respects his ideology changed and how it
remained the same. He begins his analysis by making a
crucial distinction:
. . . the bourgeois class has been growing relatively
fast and becoming differentiated into tycoon bourgeois
and under-dog bourgeois, in other words compradore
bourgeois and national bourgeois.1
From this differentiation of the primitive term "bourgeois"
Eskor-Toyo draws far-reaching conclusions and "solves" both
failures of the NLP:
After having made the distinction in "bourgeois,"
the "solution" to the problem of the NLP's supporting the
regionalist UPGA is first to equate "UPGA" with "bourgeois"
(which is one of the postulates of the theory) and then to
differentiate UPGA just as bourgeois had been differentiated.
Thus there are two types of "bourgeois" and two types of
UPGA and the importance of the distinction lies in there
lIbid.
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being a bourgeois UPGA of positive qualities and a bourgeois
UPGA of negative qualities. Thus,
The compradore bourgeois, to preserve his gain, has
to strengthen the feudal-bourgeois governmental
alliance and the connections with imperialist finance
monopoly.
But the underdog bourgeois are no longer satisfied
with the arrangement. They are eager that the bourgeois
class as a whole should throw off the feudalists or
weaken their power and rule with little or no obstruc-
tion or challenge from the feudalists.
1
Having gone this far, it is now possible to explain how it
was possible that the Youths and the "nationalist bourgeois"
formed an alliance during the election, The "solution" is
this: It was not the Youths who formed an alliance with
the "nationalist bourgeois"; it was the nationalist bourgeois
who formed an alliance with the Youths.' By the time of the
election:
. . the underdog bourgeoisie were at the end of their
resistance and had to accept the working class into
a progressive alliance .
. . 2
Having "explained" the alliance between the Nigerian Labour
Party and the UPGA it is now possible to explain the failure
of the NLP:
The working class itself, whilst demonstrating clearly
that it stood for the defence of the democratic rights
of the people against feudal reaction, yet showed it-
self ill prepared ideologically and organizationally
for struggle against feudal-compradore reaction. The
bourgeois underdog and working class resistance had
to collapse, and it did collapse.
3
1
lIbid. 2 Ibid.
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The failure of the Nigerian Labour Party is accounted for
by the failure of the UPGA. It is no longer an isolated
phenomenon but part of the moi general collapse of the united
front.
From this analysis, further propositional changes in
ideology are not necessary. The shoe lies on the other foot.
It is not the ideology of the NLP which must change, it is
the UPGA:
What is needed is that those in the NCNC, Action Group,
NEPU, UMBC, and other parties who really want a pro-
gressive regime in Nigeria should abandon their "Zikist,"
democratic "Socialist," and pragmatic illusions. They
should boldly accept the bankruptcy of these "nation-
alist" ideas which the crisis has exposed.
They should join with the Nigerian Labour Party for a
fundamental and basic change in the social system . . .
What can we learn from Eskor-Toyo's analysis which is rele-
vant to our concerns? What changed?
The axioms of the model did not change. There are
still Bourgeois, and Feudal and Working class, and each
is opposed to the other group. There are still imperialist
and neo-colonialist profitting from all this struggle:
The struggle for democracy, as we have now "discovered"
implies a struggle against imperialism, the main force
backing feudal and tycoon reaction in Nigeria.2
What did change were the semantics of the model. The rela-
tionship between the primitive terms and the objects in the
real world changed. The terms "Feudal" still apply to the
NNA and the terms "bourgeois" to the UPGA but differentiating
the term bourgeois allowed the NLP to speak of two factions
2 Ibid.Ibid.
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within the UPGA, the "compradore bourgeois" and the "nation-
alist bourgeois." Transformed into the terms of the ideology,
it is the "compradore bourgeois" who fit the axiom of
struggle between "working class" and "bourgeoisie." The
nationalist bourgeoisie is made to fit a new set of axioms
dealing with those who are not all bad but who are living
in a world of illusions. Because they are not all bad it
is possible to enter into temporary alliances with the
nationalist bourgeoisie, and because they live in illusion,
it is necessary to try to reform them and to make them see
the true nature of Nigerian politics.
Eskor-Toyo's interpretation fits into the general notion
that ideological verification must satisfy criteria taken
from reality, values, and affect. That Eskor-Toyo did try
to deal with the events of December, and that he did admit
that the '"working class . . . showed itself ill prepared
ideologically and organizationally"1 testifies to his sense
of reality. His linking the failure of the NLP to that
of the UPGA and his explanation of the NLP's working with
the UPGA preserved the illusion that there had been no
failure and opened up the possibility of the Youths being
reabsorbed into one of the nationalist parties.
In closing this section one should note that it took
a sort of creativity to differentiate the UPGA and to link
this differentiation with the fate of the NLP. From the
larger perspective of Nigerian politics, however,
1lIbid.
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Eskor-Toyo's feat did nothing more than bring the Youths
into the camp of the UPGA, something that most Southerners
were doing anyway.
L
CHAPTER XV
CONCLUSION
Findings
In this study we were concerned with the two processes
of ideological prediction and ideological verification.
Turning first to prediction, the findings of the case study
can be summarized as follows: According to the Youths, the
workers participated in the general strike out of motives
of egalitarianism and out of disappointment with post-
independence politics. From a correct perception of these
motives, the Youths predicted that the workers would support
Imoudu and the Nigerian Labour Party in the forthcoming
Federal elections. This was not to be the case; there is
evidence to show (Chapter XI) that neither egalitarianism
nor a withdrawal of consent led workers to abandon the
regionalist parties and to support the labour party. This
in a nutshell is what happened. Two questions come up:
why did the Youths fail and what did they learn from their
failure?
The two reasons for the failure of the Youths predic-
tions are first, the way the Youths translated their percep-
tions into the primitive terms of their Marxism, and second,
the false information that the workers were transmitting
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to the Youths. First, the Youths were predisposed by their
ideology to translate, "egalitariansm" into "class struggle"
and "withdrawal of consent" into "post-independence crisis."
It followed from this translation, from the primitive
terms, and from the axioms of the theory that workers were
abandoning the regionalist ("bourgeois") parties and flocking
to the Nigerian Labour party. Second, the Youths were
"decoding" information from the workers which indicated
that the workers were strongly in support of a labour party.
But the information was false; it did not correspond to the
inconsistent motives of the workers. Workers' motives
were inconsistent in the sense that a critical number of
workers supported both the regionalist and the workers
parties.
The significance of the inconsistents is derived from
the distribution of responses on the question of support
for a labour party. It turned out (Chapter XII) that about
a third of the respondents indicated support for a labour
party, somewhat over a third indicated that they did "not
mix" their political and 'their occupational ties, and a
fifth were inconsistent. Forming about a fifth of the distribu-
tion, the inconsistents -could'affect the over-all distribution
by giving the impression either that most workers supported
a labour party (one-third + one-fifth) or that most workers
were not willing to mix in politics (one-third + one-fifth).
The inconsistents represented, therefore, a potential for
|~
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false information about the attitudes of the workers. This
the Youths could not at first foresee or discriminate.
Turning to the question of how the Youths verified
their prediction, we noted (Chapter XIV) that the NLP did
not, by the Federal election, oppose UPGA, one of the
regionalist parties. Eskor-Toyo, Secretary and spokesman
for the NLP accounted for the events of December by differ-
entiating the primitive term "bourgeois" into two terms"
"compradore Bourgeois," and "nationalist bourgeois." This
differentiation allowed him to account for the failure of
the NLP by linking it to the failure of the UPGA. One can
speak of "political learning" as having taken place for the
Youths in the sense that Eskor-Toyo's differentiation will
presumably allow him to make new predictions. In the light
of the types of insight necessary for Nigerian development,
however, Eskor's is a very small victory.
Having discussed the findings of the case study we
turn to the relevance of these findings to the question
asked in the introduction: what are prediction and verifi-
cation dependent upon?
The Relevance of the Findings
Ideological prediction varies with theory and with
information. One way in which theories are more of less
sophisticated and predictions are more or less ture is the
extent that they do not impute a one-to-one relationship
between motives and actions. Going on strike for reasons of
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egalitarianism does not necessarily mean that this motive
is generalizable beyond the strike. Assuming that it is
generalizable, it may or may not be translatable into a
sentiment of class consciousness.
Predictions also vary with the truth, stability, and
consistency of the information on which they are based. From
false information true predictions can be made only by chance.
But information need not be false to be misleading. For
example, if the relationship between messages and events
is unstable, then the relationship between prediction and
future events is true only for a time but ceases to be true
when the information is "out of date." In the case studied,
it was found that reliability of information depends on the
consistency of motives of the encoder or communicator. If
the political communicator does not perceive or does not
care to perceive that he has mixed motives he will be mis-
leading in the impressions that he leaves with politicians.
In general it may be suggested that, when attitudes
tend to consistency over time, ideological experimentation
ultimately homes-in or discovers those coalitions over
which prediction and persuasion is possible, Once predic-
tion and persuasion is possible, political institutions can
be built, and political development can take place. If
attitude markets are not consistent, as they are not in
Nigerian labour, ideological experimentation cannot serve
this creative function.
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Generalizing from the findings on verification it may
be suggested that to the extent politicians like Eskor-Toyo
are willing to recognize failure and differentiate their
perception of the political process, political verification
serves to change iedology and may allow for creative new
political insights and predictions. But the question remains,
did Eskor-Toyo move toward the UPGA because he realized that
his support was unstable and inconsistent or did he change
his course and his ideology because he thought it wise to
support a "nationalist" bourgeoisie against the Northern
"feudalists." We suspect that it was for the second reason
and that in fact politicians are not aware of (or refuse to
be aware of) the unpredictability of their own politics.
The problem that the Youths had with their "Marxist"
theory of the Nigerian political system points up the
serious problem of what sociologists call the "institution-
alizing of ideology" or what Apter has called the "transfer
of institutions" in the new states. If politicians cannot
rely on the information they get from the polity how can
they adjust their models or ideologies to reality, and if
they cannot predict support or persuade voters (because they
do not know what the voters think) does this not mean that
they are -left with no alternative but to rely on force?
After the election of 1964, one Youth remarked "it is no
use for us to launch political parties, here in Nigeria,
we can only come to power through revolution."
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QUESTIONNAIRE A
281
RESEARCH INTO LABOUR IN NIGERIA
Your answer will enable us to complete our research
into the relationship between Labour and Government in the
young country of Nigeria. You are free to indicate your
name or not to indicate your name as you please.
Please answer the following questions as honestly as
you can.
Thank you for your kind help.
ROBERT MELSON
U.C.I.
282
1. What do you think was the root cause of the recent
general strike?
2. Do you think that the JAC should remain?
3. What union are you representing?
4. How old are you?
5. What is your position in the union? Are you a member
of the executive?
6. About how many members does your branch union have?
7. In what year did your union register?
8. If someone holds an executive position in your union,
how often does he have to stand for election?
9. How long have you occupied your present executive position
in your union?
10. What was the last class you attended in school?
11. What other educational qualification do you have?
12. What is your present occupation?
13. About how much do you earn per year?
14. Would you say that your chances for advancement are:
good
not bad
very bad
15. What is your tribal affiliation?
16. What is your religious affiliation?
Catholic
Protestant (Please state which branch, for example,
Baptist)
Muslim
Other
17. What was your father's occupation?
18. In general would you prefer to work for government or
for private industry?
19. Did you believe that before you went back to work during
the strike other regions of the nation were returning to
work? Which regions?
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20. How were you able to check this information?
21. Does your union belong to
NTUC
ULC
LUF
NWC
If it belongs to some other National body please note
the name. If it belongs to no National body please
write down, "none."
22. How does it help your union to be a member of such an
organization (National body as listed above)?
23. Does the National body which your union belongs have
the power to call out on strike any union in the
National body?
24. Has the National body to which your union belongs ever
disciplined a general secretary of your union?
25. Did your union go out on strike before or after you
were given orders to do so from your National body
executive?
26. Would you say that on the whole your union is independent
and free to pull out of any National body and join any
federation that it pleases?
27. What would be some of the penalties that a union would
suffer by pulling-out of a National body?
28. How many times inthe last two years has your union
called on the National body to help you?
Is your union affiliated with an international body
such as:
ICFTU
WFTU
AATUF
CAATU
PAWC
29. Do you believe that affiliation with international
bodies is useful or harmful to the Nigerian Labour
Movement?
30. Which political party did you vot for in 1959?
31. Have you ever held or do you now hold a post in a
political party or in the government? Which post?
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32. What do the initials SWFP stand for?
33. What do the initials NYC stand for?
34. Have you ever belonged to the Zikist movement?
35. Did everyone on your executive survive the strike or
were some people asked to resign by the workers because
they refused to go out on strike?
36. What do the initials FLAC stand for?
37. Have the Whitley councils been effective in your
industry?
38. Do you want to make a career in the Labour movement?
39. Are you going to cast your vote in the next national
election?
40. Do you feel that a man like you has little influence
with government people?
41. Do you feel that things are getting worse not better?
42. Do you feel that government should instruct parents how
to bring up their children?
43. How long does it take you to get home to your town or
village?
44. How often in a year do you get home?
45. When you get home do people respect you as a big man?
46. When you get home do people ask you for advice about
politics?
47. Which party do you think behaved with most friendliness
towards the workers during the strike?
NPC
NEPU
NCNC
AG
NNDP
SWFP
DYNAMIC PARTY
48. Which newspapers or Radio did you trust to give you
honest reporting during the strike?
49. Did your union have the use of a telephone during the
strike?
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50. Have you ever met anyone who holds high position in
government?
51. Is this person related to you by family or is he a
close friend?
52. Have you ever met anyone who holds a high position in
industry?
53. Is this person related to you by family or is he a
close friend?
54. Do you feel that Government should control rents and
prices?
55. Would you support a Labour Party.
QUESTIONNAIRE B
L3
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LABOUR LEADERS
Dear Sir,
Your opinions on the vital issues of Labour and Govern-
ment are of great importance to all men who are interested
either in improving industrial relations or in furthering
the study of industrial relations in Nigeria.
The answers to the questions below will be treated
statistically. I mean that once I have all the answers
before me, of all the people who answered, I can make state-
ments such as "30% of Union Leaders have held their post for
a year or more." The important thing to remember is that
your personal answers will not be quoted: it is the group's
answer that we are after.
Let me say a word about how to answer the questions
below. You will see that for almost all questions, the
answers are already provided for you. Of course no answer
that I can suggest will be exactly the one you would have
given. Tou are asked to choose those answers which come
nearest to your own point of view.
The best way to answer is to put one or more checks (' )
next to the statement or statements which come nearest to
your own. For example, I ask the question:
20. How old are you?
1. Below 20 4. Between 40-50 i
2. Between 20-30 5. Between 50-60
3. Between 30-40 6. Over 60
Let us imagine that you are 43 years old. You would check
statement 4 above.
Of course you are free to answer as you please and to
answer as many questions as you please. It is of the utmost
importance however that you answer frankly and as many
questions as possible. Remember unless you write down your
name no one can possibly know who answered a particular ques-
tion. I can assure you that in any case--even your nameless
answers--will be held in strictest confidence.
Of course if you do wish to write down your name and
address you may do so., This would help me considerably in
contacting you to ask for more of your opinions.
Thank you for your co-operation.
Robert Melson
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and University
of Ibadan.
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1. What is your position in the union?
1. Secretary
2. President
3. Treasurer
4. Vice-President
5. Other Executive Office
6. Non-Executive Union Member
2. In how many other Unions are you an executive officer?
1. One other union
2. Two other unions
3. Three other unions
4. More than three other unions
3. What is your occupation?
4. Do you work for
1. Government
2. Private Nigerian Industry_
3. Private Expatriate Industry
5. About how much do you earn per year from your union
duties?
6. What is your total income per year?
1. Less than 100 pounds
2. Between 100 and 150 pounds
3. Between 150 and 200 pounds
4. Between 200 and 250 pounds
5. Between 250 and 300 pounds
6. Between 300 and 350 pounds
7. Between 350 and 400 pounds
8. Between 400 and 450 pounds
9. Between 450 and 500 pounds
10. Between 500 and 700 pounds
11. Between 700 and 1000 pounds
12. Over 1000 pounds
7. What was your total yearly income five years ago?
1. Less than 100 pounds
2. Between 100 and 150 pounds
3. Between 150 and 200 pounds
4. Between 200 and 250 pounds
5. Between 250 and 300 pounds
6. Between 300 and 350 pounds
7. Between 350 and 400 pounds
8. Between 400 and 450 pounds
9. Between 450 and 500 pounds
10. Between 500 and 700 pounds
11. Between 700 and 1000 pounds
12. Over 1000 pounds
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8. How much do you think you will be earning five years
from now?
1. Less than 100 pounds
2. Between 100 and 150 pounds
3. Between 150 and 200 pounds
4. Between 200 and 250 pounds
5. Between 250 and 300 pounds
6. Between 300 and 350 pounds
7. Between 350 and 400 pounds_
8. Between 400 and 450 pounds
9. Between 450 and 500 pounds
10. Between 500 and 700 pounds
11. Between 700 and 1000 pounds
12. Over 1000 pounds
9. What was your father's occupation?
10. Was your father literate?
1. Literate
2. Not literate
11. Does your senior brother earn more than you do?
1. I have no senior brother
2. He earns more than I do
3. He earns the same
4. He earns less than I do
5. I am the senior brother in my family_
12. To which tribe do you belong?
13. In which region were you born?
14. In which region do you live now?
15. What is your religion?
1. Catholic
2. Protestant (Anglican, Baptist,
and so on)
3. Muslim
4. Other
If you checked-off "other" what is the
which you belong?
Methodist
church to
16. What was the last class you attended in school?
1. Primary I 7. Secondary
2. Primary II 8. Secondary
3. Primary III 9. Secondary
4. Primary Four 10. Secondary
5. Primary Five 11. Secondary
6. Primary Six 12. Secondary
13. University
II
III
Four
Five
Six
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17. Have you been able to obtain?
1. WASC
2. GCE (OL)
3. HSC
4. GCE (AL)
18. What will be your occupation five years from now?
19. Will you still be a union leader five years from now?
20. How,
1.
2.
3.
21. How
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.6.
7.
8.
9.
22. How
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
old are you?
Below 20
Between 20 and 30
Between 30 and 40
4. Between 40 and 50
5. Between 50 and 60
6. Over 60
long have you been a member of your trade union?
One year or less
Between 1 and 2 years
Between 2 and 3 years
Between 3 and 4 years
Between 4 and 5 years
Between 5 and 7 years
Between 7 and 10 years
Between 10 and 15 years
More than 15 years
long have you been in your present executive position?
One year or less
Between 1 and 2 years
Between 2 and 3 years
Between 3 and 4 years
Between 4 and 5 years
Between 5 and 7 years
Between 7 and 10 years
Between 10 and 15 years
More than 15 years
23. Have you ever held a position in
1. Yes 2. No
24. Have you ever held a position in
1. Yes 2. No
a political party?
government?
25, Will you in the future want to hold a position in a
political party?
1. Yes 2. No
26. Will you in the future want to hold a position in
government?
1, Yes 2. No
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27. Do you agree with the following statement: "A man
like me has no chance of advancement in the political
parties of today"
1. I agree 2. I disagree
3. I don't know
28. Did you vote in the Federal election of 1959?
1. Yes 2. No
29. Will you vote in the Federal election of 1964?
1. Yes 2. No
30. Do you think that there is a party in the Federation
which cares for the workers?
1. All parties care for the workers
2. There is at least one party which cares for
the workers
3. No party cares for the workers
4. I don't know
31. Which do you think were the most important causes of
the recent general strike?
1. The census issue
2. Corruption in government
3. Low salary of workers
4. The bad treatment of minority groups
5. Arrogance of those who are on top_
6. Too high salaries and too many allowances for
senior civil servants as compared to what the
workers get
7. The emergency in the Western Region
8. Too high salaries and too many allowances for
politicians as compared to what the workers
get
9. I don't know
32. As a citizen of Nigeria, which issue makes you particu-
larly angry?
1. The high salaries and allowances of t1hose who
are on top_
2. The census issue
3. The Western Region emergency
4. The bad treatment of minority groups
5. None of the above
6. Freedom of the Press
7. I don't know_
33. Do you think the strike has been a success or a failure?
1. Success
2. Failure
3. Neither
4. I don't know
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34. What is your opinion about politicians now that
Nigeria is independent?
1. I trusted our politicians more before inde-
pendence than now
2. I trust our politicians the same way as I
did before independence
3. I trust our politicians more now than I did
before independence
35. What is your opinion about senior civil servants?
1. I trusted them more before independence
2. I trust them the same way now as I did before
independence
3. I trust them more now_
36. What is your feeling about trade union leaders?
1. I trusted them more before independence
2. I trust them the same way now as I did before
independence
3. I trust them more now than I did before
independence
37. What is your opinion of government?
1. I trusted government more before independence
2, I trust government the same way as I did before
independence_
3. I trust government more now than I did before
independence
38. Now
1.
2.
3.
that the strike is over, do you trust politicians?
More than before the strike
The same as before the strike
Less than before the strike
39. Now that the strike is over, do you trust senior
civil servants
1. More than before the strike
2. The same as before the strike
3. Less than before the strike
40. Now
1.
2.
3.
41. Now
1.
2.
3.
that the strike is over do you trust union leaders?
More than before the strike
The same as before the strike
Less than before the strike
that the strike is over, do you trust government?
More than before the strike
The same as before the strike
Less than before the strike
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42. What are the things that you wish government would do
for the citizen?
1. Government should provide for education
2. Government should provide for transport
3. Government should provide for housing
4. Government should provide for burial
5. Government should provide medical aid
6. Government should provide employment
7. Government should do all of the above
8. Government should do none of the above
9. 1 don't know___
43. Do
or
1.
2.
3.
4.
you think that your position has been strengthened
weakened because of the strike?
Strengthened
Weakened
Neither
I don't know
44. What is your position in
1. Lower class
2. Middle class
3. Working class
4. Upper class
5. There are no classes
6. I don't know_
45. What about politicians?
1. Middle class
2. Working class
3. Upper class
4. Lower class
5. There are no classes
6. I don't know
society? Are you
in Nigeria
Are the
in Nigeria
46. What about senior civil servants? Are the
1. Lower class
2. Middle class
3. Working class
4. Upper class
5. There are no classes in Nigeria
6. I don't know
47. What about trade union leaders? Are they
1. Middle class
2. Lower class
3. Working class
4. Upper class
5. There are no classes in Nigeria
6. I don't know
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48. What about doctors? Are they
1. Middle class
2. Upper class
3. Lower class
4. Working class
5. There are no classes in Nigeria
6. I don't know
49. What about merchants? Are they
1. Middle class
2. Lower class
3. Upper class
4. Working class
5. There are no classes in Nigeria
6. I don't know
50. What about farmers? Are they
1. Upper class
2. Middle class
3. Lower class
4. Working class
5. There are no classes in Nigeria
6. I don't know
51. If two men were running for office, one came from
your hometown another was a trade unionist whom
would you vote for?
1. I would vote for my townsman
2. 1 would vote for the Trade Unionist
52. Which party do you think is most friendly to workers?
1. NPC 6. Dynamic party_____
2. NCNC 7. Labour party (Imoudu)
3. AG 8. Other party_
4. NNDP 9. No party_
5. SWFP 10. I don't know
53. To which national body does your union belong?
1. ULC 4. NWC
2. NTUC 5. None
3. LUF 6. Other
If you checked "other" please note below the national
body or federation to which your union belongs.
54. Do you agree or disagree with the following state-
ments?
1. There's little use in talking to public officials
because often they aren't really interested in the
problems of the average man.
Agree Disagree
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2. Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today
and let tommorow take care of itself.
Agree- Disagree
3. Inspite of what people say, the lot of the
average man is getting worse, not better.
Agree Disagree
4. It's hardly fair to bring children into the
world with the way things look for the future.
Agree Disagree
5. These days a person doesn't really know whom he
can count on.
Agree Disagree
QUESTIONNARIE C
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LABOUR LEADERS
Dear Sir,
Your opinions on the vital issues of Labour and Govern-
ment are of great importance to all men who are interested
either in improving industrial relations or in furthering
the study of industrial relations in Nigeria.
The answers to the questions below will be treated
statistically. I mean that once I have all the answers
before me, of all the people who answered, I can make state-
ments such as "30% of Union Leaders have held their post for
a year or more." The important thing to remember is that
your personal answers will not be quoted: it is the group's
answer that we are after.
Let me say a word about how to answer the questions
below. You will see that for almost all questions, the
answers are already provided for you. Of course no answer
that I can suggest will be exactly the one you would have
given. You are asked to choose those answers which come
nearest to your own point of view.
The best way to answer is to put one or more checks ( /)
next to the statement or statements which comes nearest to
your own. For example, I ask the question:
20. How old are you?
1. Below 20 4. Between 40-50
2. Between 20-30 5. Between 50-60
3. Between 30-40 6. Over 60
Let us imagine that you are 43 years old. You would check
statement 4 above.
Of course you are free to answer as you please and to
answer as many questions as you please. It is of the utmost
importance however that you answer frankly and as may ques-
tions as possible. Remember unless you write down your name
no one can possibly know who answered a particular question.
I can assure you that in any case--even your nameless answers--
will be held in strictest confidence.
If you do wish to write down your name and address you
may do so. This would help me considerably in contacting
you to ask for more of your opinions.
Thank you for your co-operation.
Robert Melson
Nigerian Institute of Social
and Economic Research,
University of Ibadan
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1. What do you think were the most important causes of
the recent general strike?
la. Did your union go on strike in the recent general strike?
2. Now that the strike is over, do politicians respect
you
1. More than before the strike
2. The same as before the strike
3. Less than before the strike
3. Now that the strike is over, do senior civil servants
respect you
1. More than before the strike
2. The same as before the strike
3. Less than before the strike
4. Now that the strike is over do workers respect you
1. More than before the strike
2. The same as before the strike
3. Less than before the strike
5. Now that the strike is over, does government respect
you
1. More than before the strike
2. The same as before the strike
3. Less than before the strike
6. From where did you get most of your information during
the strike?
1. Radio 4. From Trade Union Handouts
2. Newspapers 5. Other people
3. Television
7. From which of these human sources did you get most of
your information during the strike?
1. Family_
2. Trade union friends
3. Trade union leaders in Lagos
4. Fellow workers
5. People in my political party_
6. People in my tribal (clan) union
7. Townsmen
8. Whatnewspapers did you find most reliable during the
strike?
1. The Citizen 6. Irohin Yoruba
2. Daily Mail 7. Daily Sketch
3. Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo 8. Nigerian Outlook-
4. The Comet 9. Eastern Nigeria
5. The Nigerian Tribune Sentinel
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9. Port Harcourt Guardian
2. West AFrican Pilot
3. Daily Express
4. Nigerian Daily Times
5. Morning Post
10. Where do you get most of your information about the
election?
1. From the radio 4. From party hand-
2. From newspapers outs
3. From television 5. From other people_
11. What kind of people are most informative about the
election?
1. My family
2. Trade Union friends
3. Trade Union leaders in Lagos
4. Fellow Workers
5. People in my Political Party
6. People in my Tribal (clan) union
7. Townsmen
12. Which newspapers do you find to be most reliable
during the election?
13. What is your position in the branch trade union?
1. Secretary
2. President or Chairman
3. Treasurer
4. Vice-President
5. Other Executive Office
6. Non-Executive Union Member
14. In how many other Branch Unions are you an executive
officer?
1. One other union
2. Two other unions
3. Three other unions
4. More than three other unions
15. To which national body does your union belong?
1. ULC 4. NWC
2. NTUC 5. None
3. LUF 6. Other
If you checked "other" please note below the national
body or federation to which your union belongs.
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16. What is your position in the national body?
1. National General Secretary
2. NationalPresident or Chairman
3. Member of national executive
4. Regional Secretary
5. Regional President or Chairman
6. Member of regional executive
7. Non-executive member
17. Wgat is your occupation?
18. Would you say that your chances for advancement in
your present job are
1. Very good 4. Bad
2. Good 5. Very bad
3. Satisfactory__
19. Do you work for
1. Federal Government
2. Private Nigerian Industry
3. Regional Government
4. Private Expatriate Industry
5. Local Government
6. Statutory Corporation__
20. Would you prefer to work for
1. The Federal Government
2. Private Nigerian Industry
3. Regional Government
4. Private Expatriate Industry
5. Local government
6. Statutory Corporations
21. About how much do you earn per year from your
trade union duties?
22. What is your total income per year from your job?
1. Less than 100 pounds
2. Between 100 and 150 pounds
3. Between 150 and 200 pounds
4. Between 200 and 250 pounds
5. Between 250 and 300 pounds
6. Between 300 and 350 pounds
7. Between 350 and 400 pounds
8. Between 400 and 450 pounds
9. Between 450 and 500 pound__
10. Between 500 and 700 pounds
11. Between 700 and 1000 pounds
12. Over 1000 pounds
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23. What was your total yearly income five year ago?
1. Less than 100 pounds
2. Between 100 and 150 pounds
3. Between 150 and 200 pounds
4. Between 200 and 250 pounds
5. Between 250 and 300 pounds
6. Between 300 and 350 pounds
7. Between 350 and 400 pounds_
8. Between 400 and 450 pounds
9. Between 450 and 500 pounds
10. Between 500 and 700 pounds
11. Between 700 and 1000 pounds
12. Over 1000 pounds.
24. How much do you think you will be earning five years
from now?
1. Less than 100 pounds
2. Between 100 and 150 pounds
3. Between 150 and 200 pounds
4. Between 200 and 250 pounds
5. Between 250 and 300 pounds
6. Between 300 and 350 pounds
7. Between 350 and 400 pounds
8. Between 400 and 450 pounds
9. Between 450 and 500 pounds
10. Between 500 and 700 pounds
11. Between 700 and 1000 pounds
12. Over 1000 pounds
25. What was your father's occupation?
26. Was your father literate?
1. Literate
2. Not literate
27. Was your mother literate?
1. Literate
2. Not literate
28. To which tribe do you belong?
29. Where were you born?
30. What is your religion?
1. Catholic
2. Protestant (Anglican, Baptist, Methodist
and so on)
3. Muslim
4. Other
If you checked-off "other" what is the church to which
you belong?
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31. Where do you live now?
32. What was the last class you attended in school?
1. Primary I Secondary I
2. Primary II Secondary IT
3. Primary III 9. Secondary IIT__
4. Primary Four 10. Secondary Four
5. Primary Five 11. Secondary Five
6. Primary Six 12. Secondary Six
13. University_
33. What certificate do you have (if not listed, please
write it below) 4 C A)__
1. WASCS 4.GEcArI
2. GCE (OL)___ 5. I have no certificate__
3. HSC______
3)41 What other education have you had?
35. What will be your occupation five years from now?
36. If tomorrow you had to look for another job what sort
of work do you think you would be most qualified to
do?
37. Will you want to be a Trade union
from now? Why?
38. How old are you?
1. Below 20 4.
2. Between 20 and 30 5.
3. Between 30 and 40 6.
39. How long have you been a member of
1. One year or less
2. Between 1 and 2 years
3. Between 2 and 3 years
4. Between 3 and 4 years
5. Between 4 and 5 years_
6. Between 5 and 7 years
7. Between 7 and 10 years
8. Between 10 and 15 years
9. More than 15 years
leader five years
Between 40 and 50
Between 50 and 60
Over 60
your trade union?
40. How long have you been in your present executive
position?
1. One year or less 7. Between 7 and 10
2. Between I and 2 years years
3. Between 2 and 3 years 8. Between 10 and 15
4. Between 3 and 4 years years
5. Between 4 and 5 years 9. More than 15 years
6. Between 5 and 7 years
303
41. Have you ever held a position in a political party?
1. Yes 2. No
42. Which position?
43. Have you ever held a position in government?
1. Yes 2. No
44. Which position?
45. Did you even belong to the Zikist movement?
1. Yes 2. No
46. Will you in the future want to hold a position in a
political party?
1. Yes 2. No
47. Which p sition?
48. Which statement comes closest to your own view?
1. A man like me has a good chance of advancement in
the political parties of today
2. A man like me has some chance of advancement in
the political parties of today
3. A man liKe me nas no cnance of advancement in
the political parties of today_
49. What parties in your opinion were most helpful to
the workers during the recent general strike?
50. What parties were most helpful to workers in 1959?
51. Will you vote in the Federal election of 1964?
1. Yes 2. No
52. Which parties are most helpful to the workers in
1964?
53. Are you voting for the same party now that you
voted for in 1959?
1. Yes, same party
2. No, different party
3. I did not vote in 1959
54. Are you personally doing anything to help your
party win the election?
1. Yes 2. No
55. Did you work actively for your party in 1959?
1. Yes 2. No
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56. Do any of your closest friends disagree with your
political opinions?
1. Yes 2. No 3. I don't know
57. Do any of your trade union friends disagree with your
political opinions?
1. Yes 2. No 3. I don't know
58, As a citizen of Nigeria, which issue makes your par-
ticularly angry?
1. The high salaries and allowances of those who are
on top
2. The census issue
3. The Western Region emergency
4. The bad treatment of minority groups
5. Freedom of the Press
6. Neglect of workers by government
7. Government's not taking trade unions into its
confidence
59. Are most people in your trade union going to vote
the way you are?
1. Most persons in my trade union will vote the
way I do
2. Most persons in my trade union will vote differently
from me
3. I don't know which way my fellow trade unionists
will vote
60. Do you think it will make much difference to the trade
union movement which party wins the forthcoming election?
1. Great difference
2. Some difference
3. No difference
4. I don't know
61. Will it make much difference to your own life which
party gets elected in the forthcoming election?
1. Great difference
2. Some difference
3. No difference
4. I don't know
62. If the same man for whom you voted for councillor in
1959 were running for political office today would you
vote for him again?
1. Yes, I would vote for him again
2. No, I would not vote for him
3. I have no choice in the matter
4. I don't know
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63. If the same man for whom you voted for member of the
regional house of assembly in 1959 were running for
political office today, would you vote for him again?
1. Yes, I would vote for him again
2. No, I would not vote for him again
3. I have no choice in the matter
4. I don't know
63a Do you think that Mr. Imoudu's labour party is useful
for workers? Why?
64. If the same man for whom you voted for a seat in the
federal parliament in 1959 were running for political
office today would you vote for him?
1. Yes, I would vote for him again
2. No, I would not vote for him
3. I have no choice in the matter
4. I don't know
65. Are things getting better or worse for the ordinary
worker?
1. Much better 4. Somewhat worse
2. Somewhat better 5. Much worse
3. The same
66. Are things getting better of worse for the trade
unionist?
1. Much better 4. Somewhat worse
2. Somewhat better 5. Much worse
3. The same
67. Are things getting better or worse for Nigeria?
1. Much better 4. Somewhat worse
2. Somewhat better 5. Much worse
3. The same
68. Are things getting better or worse for your hometown?
1. Much better 4. Somewhat worse
2. Somewhat better 5. Much worse
3. The same
69. Are things getting better or worse for you?
1. Much better 4. Somewhat worse
2. Somewhat better 5. Much worse
3. The same
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70. What are the things that you wish government would do
for the citizen?
1. Government should provide for education
2. Government should provide for transport
3. Government should provide for housing
4. Government should provide for burial
5. Government should provide medical aid_
6. Government should provide employment
7. Government should keep people from being sacked
8. Government should provide for old age
9. f don't know_____
71. Which statement comes closest to your own point of view?
1. A man like me has a great deal of influence with
the senior civil servants of today
2. A man like me has some influence withthe senior
civil servants of today
3. A man like me has no influence with the senior
civil servants of today
72. As a trade unionist what do you wish government would
do?
73. Now speaking as a man who represents your people, what
do you wish government would do?
74. What is your position in society? Are you
1. Lower class 4. Upper class
2. Middle class 5. There are no classes in
3. Working class Nigeria
6. I don't know_
75. What about politicians? Are they
1. Middle class 4. Lower class
2. Working class 5. There are no classes in
3. Upper class Nigeria
6. I don't know
76. What about senior civil servants? Are they
1. Lower class 4. Upper class
2. Middle class 5. There are no classes in
3. Working class Nigeria
6. I don't know
77. What about trade union leaders? Are they
1. Middle class 4. Upper class
2. Lower class 5. There are no classes in
3. Working class Nigeria
6. I don't know
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78. What about doctors? Are they
1. Middle class 4. Working class
2. Upper class 5. There are no classes in
3. Lower class Nigeria
TI don't know_
79. What about merchants? Are they
1. Middle class 4. Working class
2. Upper class 5.. There are no classes in
3. Lower class Nigeria
6.I don't know
80. What about farmers? Are they
1. Upper class 4. Working class
2. Middle class 5. There are no classes in
3. Lower class Nigeria
6. I-don't know
81. How much do you think an average politician earns in
a year?
82. How much do you think an average man earned before he
became elected to office?
83. How many people have suggested that the salaries of
politicians should be reduced. What should be the
salary per year of a politician?
84. What kind of people most fit your conception of
"upper class"
1. The very rich
2. The very influential
3. The very respected
4. Those who are highly placed in public life
5. Good people
6. Bad people
85. Who are upper class?
1. Obas 6. Businessmen
2. Big farmers 7. Doctors
3. Politicians 8.! Lawyers
4. University graduates 9. Trade unions
5. Senior civil servants
86. Which statement comes closest to your own views:
1. Upper class people don't move with lower class
people
2. I have many friends who are upper class
3. Upper class people live in their own part of town
4. Upper class people live in the same part of town
that I live
5. Upper class people control the government
6. The people of Nigeria control the government
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87. Do you move with upper class people?
1. Yes, I move with upper class people often
2. Sometimes I move with upper class people
3. I seldom move with upper class people
4. I never move with upper class people
88. Is there any member of your family who is upper class?
1. My brother (by the same mother) is upper class
2. My brother (by different mother) is upper class
3. My father's brother is upper class
4. My mother's brother is upper class
5. The son of father's brother is upper class
6. The son of mother's brother is upper class
7. The son of father's sister is upper class
8. The son of mother's sister is upper class
9. Nobody in my family is upper class
89. Please check the statements with which you most agree:
1. There is no use in talking to public officials
because they are not interested in the problems of
the average man
2. Most public officials are very helpful
3. In order to get ahead you should work hard and
plan for the future
4. The life of the average man is getting worse not
better
5. It doesn't pay to plan for the future because you
can't tell what tomorrow will bring
6. Things are so bad that I don't want to bring up
anymore children
7. Each day things are getting better and better for
the average man
8. I believe that my children will have a much better
life than I have had
9. You simply cannot trust most people
10. Most people can be trusted
90. Do you belong to a tribal or to a clan union?
1. I belong to a tribal union
2. I belong to a clan union
3. I do not belong to any association based on
tribe or clan
91. Frankly speaking, what comes first?
1. A man's loyalty to his trade union or to his home-
town?
Trade union Hometown
2. A man's loyalty to his region or to his trade union?
Region Trade Union
3. A man's loyalty to his political party or to his
trade union?
Trade union Political Party_
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4. A man's loyalty to his trade union or the Federal
Government?
Federal Government Trade Union
5. A man's loyalty to his tribal or clan union or to
his trade union?
Trade Union Tribal or Clan"
Union
92. Do you own a radio?
1. Yes 2. No
93. How often do you listen to the radio?
1. Almost every day_
2. Two or three days a week
3. One day a week
4. Less than one day a week
94. What are your favorite kinds of programs?
1. News
2. Music
3. Discussion programs
95. About how often do you go to the films?
1. Once or more a week
2. Once or twice a month
3. Three or four times a year
4. Less than three times a year
96. What countries have you visited?
97. What was the purpose of your trip?
98. If for some reason you could not live in Nigeria, what
other country would you choose to live in?
1. Great Britain 6. China
2. Ghana 7. Egypt
3. Israel 8. Germany
4. United States 9. Other
5. Soviet Union
100. About how many bookd so you read a month?
101. What sort of books do you like best?
102. Could you name the three books that have influenced your
life most?
103. What authors do you respect most?
104. If you were to write a book what would be the most
likely subject that you would, write about?
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105. What would you say about it?
106. There is much talk today about the different things
that Nigeria could learn from foreign countries. What
do you think it could learn from Britain?
107. From Russia?
108. From China?
109. From the United States?
110. From Ghana?
QUESTIONNAIRE D
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TRADE UN~ION QUESTIONNAIRE_
1. What is your position in the branch trade union?
1. Secretary
2. President or Chairman
3. Treasurer
4. Vice-President
5. Other executive Officer
6. Non-executive Member
2. To which national body does your union belong?
1. U.L.C. 4. N.W.C.
2. N.T.U.C. 5. None
3. L.U.F. 6. Other
If you checked "Other" please note below the national
body or federation to which your union belongs.
3. What is your position in the national body?
1. National General Secretary
2. National President or Chairman
3. Member of national executive
4. Regional Secretary__
5. Regional President or Chairman
6. Member of regional executive
7. Non-executive member
4. What is your occupation?
5. Would you say your chances for advancement in your
present job are
1. Very good 4. Bad
2. Good 5. Very bad
3. Satisfactory__
6. Is it your opinion that:
1. There is no use in talking to public officials
because they are not interested in the problems
of the average man.
Yes, that is my opinion
No, that is not my opinion
2. In order to get ahead you should work hard and
plan for the future.
Yes No
3. The life of the average man is getting worse
not better.
Yes No
4. Most public officians are very helpful.
Yes No
5. Most people can be trusted/
Yes No
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6. It doesn't pay to plan for the future because you
don't know what tomorrow will bring.
Yes No
7. Each day things are getting better and better for
the average man.
Yes No
8. You simply cannot trust most people.
Yes No
7. What is your total income per
1. Less than 100 pounds
2. Between 100 and 150,/4
3. Between 150 and 200
4. Between 200 and 250
5. Between 250 and 300
6. Between 300 and 350
year from your job?
7. Between 350 and 400
8. Between 400 and 450
9. Between 450 and 500
10. Between 500 and 700
11. Between 700 and 1000
12. Over 1000
8. What was your father's occupation?
9. Was your father literate?
1. Literate 2. Not literate
10. What was your total yearly income
1. Less than 100 pounds 7.
2. Between 100 and 150 8.
3. Between 150 and 200 9.
4. Between 200 and 250 10.
5. Between 250 and 300 11.
6. Between 300 and 350 12.
11. How much do you think you will be
from now?
1. Less than 100 pounds__ 7.
2. Between 100 and 150 8.
3. Between 150 and 200 9.
4. Between 200 and 250 10.
5. Between 250 and 300 11.
6. Between 300 and 350 12.
five years ago?
Between 350 and 400
Between 400 and 450
Between 450 and 500
Between 500 and 700
Between 700 and 1000
Over 1000 pounds
earning five years
Between 350 and 400
Between 400 and 450
Between 450 and 500
Between 500 and 700
Between 700 and 1000
Over 1000 pounds
12. To which tribe do you belong ?
13. What is your religion?
1. Catholic
2. Protestant (Anglican, Methodist, Baptist, etc.)
3. Muslim
4. Other
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14. What was the last class you attended in school?
1. Primary I 7. Secondary I
2. Primary II 8. Secondary II
3. Primary III 9. Secondary III
4. Primary IV 10. Secondary IV
5. Primary V 11. Secondary V
6. Primary VI 12. Secondary VI
13. University__
15. How
1.
2.
3.
16. How
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
old are you?
Below 20
Between 20 and 30
Between 30 and 40
4. Between 40 and 50
5. Between 50 and 60
6. Over 60
long have you been a member of your trade union?
One year or less
Between 1 and 2 years
Between 2 and 3 years
Between 3 and 4 years
Between 4 and 5 years
Between 5 and 7 years
Between 7 and 10 years
Between 10 and 15 years
More than 15 years
17. Are you a member of a tribal union and do you go to
meetings?
1. I am a member of a tribal and I try to go to all
meetings
2. Sometimes I go to meetings of my tribal union
3. I belong to a tribal union but I very seldom go
to meetings
4. I do not belong to a tribal union
18. As a trade unionist what do you wish government would
do?
19. Now speaking as a man who represents your people, what
do you wish government would do?
20. When discussing social issues with your
of the topics listed below are you most
talk about? (Please pick 4 topics)
1. Need for school buildings 6.
2. Foreign aid 7.
3. Socialism 8.
4. Low wages_
5. Congo situation
townsmen which
likely to
High taxes
Zik
Elections to
parliament
21. Do you work in your hometown or do you work away from
your town?
1. I work in my hometown 2. I work away from
my hometown
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22. Where did you register to vote in the last federal
election?
1. I registered to vote in my hometown
2. I registered to vote in the town where I
presently work
3. I registered, neither in my hometown, nor in the town
where I presently work
4. I did not register to vote in the last election
23. When discussing social issues with your trade union
friends, which of the topics listed below are you most
likely to talk about? (Please pick 4 such topics)
1. Need for school buildings 6. High taxes
2. Socialism 7. Elections to
3. Low wages parliament
4. Foreign aid
5. Zik
24. How much do you think an average polician earns in a
year?
25. How much do you think an average man earned before he
became elected to office?
26. Many people have suggested that the salaries of poli-
ticians should be reduced. What should be the salary
per year of a politician?
27. People have said that the ULC and the NTUC have nothing
in common, what do you think?
28. Some people have said that the NTUC and the LUF have
nothing in common, what do you think?
29. Which book has most influenced your life?
30. Is it your opinion that the only way we can know
what is going on in the world today is to rely on
leaders and experts who are better informed than we
are?
1. We should always rely on our leaders
2. We should partly rely on our leaders and partly
on other information
3. Our leaders should not be trusted
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31. Is it your view that the best way to live is to pick
friends and associates whose political beliefs are
the same as one's own"
1. I always choose friends whose political beliefs
are the same as my own
2. Although I prefer people who share my beliefs,
most of my friends need not hold the political
beliefs that I do
3. My friendship with a man is not at all dependent
on his political beliefs
32. Do y~ou believe trade unionists should support
political parties?
1. Trade unionists should form a labour party
2. Yes, trade unionists should support one of the
existing political parties
3. Trade unionists as trade unionists should not
mix in politics, although they may do so as
private citizens
33. What countries have you visited?
34. If for some reason you could not live in Nigeria,
what other country would you choose to live in?
1. Great Britain 6. China
2. Ghana 7. Egypt
3. Israel 8. West Germany
4. United States 9. East Germany__
5. Soviet Union . 10. Other
35. In your opinion who is the greatest African leader?
1. Tafawa Balewa 6. Julius Nyerere
2. Jomo Kenyatta 7. Haile Selassie
3. Patrice Lumumba 8. Leopold Senghor
4. Abdul Nasser 9. Sekou Toure
5. Kwame Nkrumah 10. Nnamdi Azikiwe
11. Other____
36. Who is the greatest living Nigerian leader?
Thank you for your cooperation.
Robert Melson
N.I.S.E.R.
University of Ibadan
QUESTIONNAIRE E
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WORKERS QUESTIONNAIRE
Name of interviewer Place of interview date
1. What is the name of your trade union?
1. Name 2. Doesn't know_
2. How good are the chances of advancement in your present
job?
1. Very good 4. Bad
2. Good 5. Very bad
3. Satisfactory_- 6. Doesn't know
3. Are you a technical or a clerical worker?
1. Technical 2. Clerical 3. Other
4. Are you a craftsman, an artisan, or an apprentice?
1. Craftsman 3. Apprentice
2. Artisan 4. Other
5. Next I am going to read to you 8 statements. After
each statement I shall pause and ask you your opinion
about the statement. I shall ask you whether or not
you agree or disagree. Please don't think that the
statements that I shall read to you are my own opinion.
They are merely points of view with which anyone can
agree or disagree. Here is the first statement.
1. There is no use in talking to Government officials
because they are not interested in the problems
of the average man. What do you think?
Yes, I agree No, I disagree
2. In order to get ahead you should work hard and
plan for the future.
Yes No
3. The life of the average man is getting worse not
better.
Yes No
4. Most Government Officials are very helpful.
Yes No
5. Most people can be trusted.
Yes No
6. It doesn't pay to plan for the future because
you don't know what tomorrow will bring.
Yes No
7. Each day things are getting better and better for
the average man.
Yes No
8. You simply cannot trust most people.
Yes No
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6. What is your occupation?
7. What is the name of your General Secretary?
1. Name 2. Doesn't know
What is your total income per
1. Less than 100 pounds_
2. Between 100 and 150
3. Between 150 and 200
4. Between 200 and 250
5. Between 250 and 300
6. Between 300 and 350
year
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
from your job?
Between 350 and 400
Between 400 and 450
Between 450 and 5001
Between 500 and 700
Between 700 and 1000
Over 1000 pounds
9. Who is Dr. Otegbeye?
1. S.W.F.P._
2. Some Party_
3. DR._
4. NA
5. O her
11. What was your total yearly income five years ago?
1. Less than 100 pounds 7. Between 350 and 4oo
2. Between 100 and 150 8. Between 400 and 450
3. Between 150 and 200 9. Between 450 and 500
4. Between 200 and 250 10. Between 500 and 700
5. Between 250 and 300 11. Between 700 and 1000
6. Between 300 and 350 12. Over 1000 pounds
12. How much do you think you will
now?
1. Less than 100 pounds_
2. Between 100 and 150
3. Between 150 and 200
4. Between 200 and 250
5. Between 250 and 300
6. Between 300 and 350
be earning five years from
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Between 350 and 400
Between 400 and 450
Between 450 and 500
Between 500 and 700
Between 700 and 1000
Over 1000 pounds
13. Who is the president of your trade union?
1. Name 2. Doesn't know_
14. To which central labour body does your union belong?
1. ULC 3. NTUC 5. IULC_
2. LUF 4. TUCN_'6. Doesn't know
7. Other
15. Who is Mr. Michael Imoudu?
16. What central labour body does he lead?
1. ULC 3. LUF 5. IULC
2. NTUC 4. TUCN 6. Doesn't know
7. Other
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17. What tribe is Mr. Imoudu?
1. Ibo 4. Bini_
2. Hausa 5. Afemai_
3. Yoruba 6. Ivbiosakon
18. To which tribe do you belong?
What part of
Ora
Other
do you come from?
20. Who is Alhaji Haruna Adebola?
21. What central labour body does he lead?
1. ULC _4., TUCN_
2. NTUC 5. IULC
3. LUF 6. Doesn't know_
22. What tribe is Alhaji Adebola?
1. Ibo 2. Bini 3. Hausa
IF THE RESPONDENT ANSWERS, YORUBA, PLEASE
FOLLOWING QUESTION:
7. Other
4. Yoruba
ASK HIM THE
What part of Yorubaland does Mr. Adebola come from?
23. What does Mr. Imoudu tell the workers? PAUSE HERE AND
LET THE RESPONDENT ANSWER THE QUESTION. WHEN HE HAS
ANSWERED OR IF HE HAS NOTHING TO SAY THEN GO ON TO THE
THREE QUESTIONS BELOW:
1. Does he tell them to cooperate with management?
Yes No
2. Does he urge them to join a certain political party?
Yes No
3. Does he advise them to strike?
Yes_ No
WRITE RESPONDENT'S OTHER ANSWERS BELOW.
24. What does Alhaji Adebola tell the workers? PAUSE HERE
AND LET THE RESPONDENT ANSWER THE QUESTION. WHEN HE HAS
ANSWERED OR IF HE HAS NOTHING TO SAY THEN GO ON TO THE
THREE QUESTIONS BELOW:
1. Does he tell them to cooperate with management?
Yes No
2. Does he tell the workers to join a certain political
party?
Yes No
3. Does he urge them to strike?
Yes No
25. What is your religion?
1. Catholic
2. Protestant Anglican, Methodist, Baptist, etc.)
3. Muslim
4. Other
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26. What was the last class you attended in school?
1. Primary I 7. Secondary I
2. Primary II 8. Secondary II
3. Primary III 9. Secondary III
4. Primary IV 10. Secondary IV
5. Primary V 11. Secondary V
6. Primary VI 12. Secondary VI
13. University
27. How old are you?
1. Below 20 4. Between 40 and 50
2. Between 20 and 30 5. Between 50 and 60
3. Between 30 and 40 6. Over 60
28. Who is Mr. Wahab Goodluck?
29. What central labour body does he lead?
1. ULC 3. LUF 5. ILUC
2. NTUC 4. TUCN 6. Doesn't know
7. Other
30. What tribe does Mr. Goodluck come from?
1. Ibo 2. Bini 3. Hausa 4. Yoruba
IF THE RESPONDENT ANSWERS YORUBA, PLEASE ASK HIM THE
FOLLOWING QUESTION:
What part of Yorubaland does Mr. Goodluck come from?
31. What does Mr. Goodluck tell the workers?
PAUSE HERE AND LET THE RESPONDENT ANSWER THE QUESTION.
WHEN HE HAS ANSWERED OR IF HE HAS NOTHING TO SAY THEN
GO ON TO THE THREE QUESTIONS BELOW:
1. Does he tell them to cooperate with management?
Yes No
2. Does he tell the workers to join a certain
political party?
Yes No
3. Does he urge them to strike?
Yes No
32. How long have you been a member of your trade union?
1. One year or less
2. Between 1 and 2 years
3. Between 2 and 3 years
4. Between 3 and 4 years
5. Between 4 and 5 years
6. Between 5 and 7 years
7. Between 7 and 10 years
8. Between 10 and 15 years
9. More than 15 years
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33. Are you a member of a tribal union and do you go to
meetings?
1. I am a member of a tribal union and I tried to go
to all meetings
2. Sometimes I go to meetings of my tribal union
3. I belong to a tribal union but I very seldom
go to meetings
4. I do not belong to a tribal union
34. Where do you plan to settle when you retire from
work?
1. Lagos 3. Other
2. Hometown 4. Don't know_
35. Many people talk about socialism. What is it? What
countries have it?
36. Now speaking as a man who represents your people, what
do you wish Government would do?
37. Next I am going to read you 8 topics of conversation.
PROCEED TO READ THE 8 TOPICS. What I would like you
to do is to pick 4 of the 8 topics which would be the
most likely subjects of conversation with your
townsmen:
1. Need for school buildings 6. High taxes
2. Foreign aid 7. Zik
3. Socialism 8. Elections to
4. Low wages parliament
5. Congo situation_
38. Where did you register to vote in the last federal
election?
1. I registered to vote in my hometown
2. I registered to vote in the town where I
presently work
3. I registered neither in my hometown, nor in
the town where I presently work
4. I did not register to vote in the last election
39. How much do you think an average politician earns in
a year?
40. How much do you think an average man earned before
he became elected to office?
41. Many people have suggested that the salaries of
politicians should be reduced. What should be the
salary per year of a politician?
m
I323
42. Next I am going to read you 8 topics of conversation.
PROCEED TO READ THE 8 TOPICS. What I would like you
to do is to pick 4 of the 8 topics which would be
most likely subjects with your worker friends.
1. Need for school buildings 5. Zik
2. Socialism 6. High taxes
3. Low Wages 7. Elections to
4. Foreign Zid Parliament
8. Congo situation
43. Do you believe trade unionists should support political
parties?
1. Trade unionists should form a labour party
2. Yes, trade unionists should support one of the two
existing political parties
3. Trade Unionists as trade unionists should not mix
in politics, although they may do so as private
citizens
44. In your opinion who is the greatest African leader?
1. Tafawa Balewa 6, Julius Nyerere
2. Jomo Kenyata 7. Haile Selassie
3. Patrice Lumumba 8. Leopold Senghor
4. Abdul Nasser 9. Sekou Toure
5. Kwame Nkrumah 10. Nnamdi Azikiwe
11. Other
45. Who is the greatest living Nigerian leader?
46. Do you support Dr. Otegbeye's or Mr. Imoudu's Party
in the last Federal Election? (which?)
47. Which Party has been most friendly to workers?
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE F
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
The Belief and Disbelief Dimension
Accentuation of differences between the belief and the dis-
belief system:
1. Do the ULC and the NTUC have anything in common?
2. Do the ULC and the LUF have anything in common?
3. Do the LUF and the NTUC have anything in common?
4. Some people have said thatGhana and Nigeria have nothing
in common, what do you think?
5. Some people have said that the United States and the
Soviet Union have nothing in common, what do you
think?
Irrelevance
6. In the discussion of political or economic problems
affecting the union, you often find that members of
your executive bring up irrelevant issues not con-
nected to the point under discussion?
Contradictions
7. Some people have said that in order to safeguard such
democratic practices as freedom of speech and freedom
of association in Nigeria, the government should put
a stop to tribal politics in the trade unions. What
do you think?
KnowledGe
8. Have you found that your reading of Marxist-Leninist
literature enables you to correctly interpret Nigerian
society?
9. Since Marxism-Leninism gives the correct interpretation
do you find that it is a waste of time to read
bourgeois literature?
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Differentiation within the Disbelief System
10. Do you find any differences between the NNA and the
UPGA?
Central Dimension
11. From your own experience have you found that most
people cannot be trusted?
12. Do you find it natural of a person to be fearful
of the future?
13. What do you think of the saying that "it is better
to be a dead hero than a live coward."
Conflict with the Self
14. Do you find that the hardest battles that a man
must fight are those with his own weaknesses?
Inferiority
15. Many people get the feeling, "I am no good at all."
Do you find that true for your own self?
Self Aggrandizement
16. Would you say that the main thing in life is to
want to do something important?
17. If you had to choose between becoming a great man
and being a happy man, which would you choose?
Paranoid
18. Do you find that most people simply cannot be trusted?
19. Would you say that most people are failures because of
the system in which they live?
Authority
20. It has been said that in the history of manking there
have probably been just a handful of really great
thinkers. What do you think?
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Cause
21. It has been said that a man who does not give himself
heart and soul to a political or social movement has
not really lived. What are your own views about this?
22. Is it your view that of all the philosophies in the
world there is only one that is correct?
Renegades
23. Is it your view that in times like these it is often
necessary to be more on guard against ideas voiced
by people in one's own camp than against those of
the opposite camp?
24. Do you find that a group which tolerates too many
differences of opinion among its own members cannot
exist for long?
Disbeliever
25. It has been said that there are two kinds of people
in the world: those who are for the truth and those
who are against the truth. What is your oyn opinion?
Party line
26. Is it your opinion that in this complicated world-of
ours the only way we can know what's going in the world
is to rely on leadership or experts who can be trusted?
Narrowing
27. Is it your view that the best way to live is to pick
friends and associates whose tasts and beliefs are the
same as one's own.
28. There is no use wasting your money on newspapers which
you know in advance are just plain propaganda.
Future
29. Courageous leadership if need be must sacrifice the
welfare of the generation that is now alive for the
sake of the future generations.
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30. To one correctly trained in scientific socialism it
is an easy matter to predict future events.
31. Force cannot be ruled out as a method for putting into
action one's ideology.
